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Abstract 
Privacy has never been an explicit goal of authorization mechanisms. The tradi- 
tional approach to authorisation relies on strong authentication of a stable identity 
using long term credentials. Audit is then linked to authorization via the same 
identity. Such an approach compels users to enter into a trust relationship with 
large parts of the system infrastructure, including entities in remote domains. In 
this dissertation we advance the view that this type of compulsive trust relation- 
ship is unnecessary and can have undesirable consequences. We examine in some 
detail the consequences which such undesirable trust relationships can have on 
individual privacy, and investigate the extent to which taking a unified approach 
to trust and anonymity can actually provide useful leverage to address threats to 
privacy without compromising the principal goals of authentication and audit. We 
conclude that many applications would benefit from mechanisms which enabled 
them to make authorization decisions without using long-term credentials. We 
next propose specific mechanisms to achieve this, introducing a novel notion of 
a short-lived electronic identity, which we call a surrogate. This approach allows 
a localisation of trust and entities are not compelled to transitively trust other en- 
tities in remote domains. In particular, resolution of stable identities needs only 
ever to be done locally to the entity named. Our surrogates allow delegation, en- 
able role-based access control policies to be enforced across multiple domains, 
and permit the use of non-anonymous payment mechanisms, all without compro- 
mising the privacy of a user. The localisation of trust resulting from the approach 
proposed in this dissertation also has the potential to allow clients to control the 
risks to which they are exposed by bearing the cost of relevant countermeasures 
themselves, rather than forcing clients to trust the system infrastructure to protect 
them and to bear an equal share of the cost of all countermeasures whether or not 
effective for them. This consideration means that our surrogate-based approach 
and mechanisms are of interest even in Kerberos-like scenarios where anonymity 
is not a requirement, but the remote authentication mechanism is untrustworthy. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
The purpose of authentication is to verify that a user is who he/she is claiming 
to be. The goal of authorization is to provide access for certain users to cer- 
tain resources based on predefined business rules. An audit trail links actions to 
principals retrospectively. Authentication, authorization and audit trail are three 
traditional concerns in building a privilege management infrastructure (PMI). Tra- 
ditionally, authentication is strong (based long term credentials linked to a stable 
identity) and authorization is linked to audit via the authentication mechanism 
(explicitly using the same long term credential and identity). 
Often authorization decisions are made in electronic services using a stand 
alone application known as a trust management engine [10]. Trust management 
engines are used to aid applications in situations where the application is faced 
with a request for a potentially dangerous action. Long term credentials of re- 
questors are evaluated against policies by the trust management engine before a 
decision is made about the request. For example in a typical role based access 
control scenario [7,35] users present the role server with the user's key certificate 
(which is long term and linked to a stable identity) and prove that the presenting 
user is the legitimate owner of the key certificate. The role server can then consult 
a trust management engine like Keynote [9] or Policymaker [ 10] before activating 
the relevant roles. 
9 
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Traditionally identity management has been a part of the trust management 
envelope. The repeated use of long term digital credentials (by trust management 
engines to make authorization decisions) enables an adversary to correlate all the 
actions of a particular user and then link these actions back to the stable identity 
to which these credentials correspond. Thus an adversary can build a complete 
dossier on an individual [19]. Thieves can steal sensitive personal information, 
terrorists can track their targets using government maintained address records, or 
servers at the far end can leak sensitive information about us. In many instances 
in the past people have suffered damage due to the malicious use of sensitive 
information [4]. One of the problems is that too much information about us is 
stored at too many places, maybe without our explicit knowledge and consent, 
and we do not have a clue how personal sensitive information will be used by 
entities at the other end of the communication channel. Moreover most attacks 
on electronic databases are by insiders and not outsiders [4], and tighter access 
controls cannot prevent an attack mounted by a user with legitimate access to the 
system. 
There is a widely held view (which we discuss further in chapter 2) that the 
rapid erosion of privacy, resulting from the repeated use of long term credentials 
in the electronic world, is a threat. There have been several previous approaches 
(which we discuss in chapter 2) advocating anonymous transactions. The problem 
of using long term digital credentials linked to a stable long term identity has 
well been understood in the world of commercial transactions, and anonymous 
payment mechanisms [19,18] were designed to deal with this. However current 
anonymous payment mechanisms cannot be used to address the threats to privacy 
in the domain of access control systems. Digital cash [19] for example advocates 
complete anonymity and it then becomes difficult for an auditor to link actions to 
principals retrospectively which is a legitimate requirement. 
1.2 Scope of this Dissertation 
This dissertation focuses primarily on the area of access control systems, and 
argues that the exclusive use of long term credentials represents a lost opportunity 
in this area. We propose that many applications would benefit from having ways of 
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making authorization decisions without using long term credentials. We propose 
examples of such mechanisms in this dissertation, using which policies can be 
enforced in access control systems without compromising the privacy of a user. 
Our approaches allows a localisation of trust and entities are not compelled to 
transitively trust [21] other entities which form part of a system. 
This dissertation investigates the extent to which taking a unified approach to 
trust and anonymity can provide useful leverage to address the threat to privacy 
without compromising the principal goal of access control mechanism, which is 
to allow access to a resource to authorized persons and to prevent unauthorized 
access. In our privacy model users reveal their identities to some and conceal 
their identities from others, which is similar to the privacy model proposed in [1]. 
We focus on some prominent role based authorization models with emphasis on 
providing auditable anonymous role activation mechanisms using short lived elec- 
tronic identities. We propose a new layer of anonymity in the current trust man- 
agement systems which can coexist with traditional non-anonymous mechanisms. 
To be precise we concentrate on 
1. Establishing the extent to which un-correlatability is an obvious require- 
ment for authorization systems. 
2. Examining how we can address classical trust management problems in an 
anonymous way. 
These two requirements are not independent, at present we are prevented from 
thinking of the former as there is no way of doing the latter. This dissertation 
provides a happy middle ground between absolute privacy and zero privacy. Our 
approaches are founded on an ability to control both the availability and linkability 
of transactions. One of the interesting aspects of transactions is that we have no 
real control over the actions of the other party, so in order to achieve certainty of 
privacy we use unlinkability as our weapon. 
1.3 Contribution 
In this dissertation we define a new notion of surrogates or short lived electronic 
identities. We construct authorisation mechanisms using these surrogates which 
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are suitable for use with role based access control systems such as RCBS [7], 
NIST model [35] and OASIS [6], which currently rely on authentication using 
long term credentials for activation of roles. We demonstrate how the power- 
ful concept of activation of roles using prerequisites described in [6] can also be 
achieved by combining our surrogate-based authentication mechanisms with ring 
signatures [55]. We also propose an authentication mechanism using our surro- 
gates suitable for object based distributed systems like Globe [52]. 
The designers of various previous anonymous transaction systems [15,43,64, 
14,66] emphasize the property of non transferability i. e. only the owner of a cre- 
dential can use the credential and the credential cannot be delegated for use by 
others. We take issue with such approaches, and investigate ways of supporting 
auditable delegation using our surrogates in the anonymous world. We show how 
our surrogates can be used to combine anonymous authentication with delegation, 
and give some example scenarios where this is beneficial. Our delegation mech- 
anism does not greatly restrict the choice of delegation semantics, although for 
exposition we adhere to Crispo's [25] delegation model in this dissertation. 
We also show that surrogates can be combined with existing electronic pay- 
ment mechanisms without compromising the anonymity of the user. Our surro- 
gate based authentication mechanism allows an unbiased auditor with appropriate 
authority to correlate actions to individuals but a malicious auditor cannot forge 
audit records. Moreover we also show that our surrogates can be combined with 
delegation in such a way as to allow a two level audit mechanism with different 
levels of trust assumptions for an external and internal auditor. Our approaches 
allow a localisation of trust and users are not required to transitively trust [21] 
external entities. These mechanisms turn out to be useful even when anonymity 
is not a requirement because they enable remote authentication mechanism to be 
taken out of the local trust envelope. 
Our surrogates are generated by modular exponentiation of the parent public 
key of the user and the secret value corresponding to a surrogate is generated by 
modular multiplication of the private key with the exponent used to generate the 
surrogate. Surrogates differ from other anonymous or blinded credentials [19, 
12,18,43,15,63] in the way that anonymous credentials need to be certified by 
some authority [15,63], and can be reused [15], or the user needs to get a new 
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credential issued after every single transaction [63]. The surrogates we propose 
are for single use, does not need to be certified and can only be used by their 
legitimate owner. Surrogates are verified by proving that the user/presenter of 
the surrogate has knowledge of the secret that was used to generate the surrogate 
without revealing the secret. The verification authority can verify surrogates but 
cannot masquerade as a legitimate user of the system. 
1.4 Organization 
We start in chapter 2 with a brief overview of various trust management systems 
and anonymous transaction systems. Chapter 3 presents a brief overview of access 
control and authentication systems. In chapter 4 we define the new notion of 
surrogates which is the main contribution of this dissertation. In chapter 5 we 
introduce the basic authorization protocols. We present some mechanisms for 
auditable anonymous delegation in chapter 6. The implications of our work in 
some other application areas is described with some examples in chapter 7. We 
set out our conclusions in chapter 8. 
We have deliberately kept the main body of the dissertation short and included 
additional material in the appendix. The Appendix contains a number of papers 
and a technical report. The first paper entitled "A Palladium Based Solution for Bi- 
partite Trust Management" presents a mechanism which was developed at the very 
early stages of the author's PhD project and which we now regard as a false start. 
This is followed by "Anonymous Authentication" a paper which was presented at 
the Cambridge security protocols workshop in 2004 and will be published in the 
Lecture Notes In Computer Science by Springer Verlag. The paper "Uncorrelat- 
able Electronic Transactions using Ring signatures" where we use ring signatures 
to authenticate users is included next and was presented at the Wholes workshop 
organized by the Swedish Institute of Computer Science. The paper titled "Au- 
thorization for Ubiquitous Computing", which introduces a protocol which can 
be used in systems based on distributed shared objects, was presented at the Con- 
ference on Distributed Processing and Networking organized by Indian Institute 
of Technology. The final item in the appendix is a technical report published by 
the computer science department of the University of Hertfordshire titled "How 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 14 
to deceive Prying Eyes in the Electronic World". 
Chapter 2 
Trust and Anonymity 
2.1 Introduction 
Considerable work has been done both in the area of anonymous transaction sys- 
tems and of trust management. In this chapter we review some prominent pre- 
vious approaches in the light of the research question we are addressing in this 
dissertation. Trust management systems were developed to aid applications in 
making decisions about requests for potentially dangerous actions, based on local 
policies and credentials. For our purposes we divide anonymity techniques into 
two major classes, namely anonymous communication channels and anonymous 
transaction protocols. The former operates at the network layer, the latter oper- 
ates on top of the anonymous channels. Examples of the former are Mixnets [17], 
Mixminion [27] and crowd [54] and examples of the latter are Digital Cash [19], 
Pseudonym systems [18], [20], [55]etc. 
Under various subsections of 2.2 we discuss various trust management ap- 
proaches like Keynote, Independent Trust Entities, Attribute Vector model, Cer- 
tificates, trusted computing, which is followed by a discussion, of anonymous 
communication protocols at the network layer which protects against traffic anal- 
ysis, in 2.3. Section 2.4 reviews anonymous transaction protocols which operate 
on top of an anonymous communication network discussed in section 2.3. Since 
we use ring signatures using RSA keys in some of our protocols, we give a brief 
description of the RSA cryptosystem and ring signatures in sections 2.5 and 2.6 
15 
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respectively. This is followed by our conclusions. 
2.2 Trust Management Approaches 
2.2.1 Trust 
Trust is a complex subject and there is a considerable variation in the meaning 
of trust as used in the literature [38]. Trust is often used to mean reliance i. e. A 
cannot complete A's part of a task unless B completes what is required of B. A 
can validate B's actions and it is asserted in [21] that in this context A does not 
need to trust B although A needs to rely upon B. In the context of the trust man- 
agement system we discuss in section 2.2.2 trust is often used interchangeably 
with authorization and a trust management system was designed to aid applica- 
tions to answer the question "Should we allow to carry out this dangerous action". 
In [38] trust is defined as "the firm belief in the competence of an entity to act 
dependably, securely and reliably within a specified context". It is noted in [38] 
that delegation is an example of a transitive trust relationship, but in contrast it 
is concluded in [21] that trust is not delegation. In this dissertation we adhere to 
the notion of trust set out in [39] which defines trust as a measure of risk i. e. A 
trusts B means that B has the ability to violate A's security policy. We use the 
services of a third party whom we refer to as a partially trusted third party (see 
chapter 4) in the following chapters. Users trust the partially trusted third party to 
aid them to carry out a transaction but the third party cannot forge transactions or 
audit records. In other words the partially trusted third party has the potential to 
violate A's anonymity, but cannot masquerade as A. We attempt where possible 
to avoid transitivity, as it might have adverse and unexpected results [21] in par- 
ticular, all trust relationships are local and users are not required to trust unknown 
entities external to their local domain. In the rest of this section we discuss some 
trust management systems. Systems like Keynote were proposed to address the 
issue of authorisation (which we deal with in this dissertation) in access control 
systems where as independent unbiased trust entities were designed to address the 
issue of privacy. We keep policy specification languages outside the purview of 
this discussion as our proposed approach (see chapter 4) is policy neutral and can 
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be used along with any policy specification language. 
2.2.2 Keynote 
Keynote [9] is the latest version of a trust management approach [10] that initially 
came from Blaze and others at AT&T. Policy maker [10] was also developed by 
the same people and some of them were involved in the development of REF- 
EREE [24] another trust management approach that was developed along with 
researchers from MIT and W3C. We will focus on Keynote here. Keynote works 
more or less like a database query engine. It can function as a stand alone applica- 
tion interfacing with other parts of the system and helping them in making deci- 
sions. Let's lump these other parts of the system together and call them `client ap- 
plications'. Whenever any client application faces the question "Should we carry 
out this dangerous action " then it refers to Keynote for an opinion and based on 
that opinion it decides its future course of action. The application presents the 
Keynote trust management engine with a set of local policies that should be taken 
into account while taking a decision on this particular request, along with the cre- 
dentials of the requestor and details about the proposed action. If the proposed 
action conforms to the local policy then Keynote advises the requestor to proceed, 
otherwise Keynote advises it not to perform this action as it is against the local 
policy. Keynote acts as a compliance checker for the client application. The poli- 
cies are specified in the form of assertions and the actions are specified which are 
evaluated against these assertions. 
Let our policy be that we are only going to allow payment by credit cards to 
those who are authorized to accept them and have the required credentials from 
a bank or a building society which is legally empowered to issue such authoriza- 
tions. A keynote assertion specifying this policy looks like 
Authorizer: "DSA: 1FFG2" # CA's key 
9 Licensee: "RSA: DEF662" # Buyer's key 
" Conditions: "((app-domain = "BUY") "Pay by credit card if seller is au- 
thorized to accept credit cards")" 
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9 Signature: "DSA-SHA1: 1861234" # Signature of the authorizer. 
The sellers need to have digital representation of their authorizations to accept 
credit cards. Lets the seller use a SPKI certificate which can be roughly as 
. Issuer: "RSA 2GG36" # Bank's key 
" Subject: "RSA 7YYH5" # Seller's key 
" Authorization: "Can accept credit cards" 
" Delegation: "No" 
" Validity: "10/02 - 10/09" 
When there is a request by the buyer then the relevant application fetches the rel- 
evant credential of the seller, parses it and presents it to Keynote along with the 
action requested, the id of the requestor and the id of the policy to be consulted 
to make a decision. Based upon this information keynote comes out with a deci- 
sion which is most likely to be positive in the above instance. Keynote perfectly 
enforced compliance with the above mentioned policy but that is not all that we 
want to achieve. Here keynote checks whether the remote host is allowed to accept 
credit cards or not and based on this it gives a decision. But consider a situation 
where there is a corrupt or disgruntled employee who steals credit card numbers 
and uses them, or in other cases people getting access to other information like 
medical records etc. Using Keynote one has to live with the threat of correlation 
of access requests by an adversary. So we shouldn't use a Keynote affirmation to 
wrap the entire organization with a trust blanket when we do not have information 
about the storage and use of records. This static nature of assertions won't be able 
to support a dynamic real world process, where information is accessed and used 
by several different users. 
2.2.3 Independent Unbiased Trust Entities 
Independent unbiased trust entities like TRUSTe, EEF [48] etc. issue a seal that 
is displayed on the websites that do financial transactions online. There are also 
alternative dispute resolution agencies that intervene whenever there is a dispute 
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between the consumer and the seller. These seals are more like the trade licenses 
that we find in most shops or like a safety certificate. For example any boat ply- 
ing on the Trent River has to have some form of authorization from the British 
waterways board and display that, but the fact is that just having a seal doesn't 
guarantee all the employees are trained what to do when there is a man overboard. 
There are checks while issuing such seals or certificates but someone can always 
register and get a seal and later on turn dishonest. We are very skeptical about 
the utility of such practices in the cyberspace as gathering evidence purely in the 
electronic world is very hard to do [57], and a seal cannot act as a guarantee for 
somebody's honesty. Seals can have a psychological effect on the customer who 
doesn't understand the system in much depth. So if we again put the question 
what happens to our personal information, can these trust entities give us a sat- 
isfactory answer? Neither do these seals guarantee proper delivery of goods or 
save the seller from being defrauded. Merchant websites displaying such seals 
can argue that since they are displaying the relevant seals they are expected to act 
properly. The success of these independent unbiased trust entities depends more 
on self regulation which assumes that everyone will benefit by acting honestly. 
The organizations issuing seals have little control over the storage, use and access 
control mechanisms of the target organizations. The seal issuing organizations 
also lack verifiable proof of use and storage of information by the sellers and so 
an element of risk or unnecessary trust is involved between these trust entities and 
the sellers. 
2.2.4 Certificates 
Digital certificates were first proposed by Kohnfelder in his 1978 MIT bachelor's 
thesis [42]. A digital certificate was initially devised after public key cryptogra- 
phy was introduced and the need arose to communicate to principals each other's 
public key. Typically a public key certificate contains information about the issuer 
which may be a certifying authority, the subject whom it is supposed to represent, 
the dates the certificate is valid and related information. This kind of certificate 
could not vouch for the trustworthiness of the subject but is primarily used for 
binding keys to principals [33]. Digital certificates may also be used to check for 
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authorization as in SPKI [32]. As we have seen above in section 2.1, a certificate 
from a bank states whether or not a particular seller is capable of accepting credit 
cards but that is not enough to ensure that our credit card numbers won't be used 
maliciously. Certification schemes depend on a global authority [33]. We need 
detailed assertions about who can be a CA, its authority, revocation services etc 
in order to build a public key authority of some credibility. In the light of these 
problems it can be said that current certificates aren't readily able to address the 
issues which we are interested in like proper use of personal information. More 
over we are yet to build a global certification authority and our proposed schemes 
do not need a global certification authority. 
2.2.5 Attribute Vector Model 
The Attribute Vector Model [60] was developed with the goal of allowing trust 
decisions in pervasive computing. This model incorporated both the traditional 
identity based model and the context based model that is of relevance to pervasive 
computing. In the attribute vector model the degree of trust of an entity Si on Sj 
is derived as 
D(S=, S; ) =f (A(S; )) 
where Si and Sj are separate entities and A is the set of their attributes. Si's degree 
of trust D on Sj is evaluated using a function f which takes the attributes A of 
Sj as an input. Attributes can be traditional credentials or they may be context- 
based attributes like location. The former can be used for traditional computing 
purposes and the later can be used for pervasive computing devices. In the light 
of our question relating to the safety of our personal information now we do not 
think this model can be of much help when applied in the traditional context as it 
operates on credentials and we have seen earlier that credentials aren't meant for 
guaranteeing somebody's trustworthiness. 
Apart from the approaches mentioned above there were other systems like 
PICS [24] which is mostly used for content selection to prevent children from 
visiting pornographic websites. In PILS we do not have the means to specify 
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policies and credentials in the metadata format. PICS looks for labels and based 
on them it approves or disapproves a decision. This kind of system cannot be used 
to get an answer to the questions we started with. Microsoft Authenticode [24] 
was another approach that was developed to tackle a particular trust management 
problem called code signing. Authenticode provides users with the authenticity 
and assurance for accountability for software downloaded over the internet. These 
approaches rely on the use of long term credentials which by itself is a problem 
as discussed above in sections 3.6 and 2.2.2 
2.3 Anonymous Communication Channel 
In this section we discuss the mechanisms which prevent an adversary from fig- 
uring out who is communicating with whom and when, thus preventing traffic 
analysis. This is important as the protocols we describe later on in chapter 3 of 
this dissertation assume the existence of an anonymous communication channel 
between the communicating parties. Here we discuss some approaches to thwart 
traffic analysis by an adversary who can observe all traffic on the network. 
Chaum introduced the idea of using relay servers or remailers or mixes for 
anonymous communication [17]. The first widespread implementation [26] of an 
anonymous communication channel were produced by the Cypherpunks mailing 
list, which was based on the theoretical work on Mixes. Later Mixmaster [45] 
was developed which added some features missing in Cypherpunk remailers. A 
mix network which allows the sender to choose the path is known as a free route 
network where as a mix network which allows only fixed routes is known as a 
cascade network. Cascades provide greater anonymity against an adversary who 
owns many mixes [8] than free routes, but are more vulnerable to blending at- 
tacks [59]. Moreover cascade networks have lower anonymity as the anonymity 
set is limited to the number of messages the weakest node can handle, whereas in 
free networks larger anonymity sets are possible as no mix acts as a bottle neck 
and many mixes handles messages in parallel [27]. 
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2.3.1 Chaum's Mix nets 
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This technique was proposed by David Chaum [17] based on public key cryptog- 
raphy. It allows an electronic mail system to hide who a participant communicates 
with as well as the content of the communication. The system assumes that: 
1. anyone may learn the origin, destination and representation of all messages 
in the underlying telecommunication system and anyone can inject, modify 
or remove messages. 
2. It is difficult to determine anything about the correspondences between a set 
of sealed items and the corresponding set of unsealed items. 
The users of the computer system include not only the communicating partners 
but also a computer called a mix which will process each mail before it is de- 
livered. The sender encrypts a message with the recipient's public key, and ap- 
pends the address of the recipient. The encrypted message and the address of 
the destination are then encrypted using the public key of the mix. If the public 
key of the recipient is If, and that of the mix is K71. then the input to the mix 
is If,,, [RI, If, (RO, M), A, ] where RO and Rl are random numbers used as con- 
founders (the confounder is a random byte string which has been inserted in the 
message and is intended to make chosen and known plaintext attacks more dif- 
ficult) and A, is the address of the recipient and denotes . 
The mix decrypts the 
input using its secret key and then forwards the message to the recipient. The mix 
outputs messages in batches. The goal is to hide the correspondence between the 
input to, and output of, a mix. However if one item is repeated in the input and 
is allowed to be repeated in the output then the correspondence is revealed for 
that item. What is important is that the mix removes redundant copies before the 
output. In case of a single mix the approach is to maintain a record of items used 
in previous batches. 
2.3.2 Onion Routing 
Onion routing [62] is a general purpose communication infrastructure for private 
communication over a public network. It interfaces with off the shelf software 
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and systems through specialized proxies making it easy to integrate into exist- 
ing systems. It operates by building anonymous connections within a network 
of real time Chaum mixes. Onion Routing's network of core onion routers are 
distributed and under multiple administrative domains so that no single router can 
compromise the entire network. Onion routing can be used with both proxy-aware 
and non proxy-aware applications. Onion routing's anonymous connections are 
protocol independent and exist in three phases: 
1. Connection set up- Set up begins when the initiator creates an onion which 
defines the path of the connection through the network. An onion is a data 
structure that specifies the properties of the connection at each point along 
the route. 
2. The next phase is data movement when data travels along the connection 
and each onion along the route uses its public key to decrypt the onion 
it receives. As data moves through the anonymous connection each onion 
router removes one layer of encryption as defined by the control information 
in the onion defining the route. 
3. Connection tear down can be initiated by either end or by the middle. 
2.3.3 Mixmaster: Type 2 Remailer protocol 
Mixmaster's [45] design philosophy is strongly influenced by Chaum's digital 
mixes. Messages are sent as one or more packets. All mixmaster packets are 
of same length and all bits are encrypted with a 3DES [61] key at every hop, so 
no information about the identity of the message is visible to the observer. Even 
a compromised remailer can only know the previous and next locations in the 
chain but it cannot figure out how many preceding hops there were or how many 
following hops there will be. The header for the last remailer in the chain contains 
a flag indicating that it is the last hop, and indicates whether the message is part of 
a multipart message. If it is part of a message then the message ID number is used 
to identify all the other parts. Only the last hop can see that a group of packets 
are part of a single message. If not all parts arrive within a time limit then the 
message is discarded. 
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2.3.4 Mixminion: Type 3 Remailer protocol 
Mixminion [27] a protocol for asynchronous loosely federated remailers addresses 
some of the flaws of Mixmaster while being as flexible as Mixmaster. Mixmaster 
does not support replies while Mixminion introduces a new primitive called sin- 
gle reply use block (SURB) which makes correlated replies as secure as forward 
blocks. In Mixminion the servers themselves cannot distinguish reply messages 
from forward messages. Mixminion uses TLS over TCP for link encryption be- 
tween remailers and use ephemeral keys to ensure forward anonymity for each 
message, where as Mixmaster uses SMTP for transport. Most ISPs do not tolerate 
users who potentially deliver hate mail etc, and this requirement forms a barrier 
to wide scale remailer deployment. Mixminion allows each node to specify and 
advertise an exit policy, where as Mixmaster provides no way for the nodes to 
advertise their capabilities and roles. Replay attack is a serious problem in mix 
networks: Mixmaster keeps a list of old entries but here an attacker just has to wait 
till the server has forgets all its old entries and then replay a message. Mixminion 
addresses this threat using key rotation: a message is sent addressed to a given key 
and after the key changes no messages to an old key will be accepted. Mixminion 
uses synchronized redundant directory servers to provide information about the 
network compared to the ad hoc approach of Mixmaster. There is also a simple 
dummy policy in Mixminion to improve anonymity. 
2.4 Anonymous Transaction Protocols 
2.4.1 Private Authentication in Mobile Networks 
Protocols for private authentication in mobile networks were proposed in [1] where 
communicating parties reveal their identities to each other but not to others in 
a group or third parties. When a mobile principal A wants to communicate to 
another mobile principal B both in the same location then they both exchange 
messages encrypted with their public keys in such a manner that an eavesdrop- 
per cannot detect the presence of either A or B in the area. The protocols in [1] 
cannot be used for the scenarios we deal with in this dissertation as in our cases 
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the communicating partners do not reveal their identities to each other. Moreover 
in [1] two parties always use long term credentials to communicate with each 
other which can be used to correlate actions of a particular principal. 
2.4.2 On iPrivacy and Lumeria 
These systems were developed to protect user's personal information from com- 
panies. iPrivacy is a U. S based company whereby the user downloads software 
from a website [48]. This software encrypts the user's personal details, creates 
a fictitious identity and a one time credit card number, which is matched by the 
credit card company with the real credit card number and then the goods are deliv- 
ered at an address chosen by the customer. With Lumeria [48] all the information 
is stored with Lumeria and the customer accesses the seller via a proxy server of 
Lumeria and can then buy goods online. These schemes can be compared with the 
example that we have mentioned earlier where one trusts his/her doctor to keep 
their medical records safe. We cannot have any verifiable proof about the integrity 
of the software downloaded over the net or the integrity of the company storing 
our personal information. So these kinds of schemes we think are vulnerable to 
abuse in the same way as the previous ones where we keep our information with 
the selling websites. 
2.4.3 Chaum's Digital Cash 
A detail description of digital cash can be found in [19]. The user goes to the bank 
with a signed request called a note; the bank credits the account of the requestor 
after checking the signature on the note. In this scheme users generate the note 
number which the bank cannot see and that's how they ensure that even the bank 
cannot track the spending habits of the user. The note number is unique for every 
different note. After a note has been spent the bank can see the note number 
but cannot figure out to whom the note was issued. Users carry a device called 
representative supplied by the bank to generate the note numbers. There are also 
proposals of implementing an observer in the representative of the user which 
checks against double spending. The anonymity of a user can be compromised if 
he/she tries to spend a particular note twice. This scheme cannot prevent transfer 
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of credentials which is not a problem in case of notes but certainly would be for 
driving licenses, medical prescriptions etc. 
2.4.4 Pseudonyms 
A scheme using pseudonyms or short lived electronic identities was proposed 
in [43]. Here the user generates private and public keys and so do the organi- 
zations. The user goes to the credential issuing organization and generates an 
pseudonym (short lived identity) which is a function of the secret and non secret 
keys of the user and the organization. Credentials contain the nym of the user 
which the user can then use for the purpose the credential is meant for. The user 
has different credentials for different organizations and it can use credentials is- 
sued by one organization while dealing with another organization. Our proposals 
differ from pseudonyms: in our scheme the user is globally represented by his/her 
public key rather than by different pseudonyms, auditable delegation is not possi- 
ble using pseudonyms. 
2.4.5 Idemix 
A description of idemix can be found in [15]. In idemix an user first registers with 
a global pseudonym authority (PA) with which the user registers its pseudonym 
and PA issues a credential stating that the pseudonym is valid. The user then can 
use the pseudonym to get a reference for a credit card payment from a different 
organization. The organization issuing payment tokens trusts the PA. A user can 
then use the payment tokens with other organizations. The user, PA and other 
organizations have to be part of the idemix system: idemix issues IP addresses 
as well as SSL certificates to each of them. Moreover there arises a need for a 
global pseudonym authority which everyone needs to trust. It is our contention 
that building a global pseudonym authority is as difficult as building a global pub- 
lic key authority and both in any case are developments yet to come to fruition. 
Moreover transfer of credentials is not possible in the idemix system. The mech- 
anisms we propose in chapter 5 do not need a global pseudonym authority, as 
trust relationships are more localised e. g students trust their own university net- 
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work administrator. Moreover our mechanisms can coexist along side with non 
anonymous mechanisms and do not need a significant change in the infrastructure. 
2.4.6 Globally Unique Pseudonym 
A scheme for tying attributes to pseudonyms was proposed in [64]. An user con- 
tacts a registrar with a proof of his/her identity. The registrar is not a single entity 
but a group of principals and the user must contact a threshold number of them. 
The registrar then contacts an issuer who issues a globally unique pseudonym to 
the user and binds the pseudonym with the public key for signature and encryp- 
tion which is called a GUP certificate. Issuers like registrars are threshold entities. 
Having threshold entities prevents disclosure of individual information as well as 
registration of multiple entities by a single user. GUP certificates can be used ei- 
ther as a attribute certificate or can be used for commercial purposes. The scheme 
presented in [64] requires a global pseudonym authority and a registration author- 
ity which is similar to trusting a third party with personal sensitive information [4]. 
The schemes we present in this dissertation has a more localised trust relationship 
rather than a global authority. 
2.5 The Rivest Shamir Adleman Cryptosystem 
The RSA crypto-system [56) relies on the difficulty of factoring composites of 
large primes to provide its security. A composite n=p*q is computed, and made 
public, while the two primes p and q are kept secret. A value e where 1<e< (p- 
1) * (q - 1) is chosen at random, and d such that d*e=1 mod (p - 1) * (q - 1) 
is efficiently calculated. The public key is(e, n), whiled, n) is the private key. 
In order to encrypt a message M for the public key (e, n) one simply performs an 
exponentiation modulo n. The ciphertext is therefore 
Me mod n (2.1) 
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To decrypt, the message is simply raised to the power of the decryption key, 
Med mod n=M mod n (2.2) 
Digital signatures can also be implemented. The public verification key is denoted 
(e, n) while the signature key is (d, n). The signer raises the message to be signed 
to the power d as follows 
Md mod n (2.3) 
and the verifier checks the signature as follows: 
Med mod n=M mod n (2.4) 
All operations are performed modulo n. Digital signatures provide integrity prop- 
erties and non-repudiation properties: if the public key of Bob is well known, 
Alice can prove to a third party that Bob has signed a message. We in this disser- 
tation use RSA keys to generate ring signature (see section 2.6). 
One of the major issues in public key cryptosystems is key management. Sev- 
eral techniques have been proposed for the distribution of public keys which are 
as follows 
1. Public anouncement 
2. Publicly available directory 
3. Public key authority 
4. Public key certificates 
For a detailed discussion on key management one can refer to [61,11]. For the 
protocols we propose in this dissertation we do not assume the existence of a 
global public key authority, thus eliminating transitive trust relationships between 
users and global authorities. 
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2.6 Ring Signatures 
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Protocols for our example scenarios 5.4,5.3 and 6.3 make use of a two level 
authentication mechanism where users first authenticate as members of a group 
using ring signatures and then use their surrogates to authenticate as discussed in 
section 4.5. We give a brief description of ring signatures here. Ring signature 
was designed Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Yael Tauman [55]. They call a set 
of possible signers a ring. One of the members of the ring actually signs using 
his/her own private key and the public keys of the other ring members. In this 
signature scheme the verifier doesn't learn who the signer is but can only learn 
that the signer is a member of a certain group of possible signers. In producing 
such a signature the signatory doesn't need the co-operation of any other member 
of the group. The other members do not even have to agree to be in the group. 
All the signer needs to know is the public keys of all the members of the group. 
Unlike group signatures ring signatures do not have any set up procedure, have no 
revocation procedures (but verification depends on ring membership at the time of 
signing), and any user can choose any set of possible signers. What is important 
from the point of view of the protocols we present in this dissertation is that ring 
signature is perfectly signer ambiguous. If there are r members of a ring then it 
is difficult for an adversary to guess the correct signature with a probability more 
than 1/r. Since complete anonymity is not a requirement in our protocols we 
use ring signature in conjunction with our surrogates to enable an auditor to link 
actions to individuals retrospectively. 
The ring member who actually produces the signature is known as the signer 
and other ring members are known as non signers. Each member is associated 
with a public key Pk (via a PKI directory or certificate) and the corresponding 
private key is known as Sk. It is assumed that the ring members use a trapdoor one 
way permutation (such as RSA) to generate and verify signatures. Ring signatures 
have two procedures: 
1. ring - sign(m, P1, P2.... Pr, Sk) : This produces a signature o, on message 
m, given the public keys P1, P2.... Pr of the r ring members and the private 
key Sk of the signer. 
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2. ring-veri f y(m, u) : This accepts a message m and the signature or (which 
includes public keys of all the members of the ring) and outputs either true 
or false. 
Here we describe a ring signature scheme where individual signers use RSA as 
their signature scheme. 
2.6.1 Ring Sign 
Each ring member AZ has an RSA public key Pi = (ni, e;, ) and the trapdoor one 
way permutation fz over Zn; is defined as: 
fi(x) = xei mod n;, 
By the properties of RSA it is assumed that only Ai can compute the inverse per- 
mutation fi-1 efficiently. Since the trapdoor one way permutations of various ring 
members will have domains of different sizes, so for ring signatures all the trap 
door permutations are extended to have a common domain {0,1}b, where 26 is 
some power of two which is larger than all moduli nis. The trapdoor oneway per- 
mutation fz over Zn; is being extended to g= over {0,1}b and a detailed discussion 
can be found in [55]. The signature is generated as: 
1. The signer s first computes a symmetric key as the hash of the message m 
to be signed: 
k= h(m) 
2. Then the signer chooses a random initialization value v uniformly at random 
from {0,1}b. 
3. Next the signer for picks random xi for each other member of the ring, 
1<i<r, i gis, uniformly from {0,1}b and computes yj for each ring 
member where i 's: 
yZ = 9i(Xi) 
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4. Fourth the signer solves the ring equation for ys. The ring equation is a com- 
bining function which takes as input the key k, and the initialization value v 
and values Y17 y2i ..., yr 
in {0,1}b and produces an output z in {0,1}b. The 
combining function is efficiently solvable for any single input: for each s, 
1<i<r, given ab bit value z and values for all the inputs yj except y, it 
is possible to efficiently find ab bit value for ys such that Ck,,, (yl, y2, ..., yr) 
z. In this step the signer solves this equation for ys where z=v. 
Ck, 
v(yl) Y2, ..., yr) =v 
5. Next the signer uses his knowledge of the trapdoor oneway function in order 
to invert gg on ys to obtain x5. 
xs = gsl(x3) 
6. The signature o, on the message is defined as: 
Q= (Pl, P2, ... 3 
Pr; v; xl, ..., xr) 
2.6.2 Ring Verify 
A verifier can verify an alleged signature o on the message m, where 
Q= (Pi, P2) ... 'Pr; xi,... 7Xr) 
as: 
1. First for i=1,2 , ..... the verifier computes 
yt = 9i(Xi) 
2. Second the verifier computes the hash of the message to get the key k as: 
k =h(m) 
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3. Finally the verifier checks whether the yzs satisfy the fundamental equation: 
If the equation is satisfied then the verifier accepts the signature as valid. 
Ck, V(yi, y2, ..., yr) =v 
We have discussed the RSA cryptosystem based on composites in section 2.5 
where we generate inverses of RSA public keys. These inverses are used for 
doing ring signatures as described here in this section e. g. where the private key 
is used to invert the trapdoor one way permutation as shown in step 5 of the ring 
sign operation. 
2.7 Conclusions 
As discussed above trust management systems, independent trust entities or cer- 
tificates cannot guarantee proper use of personal sensitive information. Anonymity 
systems provide a solution to the problem of privacy but cannot be used for mak- 
ing authorization decisions using current trust management systems, as trust man- 
agement systems currently make decisions based on long term credentials like key 
certificates. Long term credentials, on the other hand, enable an adversary to cor- 
relate all the transactions of a particular user, which compromises the privacy of 
the user. In chapter 5 we shall present some alternative mechanisms where trust 
decisions can be made using transient identities or surrogates. 
Privacy enhancing technologies [19,12,18,43,15,63] cannot ignore the fact 
that delegation is a key organizational practice. For anonymity systems to gain 
widespread acceptability they must support delegation. In chapter 6 we propose 
a mechanism using which we can have auditable delegation of credentials in the 
anonymous world. We illustrate the general approach which, we propose, by 
presenting a protocol which can be used in a role based access mechanism to 
authenticate users to roles anonymously. 
Chapter 3 
Access Control and Authentication 
Mechanisms 
3.1 Introduction 
We review some popular access control models relevant to our work in section 
3.2, and describe an approach to access control in a system based on distributed 
shared objects in section 3.3. The delegation model we shall adhere to in this 
dissertation is discussed in section 3.4 and is followed by a brief description of an 
open network authentication system called Kerberos in section 3.5. We describe 
an early version of Microsoft Palladium and our solution based on this Palladium 
architecture in section 3.6 and subsection 3.6.1 respectively. This is followed by 
our conclusions in section 3.7. 
3.2 Access Control Mechanisms 
Access control mechanisms are designed to control access to valuable information 
and are used by the military, the government and large organizations. Their goal 
is to permit authorized access as well as to prevent unauthorized access. In the 
following subsections we give a brief overview of various access control mecha- 
nisms. 
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3.2.1 Mandatory Access Control 
Mandatory access control (MAC) supported both by military and civilian govern- 
ments attaches security labels to objects to be protected and clearance levels to 
the users. This model was first formalised by Bell and La Padula [5] but later on 
Sandhu in [58] presented a minimal model called BLP. In these models access is 
granted on the basis of the security label of the object and the clearance level of 
the user. MAC was developed primarily for the military environment and did not 
permit read up or write down: that is an user with a lower clearance level cannot 
read information with a higher clearance level nor can write objects with a lower 
clearance level. Thus information flow among entities is restricted. The system 
administrator is responsible for maintaining and setting both sets of security lev- 
els. 
3.2.2 Discretionary Access Control 
Discretionary access control (DAC) mechanisms unlike MAC allows users to con- 
trol who has access to their information. Users can delegate their own rights to 
other users. A matrix can be used to represent access to all objects by all users. 
This matrix is known as an access matrix and has a row for every user and a col- 
umn for every object. DAC is more appropriate for static situations where users 
and the objects remain same for a considerable length of time. In organizations 
where users as well as objects change frequently DAC is inadequate [6,7]. 
3.2.3 Role Based Access Control 
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) has been perceived by many [34] as more 
appropriate than DAC to the secure information processing needs of non-military 
systems. The RBAC mechanism is built upon the premise that in large corpo- 
rations individual employees do not own the information they process or have 
access to, the information is owned by the corporation and RBAC mechanisms 
should prevent employees from making unauthorized use of information. Roles 
in RBAC model the roles individuals perform in any organization e. g. in a hospital 
the roles an individual can perform can be doctor, nurse, clinician, pharmacist etc. 
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Roles are a group of permissions that an individual acting in the role can perform 
within the context of the organization. The determination of membership of roles 
and allocation of permissions to roles are in compliance with organization policies 
and not so much at the discretion of the system administrator. These policies are 
based on existing practices, laws, or ethics. The users cannot pass access permis- 
sions on to other users at their own discretion. Authentication of users to roles is 
done using long term credentials like key certificates, role certificates etc. This 
enables an adversary to correlate all the transactions of a particular user. In mech- 
anisms using long term credentials, audit is traditionally linked to access control 
via authentication using the same identity. We show alternative ways of authen- 
tication and audit without using long term credentials in this dissertation. In this 
dissertation we also deal with activation of roles using prerequisites as described 
in [6]. 
NIST model 
The NIST model was proposed in [35]. The NIST RBAC model is organised in 
four step sequence of increasing functional capabilities. The four levels are: 
" Flat RBAC 
. Hierarchical RBAC 
9 Constrained RBAC 
" Symmetric RBAC 
Flat RBAC captures the essential elements of RBAC. Users are assigned to roles 
and permissions are assigned to roles. Flat RBAC has a requirement for role 
review whereby the roles assigned to a specific user can be determined as well as 
the users assigned to specific roles. Flat RBAC also requires that users are able to 
exercise permissions of multiple roles simultaneously. Hierarchical RBAC is for 
supporting role hierarchies. A hierarchy is mathematically a partial order defining 
a seniority relation between roles, whereby senior roles acquire the permissions 
of their juniors. Hierarchical RBAC can support an arbitrary partial order or may 
impose restrictions on the role hierarchy. Constrained RBAC adds a requirement 
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for enforcing separation of duties. Constrained RBAC allows permission role 
review like user role review in Flat RBAC. The NIST RBAC model does not 
directly address the issue of authentication and depends on strong authentication 
mechanisms based on long term credentials. 
RCBS 
The Role and Context Based Security (RCBS) model was proposed in [7]. This 
model introduces permission centric operational Separation of Duty (SoD) con- 
straints which can be built on top of standard RBAC models or can be introduced 
as an additional feature of RBAC models. RCBS introduces the concept of critical 
combination which groups the set of transactions of a task and enforces Per-Role 
Operational SoD, Static Operational SoD and Inheritance in Operational SoD 
between roles with reference to the transactions in the critical combination. The 
application of permission specific constraints as proposed in RCBS allows for 
finer granularity in mutual exclusion between roles. Authentication in RCBS is 
done using role certificates which declares the identity of the user and the roles 
associated with the user. An activation certificate binds the user's identity with 
the names of the activated roles of the current session. The role manager and the 
activation manager generate the appropriate certificates. The certificates can also 
be used for interdomain authentication in the RCBS model. 
OASIS 
The Open Architecture for Secure Interworking Services [6] (OASIS) is an RBAC 
model developed at the University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory. The fea- 
tures of OASIS include session support, prerequisite parameters, context aware- 
ness, flexible delegation with a fast revocation mechanism and distributed oper- 
ation and management. Context awareness is achieved in OASIS either by tag- 
ging roles with parameters which depend on the environment in which the role 
was activated or by the use of environmental predicates. These predicates allow 
information outside the OASIS system to be incorporated in the access control 
decision process. OASIS supports a form of delegation where the assigner can 
transfer rights not held by the assigner e. g. a nurse can assign a doctor the role of 
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treating-doctor although the nurse does not have the rights of a doctor. OASIS 
provides such assignment of rights by mean of appointments. Appointments in 
OASIS can express traditional delegation as well as transfer of rights not held by 
the assigner. In OASIS [6] the assignment of users to roles is handled by role acti- 
vation rules and these rules allow users to enter roles based on valid prerequisites. 
Such prerequisites can be a role, an appointment or an environmental predicate. 
Environmental predicates are powerful enough to express constraints such as sep- 
aration of duties and cardinalities. Every prerequisite can be tagged to make it 
a membership condition and can be revoked. If a revoked role forms part of a 
prerequisite to activate other roles, the revocation of the former can trigger further 
revocation resuting in a cascade. An example scenario [6] is a hospital where the 
role on-duty-doctor can only be activated by a user if the user has already acti- 
vated the role employed_paramedic, local-user and on-duty. Another example 
scenario is a University where the role research-student can only be activated 
by a student if the student has already activated the role student. 
3.3 Distributed Shared Objects 
We live in a world where resources are hardly ever entirely local but are usually 
distributed across various locations. There is seldom a central authority that man- 
ages all access to these resources. Designers of distributed systems generally use 
long term credentials (key certificates) for authentication purposes. This means 
that servers can identify their clients, and can correlate their actions. 
Globe [52] is a wide area distributed system where objects are physically repli- 
cated at several locations. The principal construct in Globe is a Distributed Shared 
Object (DSO) which consists of several local objects residing in local address 
spaces. The local objects storing a part of a DSO's state are known as replicas. A 
replica consists of the following subobjects: 
" Semantics subobject, which is the only subobject written by the application 
developer, and which contains the code that implements the DSO. 
" Communication subobject is responsible for communication between local 
objects residing at local address spaces. 
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" Replication subobject is responsible for keeping the replica's state consis- 
tent with the other replicas. 
" Control subobject is responsible for taking care of the invocations from the 
client process on the host. 
" Security subobject is responsible for implementing the security policies of 
the DSO. 
To invoke a method on a DSO, a user has to create a local object in his/her own 
address space. This object often acts as a proxy routing requests to appropriate 
replicas. The Globe Location Service facilitates finding of replicas. A user willing 
to run a replica or a user proxy needs a Globe Object Server in his/her. computer, 
either stand alone or integrated with other application. 
The current proposals by the developers [52] of Globe are based on certificates 
issued by the DSO owner and follow a role based authorization model. 
3.3.1 Access Control in Globe 
If we model an electronic newspaper as a DSO then the corporate entity running 
the newspaper is the owner of the DSO and determines the security policies for 
the DSO by identifying all the meaningful roles for the object. This involves care- 
ful examination of the application concerned, which is outside the scope of this 
dissertation. Once the user role set is identified for an object then with each user 
role is associated a bit vector indicating the methods the role is allowed to exe- 
cute. Grouping the bit vectors for all the roles of a particular object forms the 
access control matrix for the DSO. This matrix is stored in the security subob- 
ject and when a replica is created it gets the matrix from the owner of the DSO. 
When a role wants to invoke a method on an object the security subobject consults 
this matrix to verify whether or not this role is allowed to invoke this particular 
method. 
The DSO owners sign certificates binding users to their public key, this certifi- 
cate is then used by the user to authenticate themselves while requesting access. If 
there are users with the power to delegate then the security subobject verifies the 
chain of certificates till it reaches the one signed by the DSO owner. The replicas 
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also authenticate themselves to the user, and the replica and the user can start talk- 
ing to each other after they have authenticated to each other. Replicas authenticate 
themselves to the user using replica certificates issued by the DSO owner. 
The disadvantage of using long term credentials by the user to authenticate 
himself/herself arises from the fact that an adversary can correlate all the actions 
of any particular user. This will leak information about any user's online activities 
to an adversary which can be used in a way harmful to the user. We present an 
alternative authentication model in this dissertation whereby an user can authenti- 
cate himself/herself to the replica anonymously and an adversary cannot correlate 
the actions of any user. This we believe is novel because previous approaches to 
authentication rely on long term credentials. Similarly, at present trust manage- 
ment systems like Keynote [9] make decisions based on long term credentials and 
policies. Our new approach doesn't require significant changes to the way authen- 
tications are done at present. The trust management systems can be queried using 
the surrogates [28,25] employed in our approach, and decisions can still be made 
based on fixed or dynamic policies. 
3.4 Controlled Delegation 
Delegation [30,37] is a process by which a principal A authorizes another prin- 
cipal B to act on its behalf by transferring a set of its rights to B possibly for 
a specific period of time. In many organizations, employees higher up the hier- 
archy delegate certain responsibilities to their secretaries or subordinates. Such 
instances are quite common in the real world and so to be useful in the real world 
anonymity systems should support delegation in certain situations. In an organi- 
zation a manager can delegate their secretary the power to act on behalf of the 
manager for a duration chosen by the delegator. 
There are several commercial websites whose customer base consists of peo- 
ple who are legally not allowed to have a credit card (children below 18 yrs). In 
such situations children use their parents' credit card to buy online. Now the prob- 
lem here is that credit card numbers once learnt can be reused. Things become 
more complicated when parents have anonymous credentials instead of credit 
cards: to share anonymous credentials such as those mentioned in [18,43,15,63] 
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the owner also has to share their secret key. This is a major problem in such situ- 
ations where delegation is a legitimate requirement. 
In this dissertation we adhere to the semantics of the delegation model pro- 
posed by Crispo [25] due to the following reasons. The delegation model pro- 
posed by Crispo consider threats posed by the delegator thus allowing space for 
repudiability of actions. The trust assumptions between the delegator and the del- 
egatee are clearly spelt out in the specification of the delegation mechanisms. It is 
hard for the delegator to frame the delegatee as well for the delegatee to frame the 
delegator. It is also emphasized that the principle of consent be explicitly imple- 
mented; thus the delegator delegates only with the explicit knowledge and consent 
of the delegatee. 
In the mechanism we introduce in section 6.4 we ensure that the delegator is 
not able to frame the delegatee nor the delegatee is able to frame the delegator. 
It is also difficult for the delegatee to masquerade as the delegator and an unbi- 
ased auditor can uniquely and irrefutably link actions to individuals without being 
able to forge the audit records. The delegator would no longer be able to use the 
permissions it has delegated. 
3.5 Kerberos 
Kerberos [46] is a trusted third party authentication service and users are referred 
to as the clients of the Kerberos authentication service. Various services (e. g. mail 
services, file servers) trust Kerberos' judgment as to the identity of a user to be 
accurate. We give here a brief description of the current design of Kerberos which 
is followed by an overview of our proposals in section 8.5. 
Kerberos has a top level authentication service issuing Ticket Granting Tick- 
ets (TGT). The TGT contains clients name along with current time, lifetime of 
the ticket, and the client's IP address and is encrypted in a key known only to 
the ticket-granting server and the authentication server. The authentication server 
then sends the ticket, along with another copy of the random session key, and some 
other information, back to the client. Only Kerberos authentication server and the 
client, which is actually derived from the user's password, know this response. In 
order to gain access to a service server, the application needs to build an authen- 
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ticator that contains the client's name and IP address, and the current time. The 
authenticator is sent to a Ticket Granting Service (TGS) along with the TGT and 
TGS verifies the TGT. The TGS, after authenticating the client, constructs a new 
ticket that contains a new session key, the name of the client, and an expiration 
time, all encrypted in the service server's key. Users prove their identity for each 
desired service to the concerned server and server also proves its identity to the 
user. Servers are allowed to keep track of all past requests with time stamps that 
are still valid to counter replay attacks. So what we see is strong authentication 
based on permanent credentials and audit is linked to authorization via the same 
permanent credential used to authenticate. Such an approach gives birth to some 
unnecessary trust assumptions between various entities of the system e. g. clients 
are compelled to trust servers not to enable an adversary to correlate their access 
requests. We discuss the work that can be carried on Kerberos to remove such 
compulsive trust assumptions in our future work section discussed in section 8.5. 
3.6 Microsoft Palladium 
Palladium architecture [16] (now known as NGSCB) was proposed in 2002 by 
Microsoft in association with other companies namely Intel, HP etc. In Palladium 
the public and secret keys of a user are embedded in a chip soldered with the 
microprocessor. This chip is popularly known as a Fritz chip. There is a trusted 
software component called Nexus which communicates between applications on 
top and the keys embedded in the hardware. Applications running on top can 
be divided into trusted and untrusted applications. Applications trusted by the 
user are known as Nexus certified agents or NCAs. Having keys embedded in the 
hardware would enable recipients of messages to be certain about the sender of the 
message and keys would be tied to principals by means of certificates which can 
be retrieved for verification. The problem with such an approach is that it requires 
a global certification authority. Even if there is a global certification authority 
revocation would still be a problem. Once keys are compromised it would require 
users to replace their trusted boxes with a new one. Moreover such an architecture 
does not enable plausible deniability which is a legitimate requirement in certain 
situations [57]. Palladium depends on long term credentials which again is not 
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good for individual privacy. 
3.6.1 Trusted Hardware Based Approach 
As part of our initial attempt to address the problem of anonymity and trust we 
designed a solution using Palladium which is explained in appendix A. Here we 
explain the salient features of this scheme and explain why this approach was not 
pursued further. Trustworthiness of individuals, in our Palladium based approach, 
were ascertained using weights assigned to principals by their peers and a deci- 
sion was made using a simple metric. We assume the Palladium machine will 
prevent rogue applications from stealing passwords and implement the owner's 
(i. e. owner of the keys stored in the box) security policies. There is also a trusted 
third party called AAWS which acts as a repository of information about the users. 
In the example we present in appendix A users get payment tokens form the bank 
before they buy goods electronically from an online merchant. Users authenticate 
themselves to the bank using a certificate issued by the AAWS and the bank is- 
sues payment tokens to the users. We assume that merchants also use Palladium 
machines and those machines are certified by the AAWS. There is a two way rep- 
utation assessment between the merchant and the seller. Customers use weights 
assigned to the merchant by other customers and use a simple metric to ascer- 
tain the reputation of the merchant. Merchants use a compliance checker and the 
certificates issued by the AAWS to the sellers to ascertain the trustworthiness of 
the customers. The users trust the AAWS with personal sensitive information and 
the AAWS issues pseudonym certificates to users which users then present to the 
point where they request access or a service. 
Although the exercise was useful we later realized that the disadvantages of 
such an approach using Palladium outweighs the advantages. Our design does 
not satisfy the requirement that trust should not be transitive [21] and there was a 
need for a global certificate issuing and revocation authority which we believe is 
difficult to achieve and has not happened yet. Moreover systems need to trust the 
authentication mechanism of a third party as in our example merchants need to 
trust the authentication mechanism of the AAWS and the bank. We discuss how 
we can use trusted hardware in our conclusions in chapter 8 where users retrieve 
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and use the keys in the hardware. 
3.7 Conclusions 
The access control and authentication mechanisms discussed in this chapter rely 
on long term credentials for making authorization decisions. Services also depend 
on the authentication mechanism of a trusted third party e. g. various services trust 
Kerberos' judgment about the identity of a requestor and accepts tickets issued 
by the TGS. Such approaches give rise to a unnecessary and compulsive trust 
relationship [39] between principals and services they use as well as between ser- 
vices and the authentication mechanism. The approaches we present in chapter 
5 eliminate such compulsive trust relationships between principals; thus allowing 
principals to independently control the threats they are exposed to. 
Traditionally, in access control mechanisms allowing delegation, authentica- 
tion is linked to audit using long term credentials. This enables an auditor to 
correlate actions with individuals retrospectively. Since anonymity systems do 
not use long term credentials it is difficult to link actions to individuals using such 
credentials; thus making it difficult for an auditor to resolve disputes. Some par- 
tially anonymous mechanisms allowing audit are presented in chapter 5. 
Chapter 4 
Surrogates 
4.1 Introduction 
The generation and use of surrogates is the key contribution of this dissertation. 
In the protocols discussed in chapters 5,6, and 7 we replace long term credentials 
with surrogates or short lived electronic identities; thus allowing identity to be 
taken out of the trust management envelope. In this chapter we discuss our key 
and surrogate generation mechanism. We start by describing our key generation 
mechanism in section 4.2. Since our surrogate generation method depends on the 
difficulty of computing discrete logarithms, we next introduce the discrete loga- 
rithm problem and briefly review some approaches to the solution of this problem 
in section 4.3. In section 4.4 we give a general overview the features of our surro- 
gates which is followed by a description of the method used to generate surrogates 
in section 4.5. In section 4.6 we introduce the assumptions on which we build our 
protocols, and the notations which we use in the following chapters. This is fol- 
lowed by our conclusions in section 4.7. 
4.2 Generation of Diffie-Hellman Keys 
A detailed description of Diffie-Hellman (DH) key systems can be found in [29, 
44], here we give a brief description of generation of DH keys which is as fol- 
lows: the user selects a generator g mod P (i. e. calculating consecutive powers 
44 
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of g generates all the elements in the multiplicative group modulo P) and selects 
a secret sE ZP (i. e. s is an element between 1 to (P - 1)), where ZP is a mul- 
tiplicative group [51] modulo a large prime P. The user constructs his/her public 
key X from the secret s as 
X= g8modP 
It is hard for an adversary to calculate s from X and P as this is the discrete 
logarithm problem (see section 4.3), which is considered to be intractable. The 
user proves ownership of X by proving knowledge of s without revealing s (see 
section 4.5.1). 
4.3 The Discrete Logarithm problem 
The discrete logarithm problem can be described as follows: Let ZP be a multi- 
plicative group. For gE ZZ, the discrete logarithm problem for the group may 
be stated as: 
Given gE ZP and aEZ,, find an integer x such that gX = a. 
Such an integer x is the discrete logarithm or index of a to the base g and is 
denoted as x= ind9a. 
Diffie and Hellman used the discrete logarithm problem in cryptography as a 
source of a one way function in [29]. A one way function f can be defined as 
one for which given a value y=f (x) it is difficult to compute x at least for most 
values of y [51 ]. In their paper Diffie and Hellman proposed as a natural candidate 
a function based on exponentiation modulo a prime. Let P be a large prime and g 
be a generator in ZZ, then f (x) = gX mod P, which is relatively easy to calculate 
using binary expansion [51]. On the other hand inverting the function f clearly 
requires an algorithm for computing discrete logarithm in ZZ which is thought 
to be an intractable problem. One of the early users of one way functions in 
cryptography is Roger Needham [67]. Needham used one way functions to store 
passwords securely in multi-user operating systems. Most operating systems use 
passwords for authentication and if the passwords are stored in a file then the file 
needs to be heavily protected by the operating system, but Needham's approach 
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was to store the values of a one way function applied to the passwords. When a 
user typed in his/her passwords, a one way function was applied to the password 
and the resultant value was compared to the stored value. 
4.3.1 Complexity of Discrete Logarithm 
The security of cryptosystems against computational attacks is dependent upon 
what computations are feasible. The field of mathematics that deals with this is 
known as computational complexity theory and a good introduction can be found 
in a paper by Shafi Goldwasser [51]. Computational complexity theory classi- 
fies computational problems according to their difficulty. If one problem can be 
solved in polynomial time given a solution to another, then we have a polynomial 
reduction between the two computational problems. Such polynomial reductions 
can provide information about the intrinsic difficulty of the problem. For exam- 
ple, the order problem for a finite group generated by g mod P is to find the least 
n>0 such that g" =1 mod P. It is shown in [51] that an algorithm to compute 
the discrete logarithm can be used to solve the order problem in polynomial time. 
Hence it can be said that it is at least as difficult to compute discrete logarithms to 
a base as it is to compute the order of the base in the group [51]. 
There are algorithms for solving the discrete logarithm problem which are as 
follows: 
1. The algorithm that applies for general groups builds all n powers of g and 
then looks up the group elements to find the discrete logarithm and this 
takes n operations to compute the table and O(n) space to store the ta- 
ble [51]. Daniel Shanks improved upon the bounds of this algorithm to the 
running time of O(n'/2logn) and the space' requirement of 0(n'/2) group 
elements [41]. An algorithm was proposed by Pollard [50] which has the 
same running time but very small space requirement. 
2. The second class of algorithms applies to groups whose order has no large 
prime factor. A positive integer is called smooth if it does not have any 
large prime factors. S. Pohlig and M. Hellman proposed an algorithm to 
calculate discrete logarithm where the order of g does not have a large prime 
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factor [49]. The running time for the group operations of the algorithm can 
be given as 
O(Ek 1ci (logn + Pi)) 
where n is the order of g (n and g has been explained above in this section), 
c;, is a random integer and p2 is a prime factor. Once this is done the Chinese 
Remainder theorem can be used to derive the final value of ind9a. 
3. The third class of algorithms are probabilistic rather than deterministic and 
only works for groups endowed with a special structure [51]. The ap- 
proaches in this category are commonly known as Index Calculation meth- 
ods. 
4.4 Surrogates 
Our surrogates are transient numbers generated from a parent number (such as a 
bank account number, credit card number, or social security number) by a partic- 
ular mathematical function similar to that used by David Chaum in the generation 
of group signatures [20]. There are two parts to a surrogate, one is the publicly 
transmitted part and the corresponding private part from which the public part is 
generated. The corresponding private part is known only to the user. In this disser- 
tation we denote the public part as surrogate itself and the corresponding private 
part as the private value. When we use Diffie-Hellman keys, the public part is 
known as the parent public key while the secret value from which the public key 
is generated by modular exponentiation is known as the secret or secret key. In 
this chapter and the rest of this dissertation we use Diffie-Hellman keys unless 
otherwise explicitly mentioned (see sections 5.3 and 5.4), thus whenever we use 
the term parent public key we mean Diffie-Hellman key. 
Although our mechanism for producing surrogates is novel, the concrete sur- 
rogates which it produces have similar properties to those required by the abstract 
notion of surrogate postulated in [25]. Surrogates differ from other anonymous or 
blinded credentials [ 19,12,18,43,15,63] in the way that anonymous credentials 
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need to be certified by some authority [15,63], and can be reused [15], or the user 
needs to get a new credential issued after every single transaction [63]. Our sur- 
rogates are for single use, do not need to be certified, and can be generated by the 
user. We use them for a single transaction and then discard them. Other anony- 
mous credentials [15,43] can be verified by the acceptor if the acceptor knows the 
public key of the issuer. However, the surrogates defined here are used by proving 
that the user/presenter of the surrogate has knowledge of the private part that was 
used to generate the surrogate in a way which does not reveal the private part. 
The surrogates in our protocol can be independently generated by the user 
and by the issuing authority, which is a partially trusted third party in the sense 
of section 2.2.1. However the issuing authority cannot masquerade as the user. 
Other parties (verifiers) can verify surrogates but cannot generate them. Note that 
the verifiers are not in general trusted by the user. The surrogates for a particular 
user are generated from the parent public key of that user. The private value 
corresponding to a surrogate is generated from the secret that was used to generate 
the parent public key. We generate DH keys for different example scenarios and 
then generate surrogates from the Difl'ie-Hellman keys. 
The requirement for surrogates are: 
1. Verifiability - The verifier, who might be the owner of the resource or an 
access granting service, should be able to unambiguously verify that the 
user presenting a surrogate is the legitimate owner of the surrogate. 
2. Un-correlatability - It should be hard for an untrusted adversary to link 
actions to individuals retrospectively even if the adversary manages to ob- 
tain the surrogate used for the transaction along with the transaction details. 
For example if the adversary is a legitimate verifier. Someone observing 
the network should not be able to gain any information about the nature of 
communication and the communicating parties. 
3. Misuse of surrogates - Even if an adversary manages to capture and retain a 
surrogate used for a particular transaction still it should be hard for him/her 
to generate and/or use future surrogates. 
4. Protection from (partially) trusted third party - No adversary should be able 
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to pretend to be a legitimate owner of a surrogate. Although a third party 
generates and issues the information users need to generate and use their 
surrogates, this third party should not be able to masquerade as the legiti- 
mate owner of a surrogate. 
5. Audit - An unbiased partially trusted auditor should be able to link actions 
verifiably and unforgeably to individuals, but only with the explicit knowl- 
edge and consent of the legitimate owner of the surrogate. 
We allow sharing of surrogates (in particular to surrogate delegation) but learning 
them won't help the attacker in any way. Keys and surrogates used by principals 
in the protocols presented in this chapter depend on the difficulty to compute dis- 
crete logarithm. We show how our surrogates satisfy these requirements when we 
describe various example scenarios in the following chapters. 
4.5 Generation of Surrogates 
Suppose that X is a user's Difiie-Hellman public key and s is the secret key from 
which X is generated as shown in section 4.2, where P is a large prime and is 
publicly known. 
A surrogate Ki and its corresponding private value IC are generated from a 
seed Tz E1... (P - 1) by the following equations: 
K= =Tz*smod(P-1) (4.1) 
Ki = XT' mod P (4.2) 
The important point to note is that, because 
gP-l mod P=1 (4.3) 
we have 
9 T'`s = gKi mod P (4.4) 
CHAPTER 4. SURROGATES 
and hence 
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KZ = XT' _ (93)T` = 9K` mod P (4.5) 
The initial value To of the seed and the long term values A and L are supplied by a 
(partially) trusted third party (see section 2.2.1) such as the user's bank, and are se- 
crets shared between the user and the partially trusted third party. The subsequent 
values (Ti) of the seed, used to generate the surrogates and their corresponding 
private values, are generated using the linear congruence equation, 
TZ=(A*Ti_1+L)mod P-1 (4.6) 
Then, using -r i, surrogate I( and the corresponding private value K, for the ith 
transaction are generated from equations 4.2 and 4.1 respectively. 
To use a surrogate If1 for transaction ia user proves knowledge of the corre- 
sponding ICZ .A potential signing mechanism that can be used to prove knowl- 
edge of K= is explained in section 4.5.1. Only the legitimate owner of X and s 
can generate and use surrogates corresponding to X. An adversary or the partially 
trusted third party cannot masquerade as the legitimate owner of X as the corre- 
sponding s is secret to the owner but a partially trusted third party which knows 
the seed rZ can resolve disputes and can correlate transactions conducted with sur- 
rogates generated from X using equations 4.6 and 4.2, thus facilitating auditing. 
However various transactions conducted by the same user cannot be correlated 
with each other by an adversary at the point of use of the surrogates. Learning 
one set of I(, K. - values does not help the attacker in any way, neither can the 
attacker generate the current Kj+, KZ values, nor can the attacker generate future 
surrogates and their corresponding private values. Even if Ti, A and L are compro- 
mised then the adversary might be able to correlate various surrogates. belonging 
to a particular user but cannot masquerade as the user. 
4.5.1 Signing using Surrogates 
To use a surrogate If, ' for transaction ia user proves knowledge of the corre- 
sponding If, -. For every transaction users sign a transaction description T using 
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IC and the signature can only be successfully verified using I(. We describe a 
potential signature mechanism based on El Gamal signature [31] in this section. 
The user signs a hash of the message T [31] but for simplicity we use T here. 
The user signs T using I using El Gamal signature scheme and produces the 
signature (a, b) of T as: 
a= gk mod P (4.7) 
b=(T-If, *a)*(k)-l mod (P-1) (4.8) 
where kE Z(P_1) is secret and known only to the user. Since the signature on 
T can only be verified using I(, the verification authority can be sure that the 
signature has been generated only by the legitimate owner of Ifs and no one else. 
The verification is done as follows: 
gT =ab*Kt''modP (4.9) 
The equation 4.9 can only be satisfied using Iif the signature (a, b) was gener- 
ated using Kq . 
4.6 Notation and Assumptions 
In this section we outline the assumptions on which we build our new protocols. 
The assumptions and notation we outline in this section apply to all the protocols 
we present in chapters 5,6 and 7 unless otherwise explicitly mentioned. 
4.6.1 Assumptions 
For our new protocols we. assume that principals have a public key generated 
from a secret key-using the conventional Difie-Hellman mechanism as described 
in section 4.2. The association between a principal and its public key is known by 
a partially trusted third party e. g. the role server and can be implemented using 
some offline certification authority. Entities can verify the association between 
principals and their keys by fetching certificates and this verification is done with 
CHAPTER 4. SURROGATES 52 
the explicit knowledge and consent of the principal. Ownership of surrogates are 
verified and established by proving knowledge of the corresponding private value 
using the signing mechanism discussed in section 4.5.1. 
Our protocols depend on certain properties about the underlying communica- 
tion channels above which they operate. Since we use our protocols for secure 
web access, and for remote access to distributed objects and as our protocols also 
can potentially be used for commercial purposes, we choose to use Mixminion 
(see section 2.3.4), a secure anonymous communication channel. Mixminion uses 
TLS [61] over TCP [61] for link encryption between remailers and uses ephemeral 
keys to ensure forward anonymity for each message. Mixminion also supports 
replies by the form of SURBs and the replies cannot be correlated with the ini- 
tial message. This enables two way communication between the communicating 
partners 
We also assume the existence of a secure authenticated communication chan- 
nel such as SSL/TLS. SSL/TLS allows for two way authentication, preserves data 
integrity and confidentiality and is widely used. SSL/TLS can also be used for the 
scenarios we describe here in this dissertation for e. g. remote web access, secure 
submission of personal information etc. 
Based on the discussion about complexity of the discrete logarithm problem 
in section 4.3 for our protocols we choose a cyclic group for which computing 
the order is thought to be very difficult. If (P - 1) has small prime factors then 
computing discrete logarithm is easy [49]. For our protocols P is chosen such that 
(P - 1) has one large prime factor. This can be done by choosing a large prime q 
and selecting P as the smallest prime congruent to 1 mod q or by choosing P of 
the form 2q +1 where P and q [23] are both prime. 
4.6.2 Notation 
"P denotes as a large prime with the properties mentioned in section 4.6.1. 
g is a generator modulo P (see section 4.3). P is public and so is g. 
We are going to introduce named individuals and examples in the subsequent 
chapters since it aids the understanding. We use a subscript to the keys to denote 
the user as illustrated next. 
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" Xc represents the Diffie-Hellman public key of Carol. s, represents the 
corresponding secret key of Carol. Xb represents the Diffie-Hellman public 
key of Bob. Sb represents the corresponding secret key of Bob. 
" Kt represents the surrogate used for the ith transaction. K; - represents 
the private value corresponding to the surrogate Ifs . Surrogates are always 
generated from the corresponding user's Difie-Hellman public key unless 
otherwise explicitly stated. 
" PK, represents the RSA public key of Carol. SK( represents the corre- 
sponding RSA private key (see section 2.5). 
" SIG(T) denotes a signature on message T using the mechanism described 
in section 4.5.1. Such signatures are always generated with the private 
value IKE corresponding to the surrogate I( used for the ith transaction. 
RSIG(T) denotes the ring signature (see section 2.6) on message T and 
such signatures are always generated by Carol using SKI. 
" ri denotes the seed used to generate surrogates and is calculated using the 
linear congruence equation 4.6. 
"A and L are the parameters used in the linear congruence equation (see 
equation 4.6) and are global and fixed. 
" -), stands for a secure mutually authenticated communication channel 
with properties similar to SSL/TLS throughout this dissertation. >i stands 
for an anonymous communication channel with properties similar to Mixmin- 
ion throughout this dissertation. 
" Items within -<, >- separated by commas denote individual elements of a 
shuffled message being transmitted and the braces denote the begining and 
end of message respectively. The elements of a shuffled message are ac- 
tually sent in a random order not in the order in which they appear in the 
braces. 
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Surrogates provide a happy middle ground between absolute privacy and zero 
privacy. Since one of the interesting aspects of transactions is that we have no 
real control over the actions of the other party, so in order to achieve certainty 
of privacy we use unlinkability as our weapon. Surrogates provide the ability to 
control both the availability and linkability of transactions. 
In the following chapters we demonstrate how to use our surrogates to address 
the problem of trust and privacy in various electronic services. In chapter 5 we 
integrate our surrogate based authentication mechanism with some prominent role 
based authorisation models which were discussed in section 3.2.3. In chapter 5 
we also show how the powerful concept of activation of roles using prerequisites 
discussed in section 3.2.3 can be achieved using surrogates. Delegation of surro- 
gates is discussed in chapter 6. We also show how surrogates can be integrated 
with payment mechanisms in chapter 7. 
Chapter 5 
Basic Scenarios 
5.1 Introduction 
We have already discussed some role based access models [6,7,35] where long 
term credentials like role certificates or key certificates are used for making au- 
thorization decisions. Applications such as [52] present long term credentials to a 
trust management engine [9] to check whether or not requested actions conform 
to local policies. 
In this chapter we describe some example scenarios where long term creden- 
tials are being used at present for making authorization decisions. The mecha- 
nisms described in the following sections show alternative ways of making autho- 
rization decisions using the transient identities or surrogates described in section 
4.4. Our mechanisms can coexist along with the other non-anonymous autho- 
rization mechanisms being used at present. The surrogates can be used to check 
compliance with local policies by a trust management engine. In our approach an 
issuing authority, e. g. the role server in a role based access mechanism, can com- 
municate policies expressed in terms of roles pertaining to a surrogate or group of 
surrogates to a trust management engine situated at the point where the surrogates 
will be used, and then the trust management engine can make authorization deci- 
sions on requests from the surrogate owners. Our approach adds an extra layer of 
anonymity in the trust management engines which can coexist with current trust 
management architectures. 
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The first example scenario discussing auditable anonymous role activation in 
a role based access control system, is described in section 5.2. Section 5.3 gives 
an alternative mechanism for anonymous activation of roles in the case where 
auditability is not required. This is followed in section 5.4 by a mechanism for 
anonymous activation of roles with prerequisites which allow auditing. We con- 
clude in section 5.5. 
5.2 Scenario 1: Role Based Access Control with Fixed 
Roles 
The role based authorisation model we adhere to in this example scenario was dis- 
cussed in section 3.2.3. Suppose Carol is a subscriber of an electronic newspaper. 
The newspaper uses a role based authorization model where Carol is assigned the 
role of subscriber. The process is same for every subscriber. The subscription 
department (SA) prepares and sends the information Carol needs to generate her 
surrogates. At regular intervals the subscription department also sends to the role 
server (RS) the information needed to authenticate Carol and other subscribers. 
(SA) acts as the partially trusted third party (see section 2.2.1). Every time Carol 
wishes to read a newspaper she first authenticates herself to the local web server 
(WS) using her surrogate for the current transaction, and upon a successful au- 
thentication her role is activated. WS consults a local trust management engine 
before activating relevant permissions for Carol. SA can link Carol's transactions 
but WS cannot. For every different transaction Carol uses a different surrogate. 
The requirementswhich were identified in section 4.4 are as follows: 
1. Verifiability 
2. Un-correlatability 
3. Misuse of surrogates 
4. Protection from (partially) trusted third party (SA here) 
5. Audit 
The protocol has a preparation phase followed by a transaction phase. 
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Carol sends the subscription department (SA) her public XX (see section 4.6) key 
via a secure, confidential and conventionally authenticated channel. Here we use 
a DH key system modulo a prime as described in section 4.2. 
1. Carol -ºs SA : XX = gs° mod P 
Carol uses her surrogates serially from 1. So that Carol does not need to contact 
the SA before every single transaction: SA sends Carol the information she needs 
to prepare subsequent surrogate pairs. 
2. SA -s Carol :S =-< 70, L, A >- 
For each subscriber including Carol, SA generates surrogates by repeating 
equations 4.6 and 4.2 of section 4.5 for successive values of the relevant Ti (see 
section 4.6). SA then sends the web server (WS) a batch containing say m surro- 
gates for Carol. Local policies, e. g. actions which can be performed by this batch 
of surrogates, are also sent by the SA to WS. 
3. SA ->S WS : -< Ki , ...... Km, surrogates for other users >- 
Surrogates of various different customers are sent mixed in a batch. At the end of 
this phase SA retains just the information (Xe, A, r, L) (see section 4.6) for each 
subscriber. 
5.2.2 Transaction Phase 
For transaction ith Carol calculates her ith surrogate Ifs (see section 4.6) and 
its corresponding secret I< using equations 4.6,4.1 and 4.2 of section 4.5. To 
activate her role for her current transaction Carol sends the web server via a secure 
anonymous channel her current surrogate If= and signs a message (see section 
4.5.1) T using the corresponding secret I (see section 4.6). The signature on T 
can only be verified using 1<'i+; thus WS can be sure that Carol is the legitimate 
owner of K2 . 
If the web server finds a similar surrogate has been sent to it by 
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the SA then it grants Carol access. To be specific the WS activates relevant 
permissions for Carol. To ascertain the validity of Carol's request T the WS 
consults the local trust management engine. 
4. Carol -; T1 WS : K, , SIG(T) 
The next time Carol reads the electronic newspaper she uses a different sur- 
rogate to authenticate herself. The web server WS can authenticate Carol anony- 
mously without the issuing authority SA being online. The issuing authority SA 
can periodically send Carol's new surrogates to the web server WS. SA cannot 
masquerade as Carol to WS. 
5.2.3 Analysis 
The desired properties of our system set out in section 4.4 are achieved as follows: 
1. Verifiability - In step 4, Carol sends a transaction description T signed us- 
ing the mechanism discussed in section 4.5.1. The signature can only be 
successfully verified using K, if T was signed using If, -. K, can only be 
successfully generated by Carol using equation 4.1 as s, is known to only 
Carol. Thus the verifier can be sure that the user (Carol here) presenting 
Ifz is the legitimate owner of If t. 
2. Un-correlatability - Different transactions initiated by a particular princi- 
pal cannot be linked to each other or back to the initiator of the transaction 
without the explicit consent of the legitimate owner of the surrogate. Link- 
ing Kt to 1, C, +, and back to XX would require an adversary or WS to solve 
the equation: 
logx, IT = -r;, mod P (5.1) 
and calculate ri+l from ri using the values A and L, as shown in equa- 
tion 4.6. Even if the values A and L were compromised, calculating r by 
solving equation 7.11 is still thought to be an intractable problem. If an 
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adversary cannot calculate Ti then it cannot calculate -i+1 using equation 
4.6 nor the surrogate If +1 using equation 4.2. Thus it is difficult for an 
adversary or WS to link surrogates to each other or to the parent public 
key. Carol communicates with WS via a secure anonymous communica- 
tion channel denoted as ---31; thus it is difficult for an adversary observing 
the communication network to gain any additional information about the 
communicating partners beyond its a priori belief. 
3. Misuse of surrogates - We have discussed in section 4.5 that to use a surro- 
gate Ka Carol has to prove that she knows the corresponding secret If=. 
An adversary stealing the numbers in step 2 cannot masquerade as Carol 
as he/she cannot generate I(Z without knowing s,, which is secret. So an 
adversary between Carol and the SA can never prove knowledge of Kz . 
Moreover calculating s, requires the adversary to calculate 
s, = 1og9 XX mod P (5.2) 
which is widely thought (see section 4.3) to be an intractable problem. 
4. Protection from (partially) trusted third party - The third party cannot mas- 
querade as the legitimate owner of X,, because the corresponding s, is se- 
cret. Calculating s, require an adversary to solve equation 7.12 which is 
widely thought (see section 4.3) to be hard. Moreover even if the value 
of the seed ri is known, still without the knowledge of s, it is hard to gen- 
erate the secret corresponding to a surrogate using equation 4.1. Thus the 
subscription authority cannot masquerade as Carol to WS. 
5.; Audit - It is also difficult for an adversary to activate accounts belonging to 
other subscribers. To activate accounts belonging to other subscribers the 
adversary has to prove knowledge of the secret corresponding to the legiti- 
mate subscriber's surrogate (by signing T). Even if the adversary manages 
to steal the surrogate belonging to a subscriber still he/she cannot prove 
knowledge of the secret corresponding to the surrogate as he/she cannot 
generate K, - using equation 4.1 as sc is secret and calculating s,, requires 
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the adversary to solve equation 7.12 which is widely thought (see section 
4.3) to be an intractable problem. 
The subscription authority or SA initially issues the numbers the subscribers 
use to generate their surrogates in step 2 of the preparation phase and the 
subscription authority also sends WS the surrogates subscribers will use to 
activate their accounts during the preparation phase. SA can generate sur- 
rogates belonging to subscribers using equations 4.6 and 4.2, but SA cannot 
masquerade as a subscriber as it cannot generate the secret corresponding 
to a surrogate using equation 4.1 since s, is secret. Thus, from the surro- 
gate the subscriber uses, SA can resolve disputes retrospectively. SA would 
divulge this link only in circumstances specified under legal authority, such 
as contract, legislation, search warrant or court order. 
5.3 Scenario 2: Activation of Roles Without Auditabil- 
ity 
In example scenario 1 we described a mechanism for anonymous activation of 
roles using surrogates, where an auditor can figure out retrospectively who acti- 
vated a particular role. In this section we present a mechanism for completely 
anonymous activation of roles where an auditor cannot figure out who activated a 
particular role. In our approach we view principals as members of a group which 
may be a subset of all the members of a particular role. To access a resource the 
requestor has to prove that he/she is a member of a group that is allowed access to 
the requested resource. 
We have discussed distributed shared objects (DSO) in section 3.3. The pro- 
tocol we present here can be used to allow users to anonymously authenticate to 
a globe replica. In this example a DSO models the electronic newspaper. In the 
original Globe proposal (see section 3.3.1) the DSO owner would create a role of 
subscriber and issue certificates to paid subscribers. The paid subscribers in turn 
would authenticate themselves to the replica using their certificate and access the 
newspaper. 
A customer, Carol, registers with the subscription authority (SA) as a sub- 
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scriber. Like the previous scenario here (SA) acts as the partially trusted third 
party (see section 2.2.1). This registration requires Carol to prove that she owns 
the corresponding secret key. SA informs the DSO owner about its new subscriber 
Carol along with other new subscribers. Because we are not using surrogates in 
this protocol, the requirements of this protocol are different to the requirements 
we identified in section 4.4. 
The requirements for this protocol are 
1. Verifiability - The verifier, who might be the owner of the resource or an 
access granting service, should be able to unambiguously verify that the 
user is a member of the group. 
2. Un-correlatability - It should be hard for an untrusted adversary to link ac- 
tions to individuals retrospectively even if the adversary manages to obtain 
the surrogate used for the transaction along with the transaction details. For 
example if the adversary is an legitimate verifier. Someone observing the 
network should not be able to gain any information about the nature of com- 
munication and the communicating parties. 
3. Unforgeability - It should be hard for an adversary to masquerade as a le- 
gitimate user of the system. 
The protocol has a preparation phase followed by a transaction phase. 
5.3.1 Preparation Phase 
Carol sends SA her RSA public key PK, (see section 4.6) and proves that she is 
the legitimate owner of the public key. 
1. Carol -ºS SA : PKW 
SA sends WS public keys of various subscribers including Carol's together in a 
batch along with the local policies for the group. 
3. SA -mss DSOowner : -< PKI, ....., PKm > 
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Whenever Carol wishes to activate her role to read the electronic newspaper server 
she has to activate according to policy her role of subscriber by authenticating to 
the security subobject of the DSO. Carol signs a message [T] using ring signature 
(see section 2.6) and her own RSA public key PICA and proves to the security 
subobject that she is a valid subscriber. The security subobject on consulting a 
local trust management engine activates relevant permissions for Carol. 
1. Carol i, Securitysubobject : RSIG(T) 
where RSIG(T) (see section 4.6) is the ring signature of Carol on message T. 
Following successful authentication using the ring signature Carol activates her 
role as a subscriber. 
5.3.3 Analysis 
The desired properties of our system set out in 5.3 are achieved as follows: 
1. Verifiability - In step 1 Carol signs the transaction description T using ring 
signatures described in section 2.6. In the ring signature mechanism it is 
difficult for an outsider to masquerade as a member of a group (see section 
2.6, thus the security subobject can be sure that the signer is a member of 
the group. 
2. Un-correlatability - Different transactions initiated by a particular principal 
cannot be linked to each other or back to the initiator of the transaction with- 
out the explicit consent of the legitimate owner of the surrogate. The DSO 
replica cannot guess the subscriber from the ring signature with a probabil- 
ity more than 1/r where r is the total number of the possible signers. Carol 
communicates with the DSO via a secure anonymous communication chan- 
nel denoted as ->. (see section 4.6); thus it is difficult for an adversary 
observing the communication network to gain any additional information 
about the communicating partners beyond its a priori belief. 
3. Unforgeability - In the ring signature mechanism it is difficult for an ad- 
versary to masquerade as Carol. To sign messages using ring signatures the 
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signer needs to invert a trap door oneway permutation which can only be 
done using SIf, (see section 4.6) where (PIfC * SIC, ) =1 mod q5(n). Only 
the legitimate owner of PIf, knows SIf,. Thus an adversary cannot invert 
the trapdoor oneway permutation corresponding to the public key of a legit- 
imate subscriber. Since ring signature makes it difficult for an adversary to 
masquerade as a member of a group so the security subobject can be sure 
that it is talking to a genuine subscriber. 
5.4 Scenario 3: Anonymous Activation of Roles with 
Prerequisites 
Here we illustrate the use of a two level authentication mechanism, using both ring 
signature (see section 2.6) and surrogates. A two level authentication mechanism 
supports the concept of activate security [6] according to which access control 
decisions depend on context which is monitored e. g. the assignment of users to 
roles is handled by role activation rules which require users to activate roles on 
possession of valid prerequisites. If there is a change in the context in which a 
role was initially activated then the role is revoked. Such an approach helps to 
organize access control systems into an hierarchical structure. 
We have already described OASIS in section 3.2.3. The mechanism we present 
in this section can be used for anonymous activation of roles using prerequisites in 
the OASIS role based authorisation system. In our example here the prerequisite 
for activation of a role is another role. The example we use here emulates access to 
a University Learning and Information Services (LIS) by students. On registration 
all students are assigned the role student and then they are assigned roles based 
on their program of study. For research students they are subsequently assigned 
the role of research-student. The role research. student can only be activated by 
a student if the student has already activated the role student. The LIS consults a 
trust management engine like Keynote [9] before granting specific permissions to 
a user. 
Here students first authenticate as a member of the group of students to activate 
their prerequisite role of student and then use their surrogates to activate specific 
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roles according to their program of study. LIS is accessed by staff as well as 
students and the procedure to activate roles for everyone is same. All users are 
members of a group depending on their affiliation with the university say student, 
staff etc. In order to have a two level authentication we use RSA keys along with 
DH keys. 
The transaction flow can be outlined as: 
1. Carol is a research student and registers with the University learning and in- 
formation services using her public key. She is assigned the role of research 
student by the role server (RS). (RS) acts as the partially trusted third party 
(see section 2.2.1). This registration requires Carol to prove that she owns 
the corresponding secret key. All the students of the University are assigned 
the role of student when they enroll. 
2. Carol first activates her student role before she access the database of print 
and electronic journals provided by the learning and information services. 
3. For activating her student role Carol proves she is a student without reveal- 
ing her identity. She authenticates as a member of the group students using 
ring signature. 
4. She activates her research-student role by presenting her surrogates to the 
LIS. The LIS server consults the local trust management engine to ascertain 
whether or not Carol is allowed to carry out the actions she requested. For 
every different transaction she uses a different surrogate pair. 
5. In case of a dispute Carol's transactions can be linked by the registration 
authority. This helps in auditing. But an adversary at the point of use of the 
surrogates cannot link surrogates belonging to Carol. 
The requirements which were identified in section 4.4 are as follows: 
1. Verifiability 
2. Un-correlatability 
3. Misuse of surrogates 
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4. Protection from (partially) trusted third party (RS here) 
5. Audit 
The protocol is again described as a preparation phase followed by a transac- 
tion phase. 
5.4.1 Preparation Phase 
The preparation phase is similar to scenario 1 described in section 5.2. Like sce- 
nario 1 Carol sends both her DH and RSA public keys to the role server (RS) 
now instead of the SA and the role server like SA sends the LIS, m surrogates 
Carol will be using for m transactions. The process is similar for every sub- 
scriber. Since we use a two level authentication mechanism here RS also sends 
the RSA public key of each individual student to LIS. Like SA of scenario 1, 
RS here only retains (X, A, r, L) for every student at the end of the preparation 
phase and sends LIS the surrogates of various students mixed together in a batch. 
-< PI(1......... PK,, >- denotes the public keys of various students (say n) sent 
together in a batch. 
1. Carol -mss RS : X,: = gsc mod n, PI( 
2. RS - *3 Carol :8 =-< ro, L, A >- 
3. RS --; s LIS : --< IC, 
+, 
....., Km, surrogates for other students >-, PKI, ......., PIf >- 
5.4.2 Transaction Phase 
For transaction i Carol calculates her ith surrogate Ifz and its corresponding se- 
cret K, --using equations' 4.6,4.1 and 4.2 of section 4.5. To activate her role of re- 
search-student for her current transaction Carol first authenticates herself to LIS 
as a member of the group students using ring signature on message T to activate 
the prerequisite role student and then sends the LI S her current surrogate Ki and 
like scenario 1 signs a message T' (see section 4.5.1) using the private part Kz 
CHAPTER S. BASIC SCENARIOS 66 
corresponding to her current surrogate I(. If the LIS finds a similar surrogate 
sent to it by the role server then it grants Carol access. To be specific the LIS 
activates relevant permissions for Carol. To ascertain the validity of Carol's re- 
quest the LIS consults the local trust management engine. LIS cannot correlate 
an instance of ring signature with the surrogate used by a student. 
1. Carol -3,,,, LIS : T, RSIG(T) 
where RSIG(T) is Carol's signature on T using ring signature, and the LIS 
knows the RSA public key of the other members of the group. 
2. Carol ;,,.,. LIS : I(, SIG(') 
5.4.3 Analysis 
The desired properties of our system set out in section 4.4 are achieved as follows: 
1. Verifiability - In step 1 Carol signs the transaction description T using ring 
signatures described in section 2.6. In the ring signature mechanism it is 
difficult for an outsider to masquerade as a member of a group (see section 
2.6, thus the LIS can be sure that the signer is a member of the group. In 
step 2, Carol sends a transaction description T' signed using the mechanism 
discussed in section 4.5.1. The signature can only be successfully verified 
using If, if T was signed using I(. If= can only be successfully generated 
by Carol using equation 4.1 as s, is known to only Carol. Thus the verifier 
can be sure that the user (Carol here) presenting KZ is the legitimate owner 
of IC . 
2. Un-correlatability - Different transactions initiated by a particular principal 
cannot be linked to each other or back to the initiator of the transaction 
without the explicit consent of the legitimate owner of the surrogate. The 
LIS cannot guess the subscriber from the ring signature with a probability 
more than 1/r where r is the total number of the possible signers. Linking 
IC to I+1 and back to XX would require an adversary or LIS to solve the 
equation: 
logic Ki = T= mod n (5.3) 
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and calculate -r +1 from Tj using the values A and L, as shown in equa- 
tion 4.6. Even if the values A and L were compromised, calculating Ti by 
solving equation 7.11 is still thought to be an intractable problem. If an 
adversary cannot calculate T2 then it cannot calculate ri+1 using equation 
4.6 nor the surrogate I, '+1 using equation 4.2. Thus it is difficult for an 
adversary or LIS to link surrogates to each other or to the parent public 
key. Carol communicates with LIS via a secure anonymous communica- 
tion channel denoted as )m; thus it is difficult for an adversary observing 
the communication network to gain any additional information about the 
communicating partners beyond its a priori belief. 
3. Misuse of surrogates - We have discussed in section 4.5 that to use a sur- 
rogate KZ Carol has to prove that she knows the corresponding secret IC=. 
An adversary stealing the numbers in step 2 cannot masquerade as Carol 
as he/she cannot generate KZ without knowing sc which is secret. So an 
adversary between Carol and the RS can never prove knowledge of Ifi . 
Moreover calculating s, requires the adversary to calculate the equation 
7.12, which is widely thought (see section 4.3) to be an intractable problem. 
4. Protection from (partially) trusted third party - The third party cannot mas- 
querade as the legitimate owner of Xc because the corresponding s, is se- 
cret. Calculating s, require an adversary to calculate the equation 7.12, 
which is widely thought (see section 4.3) to be hard. Moreover even if the 
value of the seed TZ is known, still without the knowledge of s, it is hard to 
generate the secret corresponding to a surrogate using equation 4.1. Thus 
the subscription authority cannot masquerade as Carol to the trading server. 
5. Audit -. It is also difficult for an adversary to activate accounts belonging to 
other subscribers. To activate accounts belonging to other subscribers the 
adversary has to prove knowledge of the secret corresponding to the legiti- 
mate subscriber's surrogate (by signing T). Even if the adversary manages 
to steal the surrogate belonging to a student still he/she cannot prove knowl- 
edge of the secret corresponding to the surrogate as he/she cannot generate 
K= using equation 4.1 as s, is secret and calculating s, requires the ad- 
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versary to calculate the equation 7.12, which is widely thought (see section 
4.3) to be an intractable problem. 
The role server or RS initially issues the numbers the students use to gen- 
erate their surrogates in step 2 and the role server also sends LIS the sur- 
rogates students will use to activate their accounts. RS can generate surro- 
gates belonging to subscribers using equations 4.6 and 4.2, but RS cannot 
masquerade as a subscriber as it cannot generate the secret corresponding 
to a surrogate using equation 4.1 since s, is secret. Thus, from the surrogate 
the subscriber uses, RS can resolve disputes retrospectively. RS would di- 
vulge this link only in circumstances specified under legal authority, such 
as contract, legislation, search warrant or court order. 
5.5 Conclusions 
RSA keys when used in conjunction with DH keys help us to have two level 
authentication. In DH key systems modulo a prime it is difficult to keep multi- 
plicative inverses of public keys secret. When both the public key X, and the 
modulus P are public it is easy for anyone to calculate the inverse of XX modulo 
P. RSA key systems modulo a composite can have public keys with an inverse 
and the inverse can be kept secret, because to calculate the inverse of a public key 
an adversary has to factorize a large number which is thought to be an intractable 
problem. A two level authentication mechanism helps us to achieve anonymous 
activation of roles with prerequisites as described in section 5.4 respectively. In 
the two level authentication mechanism described in this dissertation, users first 
authenticate as members of a group using ring signatures and then authenticate 
using surrogates. The two level authentication mechanism in scenario 5.4 allows 
us to have two level audit level mechanism with different trust assumptions for 
the internal and external auditor. The external auditors can attribute actions to a 
group where as only the internal auditor can tie actions to individual DH public 
keys. We develop this notion further in the context of delegation in the chapter 6. 
The mechanisms described above shows the possibility of coexistence of trust 
management and anonymity systems. Applications can answer the question "Shall 
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we carry out this potentially dangerous action" without having too much informa- 
tion about the initiator of the said action in question. This leads to the possibility 
of an extra anonymity layer in the trust management systems e. g. Keynote [9], 
which can coexist with the non anonymous service. The surrogates of a user can 
be presented along with policies and request for the action by the user, to the trust 
management engine and thus policies can be enforced using surrogates. 
The protocol for example scenario 2 does not make use of surrogates and thus 
it differs from other protocols. Here users prove membership to groups using ring 
signatures only. The limitation of such a scheme is that, by preventing an auditor 
from correlating actions belonging to a particular user, it does not facilitate fair 
dispute resolution. Protocols like scenarios 1 and 3 allow an auditor to figure out 
retrospectively who used a particular surrogate pair. 
It is worth noting that identity resolution is local in our system. Only the RS 
can link a surrogate to its corresponding public key and an external auditor cannot. 
An external auditor can link a surrogate to its corresponding public key only with 
the help of the RS. We believe this is significant as users do not need to have 
trust in the honesty and competence of an unknown external auditor; users in our 
system trust only their local entities (e. g. the RS here) whom they know. However 
the external auditor can prove to a arbitrary third party that a member of the group 
activated his/role role. 
The protocols we have presented here preserve the privacy of the user. For 
the protocol using two level authentication mechanism in scenario 3 we use ring 
signature, which is purely signer ambiguous and an adversary cannot determine 
the signer with a probability more than (1/r). Linking surrogates with a public 
key, in any of the protocols, requires calculating discrete logarithm, which is an 
intractable problem. It is difficult for an outsider to masquerade as a legitimate 
member of a group in scenario 3 as that would involve factorizing large numbers 
which is thought to be an intractable problem. 
Chapter 6 
Delegation 
6.1 Introduction 
Traditionally correlation of transaction records and identity theft has been the pri- 
mary concern for the designers of anonymity systems [63,15,64]. Such systems 
do not allow principals to share their credentials, which we believe prevent princi- 
pals from delegating their credentials. However it is often a legitimate real world 
requirement that users are able to delegate their credentials in an auditable man- 
ner. The approach which we take here does not greatly restrict the choice of the 
delegation semantics which can be adopted, although for exposition we adhere 
to Crispo's [25] delegation model in this dissertation. We have already reviewed 
Crispo's delegation model in section 3.4. 
Like our mechanisms discussed in chapter 5 we assume that principals have a 
public key generated from a secret using conventional Diffie-Hellman as discussed 
in section 4.2. The association between a principal and its public key can be ver- 
ified by a partially trusted third party. Similar to chapter 5 we also assume the 
existence of a confidential anonymous communication channel and a secure au- 
thenticated communication channel for our protocols. Users in the new protocols 
presented in this chapter generate surrogates with properties discussed in section 
4.4 using the method discussed in section 4.5 Using the approach we describe in 
this chapter users can delegate their surrogates without the delegatee being able to 
figure out the secret used to generate the surrogate or reuse the surrogates of the 
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delegator. 
We start in section 6.2 with a mechanism allowing delegation where it is dif- 
ficult for an auditor to link actions to individuals. In section 6.3 we present a 
mechanism for delegation where we use ring signatures and a two level authenti- 
cation mechanism similar to scenario 3 described in section 5.4. The delegation 
protocol we describe in section 6.4 does not depend on ring signatures and has 
stronger properties than the one presented in section 6.3. We conclude in section 
6.5. 
6.2 Scenario 4: Fully Anonymous Delegation -1 
The role based authorisation model we use here has been discussed in section 
3.2.3. The transaction flow for this protocol is similar to the one described in 
section 5.2, the difference being is that here it is hard for an auditor to figure 
out retrospectively who used a particular surrogate pair. This protocol uses a DH 
key system as discussed in section 4.2, and the users only use their surrogate to 
authenticate. Though here it will be hard to figure out whether it was the delegator 
or the delegatee who used a particular surrogate pair but the auditor can figure out 
the owner of the surrogate pair. The requirements which were identified in section 
4.4 are as follows: 
1. Verifiability 
2. Un-correlatability 
3. Misuse of surrogates 
4. Protection from (partially) trusted third party (RS here) 
5. Audit 
The protocol has a preparation phase followed by a transaction phase. 
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Carol sends the role server (RS) her public key via a secure, confidential and 
conventionally authenticated channel. Here we use a DH key system modulo a 
prime as described in section 4.2. 
1. Carol -;, RS : XX = gsc mod P 
Carol uses her surrogates serially from 1. So that Carol does not need to contact 
the RS before every single transaction: RS sends Carol the information she needs 
to prepare subsequent surrogate pairs. 
2. RS ->s Carol :5 =- < To, L, A >- 
For each subscriber including Carol, RS generates surrogates by repeating 
equations 4.6 and 4.2 of section 4.5 for successive values of the relevant r2. RS 
then sends the bulletin board (BB) a batch containing say m surrogates for Carol. 
Local policies, e. g. actions which can be performed by this batch of surrogates, 
are also sent by the RS to BB. 
3. RS --mss BB: -< Ki , ...... Ifm, surrogates for other users >- 
Surrogates of various different customers are sent mixed in a batch. At the end of 
this phase RS retains just the information (Xe, A, r i, L) for each subscriber. 
6.2.2 Transaction Phase 
For transaction ixh Carol calculates her ith surrogate Ifs and its corresponding 
secret Ift i. ising equations 4.6,4.1 and 4.2 of section 4.5. To activate her role 
for her current transaction Carol sends the bulletin board via a secure anonymous 
channel her current surrogate IfZ and signs a message (see section 4.5.1) T using 
the corresponding secret Ifs. The signature on T can only be verified using Kt ; 
thus BB can be sure that Carol is the legitimate owner of If1 . 
If the bulletin board 
finds a similar surrogate has been sent to it by the RS then it grants Carol access. 
To be specific the BB activates relevant permissions for Carol. To ascertain the 
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validity of Carol's request T the BB consults the local trust management engine. 
While Carol is away from her office for one day she can send her secretary the 
surrogate and its corresponding secret next in the series via a secure authenticated 
channel thus enabling her secretary to access the bulletin board on her behalf. Like 
Carol now her secretary can prove the knowledge of Kz but for the ith transaction 
only and learning one pair of surrogates wont help her secretary in any way. 
4. Carol -- ), Secretary : Ki , Kz 
5. Secretary gym BB : Ifz , SIG(T) 
6.2.3 Analysis 
The desired properties of our system set out in section 4.4 are achieved as follows: 
1. Verifiability - In step 5, Carol's secretary sends a transaction description T 
signed using the mechanism discussed in section 4.5.1. The signature can 
only be successfully verified using IKi if T was signed using IIz . 
IKz can 
only be successfully generated by Carol using equation 4.1 as s, is known 
to only Carol. Thus the verifier can be sure that the user presenting Kt is 
the legitimate owner of Ifz or has been authorised by the owner of Kz to 
use the surrogate. 
2. Un-correlatability - Different transactions initiated by a particular princi- 
pal cannot be linked to each other or back to the initiator of the transaction 
without the explicit consent of the legitimate owner of the surrogate. Link- 
ing Ail to K +1 and back to Xc would require an adversary or BB to solve 
the equation: 
logx, KZ = rz mod P (6.1) 
and calculate Ti+l from -ri using the values A and L, as shown in equa- 
tion 4.6. Even if the values A and L were compromised, calculating -ri by 
solving equation 7.11 is still thought to be an intractable problem. If an 
adversary cannot calculate T= then it cannot calculate TZ+1 using equation 
4.6 nor the surrogate K -t1 using equation 4.2. Thus it is difficult for an 
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adversary or BB to link surrogates to each other or to the parent public key. 
The user communicates with BB via a secure anonymous communication 
channel denoted as -4m; thus it is difficult for an adversary observing the 
communication network to gain any additional information about the com- 
municating partners beyond its a priori belief. 
3. Misuse of surrogates - We have discussed in section 4.5 that to use a surro- 
gate KZ Carol has to prove that she knows the corresponding secret If, -. 
An adversary stealing the numbers in step 2 cannot masquerade as Carol 
as he/she cannot generate K, - without knowing s, which is secret. So an 
adversary between Carol and the RS can never prove knowledge of If, -. 
Moreover calculating sc requires the adversary to calculate 
sý = logg XX mod P (6.2) 
which is widely thought (see section 4.3) to be an intractable problem. 
4. Protection from (partially) trusted third party - The third party cannot mas- 
querade as the legitimate owner of Xc because the corresponding sc is se- 
cret. Calculating s, require an adversary to solve equation 7.12 which is 
widely thought (see section 4.3) to be hard. Although the value of the seed 
T= is known, still without the knowledge of s« it is hard to generate the se- 
cret corresponding to a surrogate using equation 4.1. Thus the subscription 
authority cannot masquerade as Carol to BB. 
5. Audit - It is also difficult for an adversary to activate accounts belonging to 
other subscribers. To activate accounts belonging to other subscribers the 
adversary has to prove knowledge of the secret corresponding to the legiti- 
mate subscriber's surrogate (by signing T). Even if the adversary manages 
to steal the surrogate belonging to a subscriber still he/she cannot prove 
knowledge of the secret corresponding to the surrogate as he/she cannot 
generate K= using equation 4.1 as s, is secret and calculating s, requires 
the adversary to solve equation 7.12 which is widely thought (see section 
4.3) to be an intractable problem. 
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The role server or RS initially issues the numbers the subscribers use to 
generate their surrogates in step 2 of the preparation phase and the role 
server also sends BB the surrogates subscribers will use to activate their 
accounts during the preparation phase. RS can generate surrogates belong- 
ing to subscribers using equations 4.6 and 4.2, but RS cannot masquerade 
as a subscriber as it cannot generate the secret corresponding to a surrogate 
using equation 4.1 since sc is secret. Thus, from the surrogate the subscriber 
uses, RS can resolve disputes retrospectively. RS would divulge this link 
only in circumstances specified under legal authority, such as contract, leg- 
islation, search warrant or court order. 
The drawback in this scheme is that although the RS can figure out the 
owner of a surrogate but it cannot uniquely identify who used a particular 
surrogate. We address this issue in section 6.4. 
6.3 Scenario 5: Auditable Anonymous Delegation - 
2 
Let us assume that users in an organization are members of various groups, e. g. 
managers belong to a group labeled as managers where as secretaries belong 
to a group labeled as secretaries. Carol is a manager in an organization and 
she uses her surrogates to authenticate, and check or submit announcements in 
the company bulletin board once every day. The organization uses a role based 
authorization model where Carol is assigned the role of manager. When she is out 
of her office she can ask her secretary to login and check or post notices. 
We propose-a two layered authentication mechanism where an user first au- 
thenticates as ämember of a group say managers or secretaries and then uses 
his/her surrogates to check or post notices in the bulletin board. We have briefly 
introduced the features of a two level authentication mechanism in section 5.4. 
We assume that Carol's secretary also calculates her own public private RSA key 
pair. Users authenticate as a member of a group using ring signatures as described 
in section 2.6. For example while Carol's secretary is authenticating as a member 
of the group secretaries then he/she does so using the public keys of the other 
CHAPTER 6. DELEGATION 76 
secretaries and his/her own private and public key pair. 
The second layer or the authentication using surrogates helps the auditor to 
figure out the owner of a particular surrogate while the first layer or group au- 
thentication helps the auditor to figure out who used a particular surrogate pair. 
For example if Carol herself is using the bulletin board she first authenticates as 
a member of the group managers and then uses her surrogate pairs. The auditor, 
from the group Carol used to authenticate, can figure out that it was a manager 
who accessed the bulletin board and from the surrogate can figure out that the 
surrogates belong to Carol. If Carol's secretary is using the bulletin board with 
surrogates delegated to her by Carol then she first authenticates as a member of 
the group secretaries and then uses the surrogates delegated by Carol. Here the 
auditor, from the group a secretary uses to authenticate, can figure out that it was 
a secretary who accessed the bulletin board and from the surrogates can figure 
out whose secretary accessed the bulletin board. No user can authenticate as a 
member of a different group and this facilitates fair dispute resolution. 
1. Carol is assigned the role of manager by the role server (RS). RS acts 
as a partially trusted third party and performs the same functions as RS of 
scenario 3 discussed in section 5.4. 
2. RS prepares and sends the information Carol needs to generate her surro- 
gates. 
3. Carol generates the required number of surrogate pairs which depends on 
the number of days she will be out of office. We assume that her secretary 
will log in to the bulletin board once every day thus requiring one surrogate 
pair each day. 
4. Carol passes the surrogates to her secretary. This transfer of credentials 
between Carol and her secretary is done via a secure authenticated com- 
munication channel thus enabling Carol to prove later on that it was her 
secretary who used the surrogates in cases of dispute. 
5. While using the bulletin board Carol's secretary first authenticates as a 
member of the group secretaries using ring signatures with her RSA key 
pair. 
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6. Carol's secretary can only use the surrogates and she learns nothing about 
Carol's secret key s, in the process. 
7. The bulletin board maintains an audit record containing the surrogates and 
the name of the group the user belongs to. 
8. The next time Carol uses the bulletin board she authenticates as before. 
Anyone who learns the value of a surrogate cannot do any harm to Carol. 
The requirements which were identified in section 4.4 are as follows: 
1. Verifiability 
2. Un-correlatability 
3. Misuse of surrogates 
4. Protection from (partially) trusted third party (RS here) 
5. Audit 
The protocol is again described as a preparation phase followed by a transaction 
phase. 
6.3.1 Preparation Phase 
The preparation phase is similar to scenario 1 described in section 5.2. Like sce- 
nario 1 Carol sends both her DH and RSA public keys to the role server (RS) 
now instead of the SA and the role server like SA sends the BB, m surrogates 
Carol will be usingfor m transactions. The process is similar for every subscriber. 
Since we use-a two level authentication mechanism here RS also sends the RSA 
public key of each individual student to BB. Like SA of scenario 1, RS here 
only retains (X, A, T1, L) for every subscriber at the end of the preparation phase 
and sends BB the surrogates of various subscribers mixed together in a batch. 
-. < PK,......... PIC, a >- denotes the public keys of various subscribers (say n) sent 
together in a batch. 
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1. Carol -h RS : XX = gSc mod n, PKW 
2. RS -4s Carol :b =-< To, L, A >- 
3. RS - 3s BB : --< Ki , ....., Ifm, surrogates for other subscribers >-, -< PKI, ......., PI >- 
6.3.2 Transaction Phase 
For transaction i Carol calculates her ith surrogate Ki and its corresponding se- 
cret If, using equations 4.6,4.1 and 4.2 of section 4.5. To activate her role for 
her current transaction Carol first authenticates herself to BB as a member of 
the group manager using ring signature on message T to activate the prerequisite 
role and then sends the BB her current surrogate Kz and like scenario 1 signs 
a message T' (see section 4.5.1) using the private part Kt corresponding to her 
current surrogate K= . 
If the BB finds a similar surrogate sent to it by the role 
server then it grants Carol access. To be specific the BB activates relevant per- 
missions for Carol. To ascertain the validity of Carol's request the BB consults 
the local trust management engine. BB cannot correlate an instance of ring sig- 
nature with the surrogate used by a subscriber. While Carol is away from her 
office for one day she can send the secretary a surrogate pair next in the series 
via a secure authenticated channel thus enabling her secretary to access the bul- 
letin board on her behalf. Now her secretary first authenticates as a member of 
the group secretaries using ring signatures with her own public key and public 
keys of other secretaries and then proves knowledge of K, -. Her secretary signs 
T using Ifs and. the signature can only be verified using Ifi . 
Learning one pair 
of surrogates wont help her secretary in any way. The secretary cannot correlate 
other transactions of Carol. 
4. Carol -s Secretary : Kz , 
Ifs 
5. Secretary >i BB : RSIG(T), SIG(T') 
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The desired properties of our system set out in section 4.4 are achieved as follows: 
1. Verifiability - In step 5 Carol's secretary signs the transaction description T 
using ring signatures described in section 2.6. In the ring signature mech- 
anism it is difficult for an outsider to masquerade as a member of a group 
(see section 2.6, thus the BB can be sure that the signer is a member of 
the group. In step 5, the secretary also sends a transaction description T' 
signed using the mechanism discussed in section 4.5.1. The signature can 
only be successfully verified using If= if T was signed using ICE. I can 
only be successfully generated by Carol using equation 4.1 as s, is known 
to only Carol. Thus the verifier can be sure that the user presenting Ifz is 
the legitimate owner of Ki or has been authorised by the legitimate owner 
of IIZ to use the surrogate. 
2. Un-correlatability - Different transactions initiated by a particular principal 
cannot be linked to each other or back to the initiator of the transaction 
without the explicit consent of the legitimate owner of the surrogate. The 
BB cannot guess the subscriber from the ring signature with a probability 
more than 1/r where r is the total number of the possible signers. Linking 
I( to K +1 and back to X, would require an adversary or BB to solve the 
equation: 
1ogx, Ki = Tz mod n (6.3) 
and calculate Ti+l from -rr using the values A and L, as shown in equa- 
tion 4.6. Even if the values A and L were compromised, calculating Ti by 
solving equation 7.11 is still thought to be an intractable problem. If an 
adversary cannot calculate -rz then it cannot calculate j+1 using equation 
4.6 nor the surrogate K +1 using equation 4.2. Thus it is difficult for an 
adversary or LIS to link surrogates to each other or to the parent public 
key. Carol communicates with BB via a secure anonymous communica- 
tion channel denoted as --- m; thus 
it is difficult for an adversary observing 
the communication network to gain any additional information about the 
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communicating partners beyond its a priori belief. 
3. Misuse of surrogates - We have discussed in section 4.5 that to use a sur- 
rogate K, Carol has to prove that she knows the corresponding secret K. -. 
An adversary stealing the numbers in step 2 cannot masquerade as Carol 
as he/she cannot generate KC without knowing s, which is secret. So an 
adversary between Carol and the RS can never prove knowledge of If, -. 
Moreover calculating s, requires the adversary to calculate the equation 
7.12, which is widely thought (see section 4.3) to be an intractable problem. 
4. Protection from (partially) trusted third party - The third party cannot mas- 
querade as the legitimate owner of XX because the corresponding s, is se- 
cret. Calculating s, require an adversary to calculate the equation 7.12, 
which is widely thought (see section 4.3) to be hard. Moreover even if the 
value of the seed TZ is known, still without the knowledge of sc it is hard to 
generate the secret corresponding to a surrogate using equation 4.1. Thus 
the subscription authority cannot masquerade as Carol to the trading server. 
5. Audit - It is also difficult for an adversary to activate accounts belonging to 
other subscribers. To activate accounts belonging to other subscribers the 
adversary has to prove knowledge of the secret corresponding to the legiti- 
mate subscriber's surrogate (by signing T). Even if the adversary manages 
to steal the surrogate belonging to a student still he/she cannot prove knowl- 
edge of the secret corresponding to the surrogate as he/she cannot generate 
If; - using equation 4.1 as s, is secret and calculating s, requires the ad- 
versary to calculate the equation 7.12, which is widely thought (see section 
4.3) to be an intractable problem. 
The role server or RS initially issues the numbers the students use to gener- 
ate their surrogates in step 2 and the role server also sends BB the surrogates 
subscribers will use to activate their accounts. RS can generate surrogates 
belonging to subscribers using equations 4.6 and 4.2, but RS cannot mas- 
querade as a subscriber as it cannot generate the secret corresponding to a 
surrogate using equation 4.1 since s, is secret. Thus, from the surrogate 
the subscriber uses, RS can resolve disputes retrospectively. RS would di- 
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vulge this link only in circumstances specified under legal authority, such 
as contract, legislation, search warrant or court order. The drawback of this 
scheme is that the secretary can further delegate Carol's surrogates without 
the explicit knowledge or consent of Carol. We address this issue in the 
following protocol. 
6.4 Scenario 6: Auditable Anonymous Delegation - 
3 
There are several commercial websites where users can log in and watch movies 
by paying a monthly or yearly membership fee. Such a website will require a 
user to register with their credit/debit card number to become a member. The aim 
of registration is to produce an identification token that binds one of the user's 
conventional identities (credit card) to a bit pattern (login name) which uniquely 
identifies the user in the computer system [22]. So long as a member wishes to 
continue his/her subscription, his/her login name remains the same. Every time 
a member wishes to watch a movie they authenticate using the fixed login name 
and password. So long as a particular member account is valid and active there is 
no limit to the number of movies a member can watch. 
However it is a legitimate real world requirement that adult members allow 
their children (below 18) to watch a movie using the credentials of their parents. 
We refer to the principal that delegates as the delegator, and the principal that acts 
using the credentials of the delegator is referred to as the delegatee. The problem 
in this scenario is that once a child has learnt the fixed login name and password 
of his parents he . can reuse 
them at a later date without the explicit knowledge 
or consent of his parents. Using the following protocol users can share their cre- 
dentials in such a way that it is difficult for the delegatee to reuse credentials of 
the delegator. This protocol is for authorization and not for payment. We discuss 
implications of our protocols in the design of payment mechanisms in chapter 7. 
The transaction flow is as follows: 
1. Carol registers with the bank with her public key. 
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2. Payment is handled between the bank and the merchant. The bank prepares 
and sends the information Carol needs to generate her surrogates. 
3. For the ith transaction Carol prepares her ith surrogate and sends to Bob in 
such a way that only Bob can use it. 
The requirements which were identified in section 4.4 are as follows: 
1. Verifiability 
2. Un-correlatability 
3. Misuse of surrogates 
4. Protection from (partially) trusted third party (RS here) 
5. Audit 
6.4.1 Message Exchanges 
Carol generates her public key XX using equation ?? from her secret s, and simi- 
larly Bob generates his public key Xb (see section 4.6) as: 
Xb = g8' mod P (6.4) 
where Bob's secret key is Sb. 
Carol registers with the bank using her public key and the bank sends her the 
information she needs to generate her surrogates. 
1. Carol -ýS bank : X. 
2. bank )s Carol : -< ro, L, A >- 
On receipt of Carol's public key the bank selects To, LE ZP as described in 
section 4.5. So that Carol does not need to contact the bank before every sin- 
gle transaction, the bank sends Carol the information she will need to prepare m 
surrogate pairs using the equations 4.6,4.1 and 4.2. 
Carol uses her surrogates serially from 1... m. 
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For each member, the bank sends the merchant m surrogates by repeating 
equations 4.6 and 4.2 for each of the next m values of i. Surrogates of various 
different customers are sent together in a batch as, 
3. bank -ýs merchant : -< K+ i... m) 
Kfýi..., 
n) >- 
where IC, (t ml 
denotes surrogates belonging to Carol and Kfit ml 
denotes surro- 
gates belonging to some other customer. In the rest of the paper we refer to Carol's 
ith surrogate as If= and the corresponding secret as K, -. 
For the ith transaction Carol generates the exponent Ti, the secret correspond- 
ing to the ith surrogate Kz and her ith surrogate I( using equations 4.6,4.1 and 
4.2 respectively. Carol selects a random value rE Zp and blinds Bob's public 
key as 
(Xb) r= (gsb)r mod P (6.5) 
Carol signs M= (Xb)' using I( using the signature scheme discussed in 
section 4.5.1 and produces the signature SIG(M). Carol sends to Bob via a secure 
anonymous channel the following: 
4. Carol -; 71 Bob : r, 1<-i+, SIG(M) 
Bob generates M by repeating equation 6.5 with the r he receives from Carol and 
verifies that M is being signed by someone who knows the secret corresponding 
to I( using the method discussed in section 4.5.1. Thus Bob can also be sure that 
Carol has signed his blinded public key and not something else. 
Bob generates his secret corresponding to his blinded public key as: 
Sb = Sb *r mod (P - 1) (6.6) 
and generates the signature a', b' of transaction description T using the method 
discussed in section 4.5.1. Bob sends the merchant via a secure anonymous com- 
munication channel 
5. Bob ),,, Merchant: M, SIG(M)KZ , T, SIG(T) 
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where M is Bob's blinded public key. 
The merchant has access to the list of surrogates the bank had sent in step 3. 
This can be thought of as similar to a revocation list proposed in public key infras- 
tructures. Thus it is difficult for an someone who is not a customer of the bank to 
forge a transaction with random Diffie-Hellman public keys. The merchant veri- 
fies that M is being signed someone who knows the secret corresponding to Kt 
using the verification method discussed in section 4.5.1. Only when Bob proves 
knowledge of the secret 3b corresponding to M does the merchant accept the fact 
that Bob has been authorised to use Ifil by the legitimate owner of I. 
6.4.2 Analysis 
The desired properties of our system set out in section 4.4 are achieved as follows: 
1. Verifiability - In step 5, Bob sends a transaction description T signed us- 
ing the mechanism discussed in section 4.5.1. The signature can only be 
successfully verified using M if T was signed using sb. sb can only be 
successfully generated by Bob using equation 4.1 as Sb is known to only 
Bob. Thus the verifier can be sure that the user presenting M is the legit- 
imate owner of M or has been authorised by the owner of Ki to use the 
surrogate. 
2. Un-correlatability - Different transactions initiated by a particular princi- 
pal cannot be linked to each other or back to the initiator of the transaction 
without the explicit consent of the legitimate owner of the surrogate. Link- 
ing I< to K i'+1 and back to XX would require an adversary to solve the 
equation 
1ogx, KZ = Tz mod P (6.7) 
and calculate Ti+l from Ti using the values A and L, as shown in equation 
4.6. The values A and L are shared between Carol and the bank. It is 
difficult for someone other than the bank to calculate Ti by solving equation 
7.11 is thought to be an intractable problem. If an adversary cannot calculate 
Tt then it cannot calculate Tz+1 using equation 4.6 and the surrogate using 
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equation 4.2. Thus it is difficult for an adversary to link surrogates to each 
other or to the parent public key. An auditor can only link surrogates back 
to the parent public key with the explicit knowledge and consent of the 
legitimate owner of the surrogates. 
3. Misuse of surrogates - We have discussed in section 4.5 that to use a sur- 
rogate I( Carol has to prove that she knows the corresponding secret KZ . 
An adversary stealing the numbers in step 2 cannot masquerade as Carol 
as he/she cannot generate KZ without knowing sc which is secret. So an 
adversary between Carol and the bank can never prove knowledge of Ifz . 
Moreover calculating s, requires the adversary to calculate 
s, = logg XX mod P (6.8) 
which is widely thought (see section 4.3) to be an intractable problem. 
4. Protection from (partially) Trusted Third Party- The (partially) trusted third 
party cannot masquerade as the legitimate owner of XX as the corresponding 
s, is secret. Calculating sc requires an adversary to solve the equation 
logg X. = s, mod P (6.9) 
which is thought to be hard. Moreover even if the value of some exponent r 
is known, still without the knowledge of s, it is hard to generate the secret 
I< corresponding to a surrogate Kt using equation 4.1. Thus the bank 
cannot masquerade as Carol to Bob. 
5. Audit - The bank can generate the surrogates using equations 4.6 and 4.2 
and in cases of dispute involving a surrogate the bank can determine the 
owner of a surrogate; thus an auditor with appropriate authority can uniquely 
and irrefutably link actions to principals. Although Carol can decide who 
can use the surrogate, she herself cannot use the surrogate she has delegated 
and pretend that it was actually used by the delegatee, as 5b is secret. 
If If, is not delegated then Carol will use it by signing T with K, -. It 
is in Carol's interest to delegate by signing the blinded public'key of Bob 
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else Bob can frame Carol or further delegate Carol's surrogate. If a signed 
blinded public key can be verified using I( then an auditor can be sure that 
Carol signed it as K= is only known to Carol. Carol cannot masquerade as 
Bob since Sb is secret and known only to Bob. Bob also cannot masquerade 
as Carol as K= is secret and known only to Carol. 
Thus it is difficult for Carol to frame Bob or for Bob to frame Carol. Al- 
though an auditor can link actions to principals still it cannot forge audit 
records as it cannot generate Carol's or Bob's signature in steps 4 or 5 re- 
spectively. 
In the protocol described in this paper, identity resolution is local; neither 
the bank nor the merchant need to know Bob's identity. There can also be 
two different auditors, one who links the surrogate back to Carol while the 
other can prove that it was Bob who used it. This is significant because 
all trust is now local and Bob does not need to trust the bank or the mer- 
chant with personal information in order to use the service of the merchant. 
This has implications in the design of role based authorisation systems: us- 
ing mechanisms like ours users can activate roles across domains without 
revealing personal information and auditors can still link actions back to 
the original user. An external auditor can link actions back to originating 
domain but linking the individual user requires the co-operation of an audi- 
tor trusted locally. Thus users have control over their personal information 
without compromising the goals of audit and authorisation. 
6.5 Conclusions 
'Contrary to the previous approaches mentioned under section 2.4 we show here 
that one can transfer credentials in the anonymous world without revealing the 
secret from which the credential was generated. Transferability in turn allows del- 
egation. We can have both auditable and non auditable transfer of credentials in 
the anonymous world using our approaches. In the protocols presented in sections 
6.2 and 6.3 although it is possible for an auditor to detect the owner of a surro- 
gate retrospectively it is hard to determine who used a surrogate. Moreover once 
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the surrogate has been delegated Carol can still use the surrogate and frame her 
secretary in the protocol discussed in sections 6.2. Moreover Carol cannot control 
who can use the surrogate and her secretary can well share Carol's surrogate with 
others. 
In the protocol discussed in section 6.4 Carol delegates her surrogate in such 
a way that only Bob can use it. If ICS is not delegated then Carol will use it by 
signing T with K, -. It is in Carol's interest to delegate by correctly signing the 
blinded public key of Bob else Bob can frame Carol or further delegate Carol's 
surrogate. If a signed blinded public key can be verified using K1 then an auditor 
can be sure that Carol signed it as Kt is only known to Carol. Carol cannot 
masquerade as Bob since sb is secret. Bob also cannot masquerade as Carol as 
K, is secret and known only to Carol. Thus it is difficult for Carol to frame Bob 
or for Bob to frame Carol. By signing the blinded public key of Bob Carol can 
specify that only Bob can use the surrogate; thus preventing Bob from further 
delegating Carol's surrogate. To further delegate Carol's surrogate Bob needs to 
share his secret key. 
For the protocols discussed in this chapter the bank can generate the surrogates 
using equations 4.6 and 4.2 and in cases dispute involving a surrogate the bank can 
detect the owner of a surrogate, but cannot masquerade as the legitimate owner of 
XX as the corresponding s, is secret. Calculating s, requires an adversary to solve 
the equation 
logy XX = s, mod P (6.10) 
which is thought to be hard. Moreover even if the value of the exponent Tq is 
known still without the knowledge of s, it is hard to generate the secret cone- 
sponding to a surrogate using equation 4.1. Thus the bank cannot masquerade as 
Carol to Bob or to Carol's secretary. 
In the protocol described in section 6.4 identity resolution is local, neither the 
bank nor the merchant need to know Bob's identity. There can also be different 
auditors one who links the surrogate back to Carol while the other can prove that 
it was Bob who used it. This is significant because all trust is now local and Bob 
does not need to trust the bank or the merchant with personal information although 
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Bob can use the service of the merchant. This has implications in the design of 
role based authorization systems. Users can activate roles across domains without 
revealing personal information and an auditor can still link actions back to the 
original user. An external auditor can link actions back to the user only with 
the co-operation of an auditor trusted locally. Thus users have control over their 
personal information without compromising the goals of audit and authorization. 
Chapter 7 
Implications And Extensions 
7.1 Introduction 
Although this dissertation has been primarily concerned with access control our 
work has implications in other areas such as electronic payment, price discrimi- 
nation, licensing enforcement. If users access a service by using their surrogates 
then to pay for the service there should be ways of tying the payment tokens to 
their corresponding surrogates for auditing and accounting purposes. Similarly 
for price discrimination if a buyer can prove using his/her surrogate which price 
band he/she belongs to, and the buyer is the legitimate owner of the surrogate, 
then price discrimination can be done with online transient identities, thus pro- 
tecting offline identities. In this chapter we present some approaches where we 
tie payment tokens to surrogates, and show a way of charging different prices to 
different customers using transient identities. We assume as usual the existence of 
a secure anonymous channel, a secure, confidential authenticated communication 
channel, and prime numbers with the same properties as in the previous chapter, 
for the examples we present in this chapter. 
We give a description of how we generate payment tokens in section 7.2. In 
section 7.3 we show a way for charging different prices to different users which 
is followed in section 7.4 by a protocol which ties payment tokens to our surro- 
gates. In section 7.6 we present a mechanism which allows sharing of payment 
tokens between principals which is followed by conclusions in section 7.7. Prin- 
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cipals in our protocols generate surrogates as described in section 4.5 and use 
either conventional Dife-Hellman keys as described in section 4.3 or generate 
keys as described in ??. We do not advocate a particular payment mechanism in 
this dissertation. Other existing payment mechanisms can be combined with our 
surrogates using the protocols similar to those we present in this chapter 
Our protocols depend on certain properties about the underlying communi- 
cation channel above which they operate. We assume the existence of a secure 
anonymous communication channel like Mixminion and a secure authenticated 
communication channel like SSL/TLS, both with the properties discussed in 5. 
We start with a description of the method we use to generate payment tokens 
in section 7.2. The first scenario deals with price discrimination and a protocol 
which can be used for charging different prices to different customers is described 
in section 7.3. We show a way of tying the payment tokens to the surrogates in 
section 7.4 which is followed by a protocol using which one can share payment 
tokens in section 7.6. We conclude this chapter in section 7.7. 
7.2 Pseudonymous Payment Tokens 
Here we give a brief overview of how we generate and use payment tokens in 
the following examples. Our payment tokens build on the Information checking 
protocol proposed in [53]. The bank in our protocol randomly selects three num- 
bers So, B0 and YOE Zp (where P is a large prime) and generates the subsequent 
Si, Bi and Y by exponentiating So, B0 and Yo respectively using an exponent 
a i. The initial value of a, uo is selected by the bank. The subsequent values of 
the exponent o, used to generate the surrogates and their corresponding secret are 
generated, by the riser, using the linear congruence equation as, 
Q= = (A * aj_1 + LQ) mod (P - 1) (7.1) 
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where A and Lv are selected by the bank and are fixed. Then, using Qi the subse- 
quent Si, B;, and Y values are generated as: 
Si = So' mod P (7.2) 
Bz = Bö' mod P (7.3) 
Y= Yo" mod P (7.4) 
Finally using the following equation we calculate CT using the Si, Bi and Y val- 
ues. 
Ci=Si +Bi *Ymod P (7.5) 
The payment token that the customer presents consists of the Bi and C= corre- 
sponding to a particular Si and Y value. The bank sends the customer B0, and 
the information to generate subsequent B2 values. So that the customer does not 
have to contact the bank before every transaction the bank prepares and sends 
the customer m, C values prepared using equations 7.1,7.2,7.3,7.4 and 7.5 and 
sends the customer mC values and B0 value along with A and LQ values. S, B, 
Y and C values are used serially from 1.. m. The bank retains So, Yo, A and La 
values. For transaction i the customer calculates Bi values using the information 
sent by the bank and the bank calculates the corresponding Si and YY values. The 
customer presents the bank the corresponding Bi value it calculates and the Ci 
value sent by the bank. The bank verifies equation 5 using, the B and C value 
sent by the customer and the S and Y value it calculates. If equation 7.5 is sat- 
isfied then the bank accepts the payment tokens B2 and Cz as valid. It is hard for 
an adversary who, does not posses the correct B0, A and LQ values to generate B 
and C values corresponding to a particular S and Y value, thus making stealing 
of payment tokens difficult. 
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7.3 Scenario 7: Price Discrimination using On Line 
Identities 
7.3.1 Motivation 
The issue of deployment and use of anonymizing technologies is analogous to a 
non zero sum game where the players' (merchants and users) interests are not al- 
ways in direct conflict to each other but there are opportunities for both to gain. 
Both the merchants and the customers have incentives to support techniques (e. g. 
differential pricing) that facilitate optimal resource allocation. In games like this 
where the players have common interests it is unlikely that there will be any de- 
ployment and use of anonymizing technologies, unless there is an agreement be- 
tween merchants and the users [2]. A model where everybody (merchants as well 
as the user) has the incentive to cooperate is more likely to be accepted [2]. The 
merchants need to cooperate because deployment of fully anonymizing techniques 
involves a switching cost on the part of the merchant. 
The users and the merchants both have incentives in the deployment and use 
of medium anonymity systems. Medium anonymity systems support techniques 
(price discrimination) that makes the economy stronger without violating the pri- 
vacy of the customer. Merchants can also increase their customer base by offering 
privacy conscious customers the use of anonymizing technologies. It has been 
argued in [65] that when merchants face privacy conscious customers they will 
adopt measures to protect the privacy of the customer. Its been reported in [3,13] 
that if sellers share information about taste and the buying habits of customers, 
then "market laws alone might produce pareto-optimal outcomes" [2].. While [3] 
states that the buyer can benefit from the seller knowing him better which is good 
for the society, [36] concludes that the use of pseudonyms helps both the soci- 
ety and the individual. So one can say based on these studies [3,36,65] that 
differential pricing based on online identities can be effective. The merchants as 
well as the users both have incentives to cooperate in the deployment and use of 
such anonymizing technologies. We talk very briefly about some anonymizing 
technologies that permit differential pricing in the next section. 
Why settling for medium anonymity systems is good for both the merchants 
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and the sellers can be more explicitly formalized through the principle of sub 
optimization: 
"Local optimization in general does not lead to global optimization. " [40] 
We use the term local optimization in this context to mean procedures or designs 
intended to provide absolute anonymity i. e. systems which does not allow a third 
party to correlate transactions belonging to any particular user, under any condi- 
tion. By global optimization we mean a globally optimal cooperative arrangement 
i. e. optimal allocation of resources. Since differential pricing facilitates an opti- 
mal allocation of resources [47] so widespread use of technologies that do not 
facilitate price discrimination might create a less efficient economy. Thus the sub 
optimizing decision (absolute anonymity) is inconsistent with the globally opti- 
mizing one (efficient economy). 
7.3.2 Transaction Flow 
In our protocol a principal (Carol) proves they are entitled to a student discount 
and then pays for her rail ticket using payment tokens. The amount is eventually 
charged Carol's credit card. The payment tokens are different for every transaction 
and various payment tokens cannot be linked either to each other or to the user 
except by the credit card company. Before the protocol run there is a preparation 
phase where: 
1. Carol registers with a Local Education Authority (LEA) with her public key 
as a student. This registration requires Carol to provide supporting paper 
documents'the details of which are outside the scope of this paper. 
2. The customer Carol requests payment tokens from her bank. The bank pre- 
pares and sends the information Carol needs to generate her payment tokens. 
These payment tokens are not specific to any particular product. These pay- 
ment tokens can be used for purchasing various products. 
During the protocol run: 
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1. Carol authenticates to the rail company that she is entitled to a students' 
discount. 
2. Carol generates the payment tokens. 
3. Carol pays for her tickets with the payment tokens. 
4. The payment is authorized similar to the way credit cards are authorized at 
present. The authorization decision is communicated to the seller. 
Every time Carol authenticates to the rail company that she is entitled to a stu- 
dents' discount she doesn't need to give any personal sensitive information to the 
vendor. The payment tokens cannot be linked to Carol by the vendor. The guard 
in the train can verify Carol's entitlement to her ticket without Carol disclosing 
personal sensitive information. The requirements which were identified in section 
4.4 are as follows: 
1. Verifiability 
2. Un-correlatability 
3. Misuse of surrogates 
4. Protection from (partially) trusted third party (RS here) 
5. Audit 
7.3.3 Preparation 
This phase is not specific to the rail tickets application. Registering with the Local 
Education Authority (LEA) is required for other situations (for example for a 
waiver of council tax from the county council) and the payment tokens issued by 
the bank can be used to buy other goods also. 
Registering with the LEA 
Carol sends her RSA public key PK, to the LEA, using a secure, conventionally 
authenticated channel. 
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1. Carol ->s LEA : PKW 
Once Carol proves that she is the legitimate owner of PK, PKW is added to 
the list of valid public keys of students. Under normal circumstances Carol is 
known as PK, in the public list maintained by the LEA so long as she remains 
a student. Carol also registers with the bank with her public key PKc. Carol 
will have surrogate pairs K2 and Ki , generated 
from XX as described in section 
4.5, to support applications where Carol needs to prove that she has a valid bank 
account. Two different surrogates of Carol cannot be linked to Carol without the 
active cooperation of the bank. It is hard for an adversary to deduce XX from Ki . 
Registering with the Bank 
Carol registers with the bank using her DH public key X,. 
1. Carol -) Bank : XX = gSc mod P 
So that Carol doesn't need to communicate with the bank for every single transac- 
tion the bank prepares m payment tokens using equations 7.1,7.2,7.3,7.4 and 7.5 
It sends customer only the m Ci values along with the information Carol needs 
to prepare the corresponding Bi values. Only the bank can generate the Si and Y 
values. The bank sends Carol: 
2. Bank ), Carol :A= --< Cl,,,,,., Bo, ao, L, A, P >- 
The bank retains the B2 value Carol will be using for her first transaction while 
issuing A The bank always calculates the B value the customer will be using for 
his/her next transaction subsequently after the first transaction. When the seller 
submits the customer information for authorization to the bank, the bank locates 
the proper customer information using the B value. 
At the end of this phase the bank does not retain all the S, Y and B values 
but only the initial generators So, Bo, Yo, along with o, the offset L, and the 
constant A to generate subsequent 0T values. The bank retains the information IF 
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=- Kb , So, Bo, Y0, Lo, B1, A, ao, X, P >- 
Carol shares a secret key with the bank Sth. 
7.3.4 The Protocol 
For transaction i the exponent az is calculated using equation 7.1 and then Bi is 
calculated using equation o= by equation 7.3. 
Carol creates a message M containing journey details and indicates that she is 
a student and wants a discounted price. Carol signs M using ring signature with 
X and H along with the public keys of the other members of the ring. H is used to 
invert the trapdoor oneway permutation described in step 5 of section 2.6.1. Carol 
send the seller 
1. Carol gym Seller : -< RSIG(T) >- 
where Pi are the public keys of the other ring members. The seller verifies the 
signature as mentioned in section 2.6.2 and if the ring equation is satisfied then 
the seller is happy to offer a students' discount to Carol. In this process the seller 
has no idea regarding the identity of the signer. The seller signs a transaction 
description T and sends that to Carol 
2. Seller Carol : [T']Kseller 
If Carol is happy with ' and wants to pay she sends the calculated B2 value 
and the corresponding Ci value to the seller along with V. T' is being encrypted 
using the secret key Carol shares with the bank and only the bank can decrypt Ti'. 
3. Carol -->, n Seller :< Ifz , SIG(T'), Bt, C2 > 
T' is encrypted to prevent the seller from changing the values of T'. The seller 
contacts the bank, the bank locates the appropriate customer with the help of the 
B value. We have mentioned in the preparation phase that the bank calculates in 
advance the B value a particular customer will be using next. This is done by the 
bank at the end of each transaction. For the first transaction the bank retains the 
first B value while issuing the tokens. The bank calculates the corresponding S 
and Y values from A and solves the equation C2 = Si + Bz *Y for transaction 
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i. If the equation is satisfied by the B and C values presented by the customer 
the bank agrees to the transaction. This process ensures that the seller receives his 
payment. 
4. Seller -ýS Bank :- [T']s,,, B17 Ci 
5. Bank -ýS Seller : -< Ti', AuthorizationDecision >- 
The seller can be sure that the customer didn't change the value of ' when it gets 
' back from the bank in the last step. The bank then calculates the B value the 
customer will be using for the next transaction using equation 7.1 and 7.3. 
7.3.5 Analysis 
The desired properties of our protocol set out in section 4.4 are achieved as fol- 
lows: 
Verifiability - If equation 7.5 is satisfied then the bank accepts the payment 
tokens B. and Ci as valid. It is hard for an adversary who does not posses 
the correct Bo, A and LQ values to generate B and C values corresponding 
to a particular S and Y value. 
The signature can only be successfully verified using I( if T' was signed 
using Kz. Ki can only be successfully generated by Carol using equation 
4.1 as s, is known to only Carol. Thus the verifier can be sure that the user 
(Carol here) presenting Kt is the legitimate owner of IfZ. 
In the ring signature mechanism it is difficult for an outsider to masquerade 
as a member of a group (see section 2.6, thus the verifier can be sure that 
the signer is. a member of the group. 
2. Un-correlatability - Different transactions initiated by a particular princi- 
pal cannot be linked to each other or back to the initiator of the transaction 
without the explicit consent of the legitimate owner of the surrogate. Link- 
ing Ifz to Kt, and back to XX would require an adversary or the merchant 
to solve the equation: 
1ogh, Ift = TZ mod P (7.6) 
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and calculate 7-j+1 from r using the values A and L, as shown in equation 
4.6. Even if the values A and L were compromised, calculating ri by solving 
equation 7.11 is still thought to be an intractable problem. If an adversary 
cannot calculate T= then it cannot calculate Tj+1 using equation 4.6 nor the 
surrogate K +1 using equation 4.2. Thus it is difficult for an adversary or 
the merchant to link surrogates to each other or to the parent public key. 
Carol communicates with merchant via a secure anonymous communica- 
tion channel denoted as )t; thus it is difficult for an adversary observing 
the communication network to gain any additional information about the 
communicating partners beyond its a priori belief. The merchant cannot 
guess the subscriber from the ring signature with a probability more than 
11r where r is the total number of the possible signers. Linking the pay- 
ment tokens BZ and CZ with BZ+1 and Cj+1 also requires the adversary to 
solve the discrete logarithm problem which is thought to be intractable (see 
section 4.3). 
3. Misuse of surrogates We have discussed in section 4.5 that to use a surrogate 
Ki Carol has to prove that she knows the corresponding secret KZ . 
An adversary stealing the numbers in step 2 of the registration process with 
the bank cannot masquerade as Carol as he/she cannot generate K; - without 
knowing s,, which is secret. So an adversary between Carol and the bank 
can never prove knowledge of K, -. Moreover calculating s" requires the 
adversary to calculate 
sc =logg Xc mod P (7.7) 
which is widely thought (see section 4.3) to be an intractable problem. 
4. Protection from (partially) trusted third party (bank here)- The third party 
cannot masquerade as the legitimate owner of XX because the corresponding 
s. is secret. Calculating s, require an adversary to solve equation 7.12 which 
is widely thought (see section 4.3) to be hard. Moreover even if the value of 
the seed -ri is known, still without the knowledge of s. it is hard to generate 
the secret corresponding to a surrogate using equation 4.1. Thus the bank 
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cannot masquerade as Carol to the merchant. 
5. Audit - It is also difficult for an adversary to activate accounts belonging to 
other subscribers. To activate accounts belonging to other subscribers the 
adversary has to prove knowledge of the secret corresponding to the legiti- 
mate subscriber's surrogate (by signing T). Even if the adversary manages 
to steal the surrogate belonging to a subscriber still he/she cannot prove 
knowledge of the secret corresponding to the surrogate as he/she cannot 
generate If, using equation 4.1 as s, is secret and calculating s, requires 
the adversary to solve equation 7.12 which is widely thought (see section 
4.3) to be an intractable problem. 
The bank initially issues the numbers the subscribers use to generate their 
surrogates in step 2 of the preparation phase and the bank also sends the 
merchant the surrogates subscribers will use to activate their accounts dur- 
ing the preparation phase. The bank can generate surrogates belonging to 
subscribers using equations 4.6 and 4.2, but it cannot masquerade as a sub- 
scriber as it cannot generate the secret corresponding to a surrogate using 
equation 4.1 since s, is secret. Thus, from the surrogate the subscriber uses, 
the bank can resolve disputes retrospectively. The bank would divulge this 
link only in circumstances specified under legal authority, such as contract, 
legislation, search warrant or court order. 
7.4 Scenario 8: Tying of Payment Tokens to Surro- 
gates 
Now we present ä'protocol where we tie payment tokens with surrogates. Users 
use conventional DH keys as described in section 4.3 and generate surrogates as 
described in section 4.5. The transaction flow is outlined by means of an example 
as: 
1. The customer Carol requests payment tokens from her bank. 
2. The bank prepares and sends the information Carol needs to generate her 
payment tokens and surrogates. 
CHAPTER 7. IMPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS 100 
3. Carol goes to a website selling goods she wants to purchase. 
4. Carol generates the payment tokens and surrogates. 
5. The seller authenticates locally whether or not Carol is the legitimate owner 
of the surrogate. 
6. Carol pays with her payment tokens which the seller validates with the bank. 
The next time Carol goes to shop with the same seller she uses different surrogates 
and payment tokens which can be verified as before but cannot be correlated with 
a previous surrogate or payment token. Our motivation has been that Carol trusts 
her bank which is quite a practical thing to do. The requirements which were 
identified in section 4.4 are as follows: 
1. Verifiability 
2. Un-correlatability 
3. Misuse of surrogates 
4. Protection from (partially) trusted third party (RS here) 
5. Audit 
7.4.1 The Protocol 
There are three parties in the protocol, the bank, the customer and the seller. The 
bank is online. The customer first sends the bank its public key via a secure, 
conventionally authenticated communication channel. 
1. Customer -->S Bank : XX = gs- 
So that the customer doesn't need to communicate with the bank for every single 
transaction the bank prepares mC values using equations 7.1,7.2,7.3,7.4 and 
7.5. The bank sends the information Carol needs to prepare the corresponding B 
values and the surrogates. Only the bank can generate the S and Y values. 
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2. Bank -s Customer :A= -< Cl..,,,, Bo, U0, To, Lo, L, A, P >- 
During the preparation phase the bank also generates the surrogate as shown 
in 4.5, the customer will be using in its first transaction. We will see later that the 
bank always stores the surrogate the customer will be using next. When the seller 
submits the customer information for authorization to the bank the bank locates 
the proper customer information using this surrogate. 
At the end of this phase the bank does not retain all the S, Y and B values but 
only the initial generators 7.0 and o values, and the offsets and the constant A to 
generate subsequent of and Ti values. The bank retains: 
I' =ý So, Bo, Yo, Lam, L, A, Kt , cri, To, X, P >- 
The Ki 
, 01, and ro values 
in the bank's record will change after every transaction. 
For transaction i the customer calculates its ith surrogate K= using equations 
4.6,4.1 and 4.2. The corresponding secret Kz of the current surrogate is also gen- 
erated by the customer. The exponent vi used to generate the Bi for the current 
transactions is calculated by the customer using equation 7.1 and the information 
provided by the bank, and the exponent used for generating Bi_1 (except for B1). 
Then the Bi value is calculated using equation 7.3. The seller generates a trans- 
action description T and sends the customer signed with the seller's private key 
Kseue, T is agreed between both the seller and the customer. If the customer 
wants to pay the customer authenticates to the seller that it is the legitimate owner 
of the current surrogate. The customer sends the seller the ith payment tokens 
and the current surrogate. 
3. Seller -*., 7. 
Customer : [T]Kseller 
4. Customer -),,, Seller : SIG(T), I, B2, C3 
The seller contacts the bank, the bank locates the appropriate customer with the 
help of the surrogate, as the bank calculates in advance the surrogate a particular 
customer will be using next. This is done by the bank at the end of every transac- 
tion. For the first transaction the bank retains the value of the first surrogate while 
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issuing the tokens. The bank calculates the corresponding S and Y value and 
solves equation 7.5. If the equation is satisfied by the B and C values presented 
by the customer the bank agrees to the transaction. This process ensures that the 
seller receives his payment. 
5. Seller -ºs Bank: - If=, SIL(T), Bi, Cz >- 
6. Bank -* Seller :-T, authorizationDecision >- 
The bank, after every transaction, calculates the surrogate the customer will 
be using for the next transaction using the method shown in 4.5. 
7.5 Analysis 
The properties of our protocol set out in section ?? are achieved as follows: 
1. Verifiability - If equation 7.5 is satisfied then the bank accepts the payment 
tokens Bi and C2 as valid. It is hard for an adversary who does not posses 
the correct Bo, A and LQ values to generate B and C values corresponding 
to a particular S and Y value. 
The signature can only be successfully verified using K= if T was signed 
using KZ . K= can only be successfully generated by Carol using equation 
4.1 as s, is known to only Carol. Thus the verifier can be sure that the user 
(Carol here) presenting Kz is the legitimate owner of K. . 
2. Un-correlatability - Different transactions initiated by a particular princi- 
pal cannot be linked to each other or back to the initiator of the transaction 
without the'explicit consent of the legitimate owner of the surrogate. Link- 
ing Ki to K +1 and back to X, would require an adversary or the merchant 
to solve the equation: 
logxý K, _ -rz mod P (7.8) 
and calculate ri+l from T= using the values A and L, as shown in equation 
4.6. Even if the values A and L were compromised, calculating Tt by solving 
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equation 7.11 is still thought to be an intractable problem. If an adversary 
cannot calculate TZ then it cannot calculate T2+1 using equation 4.6 nor the 
surrogate Kt , using equation 4.2. Thus it is difficult for an adversary or 
the merchant to link surrogates to each other or to the parent public key. 
Carol communicates with merchant via a secure anonymous communica- 
tion channel denoted as ---4m; thus it is difficult for an adversary observing 
the communication network to gain any additional information about the 
communicating partners beyond its a priori belief. Linking the payment to- 
kens Bi and CZ with Bt+l and Cz+l also requires the adversary to solve the 
discrete logarithm problem which is thought to be intractable (see section 
4.3). 
3. Misuse of surrogates We have discussed in section 4.5 that to use a surrogate 
K- Carol has to prove that she knows the corresponding secret Ifs . 
An adversary stealing the numbers in step 2 cannot masquerade as Carol 
as he/she cannot generate Ifs without knowing s, which is secret. So an 
adversary between Carol and the bank can never prove knowledge of Ifi . 
Moreover calculating s,, requires the adversary to calculate 
sc =logg Xc mod P (7.9) 
which is widely thought (see section 4.3) to be an intractable problem. 
4. Protection from (partially) trusted third party (bank here)- The third party 
cannot masquerade as the legitimate owner of XX because the corresponding 
s, is secret.. Calculating sc require an adversary to solve equation 7.12 which 
is widely thought (see section 4.3) to be hard. Moreover even if the value of 
the seed ri is known, still without the knowledge of sc it is hard to generate 
the secret corresponding to a surrogate using equation 4.1. Thus the bank 
cannot masquerade as Carol to the merchant. 
5. Audit - It is also difficult for an adversary to activate accounts belonging to 
other subscribers. To activate accounts belonging to other subscribers the 
adversary has to prove knowledge of the secret corresponding to the legiti- 
mate subscriber's surrogate (by signing T). Even if the adversary manages 
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to steal the surrogate belonging to a subscriber still he/she cannot prove 
knowledge of the secret corresponding to the surrogate as he/she cannot 
generate Is using equation 4.1 as s, is secret and calculating sc requires 
the adversary to solve equation 7.12 which is widely thought (see section 
4.3) to be an intractable problem. 
The bank initially issues the numbers the subscribers use to generate their 
surrogates in step 2 of the preparation phase and the bank also sends the 
merchant the surrogates subscribers will use to activate their accounts dur- 
ing the preparation phase. The bank can generate surrogates belonging to 
subscribers using equations 4.6 and 4.2, but it cannot masquerade as a sub- 
scriber as it cannot generate the secret corresponding to a surrogate using 
equation 4.1 since s, is secret. Thus, from the surrogate the subscriber uses, 
the bank can resolve disputes retrospectively. The bank would divulge this 
link only in circumstances specified under legal authority, such as contract, 
legislation, search warrant or court order. 
7.6 Scenario 9: Delegation of Payment Tokens 
There are several commercial websites whose customer base comprises of people 
who are legally not allowed to have a credit card (boys and girls below 18 yrs). 
In such situations children use their parents' credit card to buy online. Now as in 
chapter 6 the problem here is that credit card numbers once learnt can be reused. 
Things become more complicated when parents have anonymous credentials in- 
stead of credit cards: to share anonymous credentials such as those mentioned in 
[18,43,15,63] the owners also have to share their secret key. This is a major 
problem in such situations where delegation is a legitimate requirement. In this 
protocol we show a way of sharing payment tokens and surrogates. In this pro- 
tocol Carol generates her DH keys modulo a prime as shown in section 4.3. The 
requirements which were identified in section 4.4 are as follows: 
1. Verifiability 
2. Un-correlatability 
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3. Misuse of surrogates 
4. Protection from (partially) trusted third party (RS here) 
5. Audit 
7.6.1 The Protocol 
There are four parties in the protocol, the bank, the customer Carol, her son 
William and the seller. The bank is online and the seller communicates with the 
bank for authorization decisions. Carol sends the bank her public key X. using a 
secure, conventionally authenticated communication channel. 
1. Carol --* Bank : XX = gs° 
So that the Carol does not need to contact the bank before every single transaction, 
the bank sends her only the mC values, generated using equations 7.1,7.2,7.3, 
7.4 and 7.5, along with the information she needs to prepare the corresponding B 
values and the surrogates. Only the bank can generate the S and Y values. 
2. Bank -* Carol :A_- Cl...,,,, Bo, vo, To, LQ, L, A, P >- 
During the preparation phase the bank also generates the surrogate Kj , as shown 
in section 4.5, Carol will be using in her first transaction: The bank always stores 
the surrogate Carol will be using next along with her account information prior 
to Carol uses it. Customer information are indexed using the surrogates by the 
bank. When the seller submits any customer information for authorization, the 
bank locates the corresponding account information using the surrogate. The bank 
retains for every customer 
F =-< So, Bo, Yo, L,, L, A, K l+, 171, To, X, P >- (7.10) 
The Ifl ,o, and ro values will change after every transaction. 
For transaction i Carol calculates its ith surrogate and its corresponding secret, 
using the method described in section 4.5. Then, by equations 7.1, exponent az 
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used to generate the Bi for the current transactions is calculated by Carol from the 
information provided by the bank and using the exponent used for generating B=_1 
(except for B1). Then the BZ value is calculated is calculated using equation 7.3. 
Carol sends William the value of her current public and private surrogate along 
with the payment tokens Bi and C. The payment tokens are sent to William via 
a secured authenticated communication channel by Carol. Thus Carol can later 
on prove that it was William who used it and not Carol. The payment tokens are 
verified at the point of use by the bank. After verifying the bank also calculates 
the values of the exponents to be used for calculating the next payment tokens. 
So any payment tokens that has been previously delegated and used cannot be 
verified again. 
3. Carol -* William : Kz , Kt , BZ, CZ 
William cannot figure out Carol's secret key s from Ki or Ki nor can he generate 
future B and C values from Bi and C. For the next transaction (i. e. transaction 
(i + 1)) Carol will use Bj+1 and CZ+1 as her payment tokens and Kt 1 or Ki+l 
will be her surrogates. The values are different for each successive transactions 
and are generated serially using the information the Bank sends Carol in A. 
The seller generates a transaction description T and sends it to William signed 
with the seller's private key Kseller" T is agreed between William and the seller. If 
William wants to pay, he authenticates to the seller that he is the legitimate owner 
of the current surrogate by signing the transaction description T. Along with the 
signed transaction description William sends the seller the ith payment tokens and 
the current surrogate. ->m stands for an anonymous communication channel. 
4. Seller William: [TI Keeller 
5. William --gym Seller : [T]K-, Ki , 
Bj, Ci 
The seller contacts the bank, the bank locates the appropriate customer with the 
help of the surrogate. We have mentioned in the preparation phase that the bank 
calculates in advance the surrogate a particular customer will be using next. This 
is done by the bank during the synchronisation phase at the end of every transac- 
tion. For the first transaction the bank retains the value of the first surrogate while 
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issuing the tokens. The bank calculates the corresponding S and Y value and 
solves equation 7.5 for transaction i. If the equation is satisfied by the B and C 
values presented by the customer the bank agrees to the transaction. This process 
ensures that the seller receives his payment. 
6. Seller -> Bank : -< Kti , 
[T]K-, Bi, Ci >- 
7. Bank -3 Seller : -< T, authorizationDecision >- 
The bank, after every transaction, calculates the surrogate the customer will be 
using for the next transaction using equations 4.6 and 4.2. 
The surrogates and payment tokens are generated and used serially for syn- 
chronisation between the bank and the customer. If Carol wants two of her chil- 
dren to buy something with her credential she can generate surrogates and pay- 
ment tokens for two of her children separately. In situations where there are two 
transactions the tokens can be accompanied with serial numbers and the bank can 
authorise payment tokens in an order as per the serial numbers. The one with a 
lower serial number will be approved first then one with a higher one. This re- 
quires the bank to maintain extra state which is the last serial number used by the 
customer. We believe that this will not induce any significant delay or processing 
overhead on the bank or the seller or affect the overall performance of the proto- 
col. Including serial numbers with the payment tokens doesn't in anyway enable 
the seller to correlate various transactions of any particular customer. 
7.6.2 Analysis 
The properties of our protocol set out in section 4.4 are achieved as follows: 
1. Verifiability-44f equation 7.5 is satisfied then the bank accepts the payment 
tokens BZ and Ci as valid. It is hard for an adversary who does not posses 
the correct Bo, A and LQ values to generate B and C values corresponding 
to a particular S and Y value. 
The signature can only be successfully verified using Ifs if T was signed 
using I(. Kz can only be successfully generated by Carol using equation 
4.1 as s,, is known to only Carol. Thus the verifier can be sure that the user 
(Carol here) presenting If= is the legitimate owner of KZ . 
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2. Un-correlatability - Different transactions initiated by a particular princi- 
pal cannot be linked to each other or back to the initiator of the transaction 
without the explicit consent of the legitimate owner of the surrogate. Link- 
ing I( to I+1 and back to XX would require an adversary or the merchant 
to solve the equation: 
1ogh,. Ifz = Ti mod P (7.11) 
and calculate Ti+l from rti using the values A and L, as shown in equation 
4.6. Even if the values A and L were compromised, calculating Ti by solving 
equation 7.11 is still thought to be an intractable problem. If an adversary 
cannot calculate TZ then it cannot calculate Tz+l using equation 4.6 nor the 
surrogate K +1 using equation 4.2. Thus it is difficult for an adversary or 
the merchant to link surrogates to each other or to the parent public key. 
Carol communicates with merchant via a secure anonymous communica- 
tion channel denoted as - km; thus it is difficult for an adversary observing 
the communication network to gain any additional information about the 
communicating partners beyond its a priori belief. Linking the payment to- 
kens BZ and Ci with Bi+l and Ct+l also requires the adversary to solve the 
discrete logarithm problem which is thought to be intractable (see section 
4.3). 
3. Misuse of surrogates We have discussed in section 4.5 that to use a surrogate 
I( Carol has to prove that she knows the corresponding secret K'=. 
An adversary stealing the numbers in step 2 cannot masquerade as Carol 
as he/she cannot generate i without knowing s, which is secret. So an 
adversary'between Carol and the bank can never prove knowledge of Kz . 
Moreover calculating s, requires the adversary to calculate 
s, = 1og9 Xý mod P (7.12) 
which is widely thought (see section 4.3) to be an intractable problem. 
4. Protection from (partially) trusted third party (bank here)- The third party 
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cannot masquerade as the legitimate owner of X, because the corresponding 
s, is secret. Calculating s. require an adversary to solve equation 7.12 which 
is widely thought (see section 4.3) to be hard. Moreover even if the value of 
the seed Ta is known, still without the knowledge of s, it is hard to generate 
the secret corresponding to a surrogate using equation 4.1. Thus the bank 
cannot masquerade as Carol to the merchant. 
5. Audit - It is also difficult for an adversary to activate accounts belonging to 
other subscribers. To activate accounts belonging to other subscribers the 
adversary has to prove knowledge of the secret corresponding to the legiti- 
mate subscriber's surrogate (by signing T). Even if the adversary manages 
to steal the surrogate belonging to a subscriber still he/she cannot prove 
knowledge of the secret corresponding to the surrogate as he/she cannot 
generate Kz using equation 4.1 as s, is secret and calculating s, requires 
the adversary to solve equation 7.12 which is widely thought (see section 
4.3) to be an intractable problem. 
The bank initially issues the numbers the subscribers use to generate their 
surrogates in step 2 of the preparation phase and the bank also sends the 
merchant the surrogates subscribers will use to activate their accounts dur- 
ing the preparation phase. The bank can generate surrogates belonging to 
subscribers using equations 4.6 and 4.2, but it cannot masquerade as a sub- 
scriber as it cannot generate the secret corresponding to a surrogate using 
equation 4.1 since s, is secret. Thus, from the surrogate the subscriber uses, 
the bank can resolve disputes retrospectively. The bank would divulge this 
link only in circumstances specified under legal authority, such as contract, 
legislation,. search warrant or court order. The problem with this scheme is 
that an auditor cannot figure out who used a particular surrogate although it 
can figure out the owner of the surrogate. 
7.7 Conclusions 
Though we concentrate on access control in this dissertation nevertheless our work 
has some interesting implications in the areas of payments, differential pricing etc. 
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Although we have presented some payment protocols in chapter 7 we admit that 
they are far from perfect and we are happy to use any other payment protocol 
along with our surrogates in the protocols described above. 
In our trust model the users trust the bank which replaces the need for a global 
pseudonym authority by a more localised trust relationship. Moreover in the real 
world users have to trust the bank and are legally bound to provide self identifying 
information to the bank. 
The protocol presented in section 7.3 does not make use of surrogates and any 
other public key cryptosystem based on a trapdoor oneway permutation can be 
used. What we have shown is that price discrimination using real life identities 
need not always be a threat to privacy. 
The traditional belief that transferability is not desirable in anonymity sys- 
tems has led to systems which do not support delegation. Our surrogates can be 
auditably delegated along with the payment tokens, while preserving privacy. 
Chapter 8 
Conclusions 
8.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we assess the extent to which our approaches can provide useful 
leverage to address problems of trust and anonymity in various electronic services. 
In section 8.2 we revisit the problems of access control, trust management, and 
delegation in the light of the approaches described in this dissertation. Section 
8.3 gives a brief overview of how our approaches can be used in conjunction 
with trusted hardware. In section 8.4 we describe how our approaches can be 
exploited so as to reduce trust assumptions necessary between various entities of a 
system. Future work which could be carried out by extending various approaches 
presented in this dissertation is discussed in section 8.5. We summarise our work 
in section 8.6 
8.2 Significance 
We have shown ways in which authorization decisions can be made without using 
long term credentials linked to a stable identity. Role based access control models 
such as [7,35] currently rely on authentication using long term credentials for ac- 
tivation of roles. But our surrogates can be used in RCBS [7] for activation of roles 
without compromising individual privacy by means of the protocols described in 
section 5. The powerful concept of activation of roles using prerequisites de- 
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scribed under section 3.2.3 can be achieved with surrogates using the protocol 
described in section 5.4. Our approaches can also be used for activation of roles 
in applications like Globe [52], discussed in section 3.3, without the proxy being 
able to correlate actions belonging to a particular user. At the same time, proxies 
can still get the benefit of consulting a local trust management engine before al- 
lowing access to a resource. Compared to the approaches mentioned under section 
2.4 our approaches do not need a global pseudonym authority like idemix [ 15] or 
depend on some universal authority for registration of pseudonyms like Globally 
Unique Pseudonyms [64]. Our approaches do not advocate complete anonymity, 
but allow an auditor with appropriate authority to correlate actions belonging to 
a particular user retrospectively. None of the protocols we presented in chapter 5 
requires communicating partners to share a long term secret, a feature which we 
believe is significant. 
Keynote, discussed in section 2.2.2, currently uses long term credentials to 
make authorization decisions. This can be a threat to individual privacy. Our 
approaches can be integrated with systems that currently use trust management 
systems such as Keynote to make authorization decisions. Surrogates can come 
with explicit labels and policies which can then be used by the trust management 
systems to make authorization decisions. This adds an extra layer of anonymity 
in trust management systems, which can coexist peacefully with traditional non- 
anonymous mechanisms. We have shown that one can make trust decisions based 
on transient identities and we believe this ability is useful for certain services. 
Users, in the protocols presented in this dissertation, generate and use their 
own surrogates and it is difficult for an adversary to masquerade as a legitimate 
user. The anonymity systems described under section 2.4 either require the user 
to trust a third party with personal sensitive information as in section 2.4.2 or 
depend on a global authority as in sections 2.4.5 and 2.4.6. Trusting a third party 
with personal sensitive information is not quite right [4]. A global pseudonym 
authority as advocated in [15,64] is difficult to build or at least is as hard as a 
global public key certification authority which hasn't happened yet. Moreover the 
trust relationship between users and a global pseudonym authority is unnecessary, 
compulsive and can have undesirable consequences. In our approaches principals 
do not share personal sensitive information with everybody and we have more 
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localised trust relationships. No longer are users required to accept a transitive 
notion of trust, nor do we presuppose a global pseudonym authority. 
Previous anonymous credential management systems do not allow principals 
to share their credentials, a feature which we believe prevents users from delegat- 
ing credentials. We have described approaches in chapter 6 where users can dele- 
gate their surrogates without the delegatee being able to figure out the secret used 
to generate the surrogate. The ability to delegate, we feel, is a significant improve- 
ment over previous approaches because delegation is useful [25] as resources are 
hardly ever entirely local and it is often a legitimate real world requirement that 
users are able to delegate jobs and credentials using which the delegatee can ac- 
cess the resources of the delegatee so as to complete the job. 
8.3 Trusted Hardware 
Though the palladium based approach we review in section 3.6.1 does not help 
us to ascertain trust while maintaining individual privacy at the same time, trusted 
hardware can nevertheless be deployed in conjunction with the protocols we pre- 
sented in this dissertation. 
The two level authentication mechanism we present in sections 5.4 and 6.3 
can exploit the availability of trusted hardware. Users could make use of such 
hardware to authenticate as members of a group before using their surrogates in 
the protocols described in section 5.4 and 6.3. One could also use trusted hardware 
to authenticate as a member of a group in the protocol described in section 5.3. 
The top level authentication mechanism in the protocols described in sections 5.4, 
5.3 and 6.3 is done using the public key of the users. Ring signature is perfectly 
signer ambiguous so it is difficult for an adversary to figure out the actual signer 
from a group and at the same time it is difficult for an outsider to masquerade as a 
member of a group. 
It is not necessary that keys be permanently stored in particular hardware as 
the keys can be fetched using a protocol like the one presented in [23]. What is 
important is that only the legitimate owner of the keys can fetch and use the keys 
via the trusted hardware. The user can first auditably authenticate to the hardware 
using surrogates and then the hardware keeps an audit trail. The hardware can 
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then be used by the user to authenticate as a member of the group. 
Unlike our earlier approach (which we present in the appendix and now re- 
garded as a false start) we advocate a more localised trust relationship in the mech- 
anisms presented in chapter 5. In particular, in our protocols there is no need for a 
global certification and revocation authority. The keys are not stored in the hard- 
ware when the hardware is not in use, so even if the hardware is compromised it is 
still difficult to compromise the keys. Moreover unlike a conventional Palladium 
based approach, end-systems do not need to trust the authentication mechanism of 
any third party. Our new approaches, take identity out of the authorization man- 
agement infrastructure. In the approaches presented in chapter 5 users do not need 
to reveal any digital credential, such as a public key, linked to a stable identity to 
authenticate themselves or obtain tokens, but the trusted hardware nevertheless 
makes it difficult for an adversary to forge transactions. 
8.4 Localisation of Trust 
Using the protocols proposed in this dissertation it is possible to reduce the need 
to trust. In the protocols described in this dissertation, when principals request 
access, the server does not need to trust the authentication mechanism of a third 
party. For example in the Kerberos authentication service the services must trust 
Kerberos' judgment as to the identity of a user to be accurate. Thus in the con- 
text of access to the LIS described in section 5.4, Kerberos advocates an approach 
where principals authenticate to an entity other than the LIS and get a ticket which 
the principals then use to access the LIS. In such an approach the LIS needs to trust 
the authentication mechanism of the third party whereas in the protocol described 
in section 5.4 the LIS authenticates users directly, but anonymously, before allow- 
ing access. Thus the LIS does not need to trust the authentication mechanism of 
a third party. The LIS server has the surrogates of users who are allowed access 
and the use of two different mechanisms makes it very difficult for someone who 
is not authorized to masquerade as a member of a group. 
In our approach principals need only reveal their long term credentials to en- 
tities which are legally authorized to verify them. For example, in the protocol 
described in section 5.2, Carol only reveals her long term credential linked to 
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her stable identity to the subscription authority while registering, she does not 
need to reveal her long term credentials every time she reads the newspaper. The 
subscription authority is legitimately required to know Carol whereas the server 
where Carol logs in to read the newspaper does not need to know Carol's identity 
but only needs to know whether or not Carol is authorized to read the newspaper. 
Since there is now no risk of correlation of Carol's online activities by the server 
it follows that Carol does not need to unnecessarily trust the server when she logs 
in to read the newspaper. So the threat that information about us is stored at too 
many places can be countered using the protocols presented in this dissertation. 
In the delegation protocol presented in section 6.4 Carol does not need to trust 
Bob to be honest. Carol has control over who can use the surrogate as she can 
specify this. Bob cannot further delegate surrogates without the explicit knowl- 
edge and consent of Carol. In the protocol presented in section 6.3 Carol can use 
the surrogate she delegates and so Bob needs to trust Carol to be honest and not 
use the surrogate she delegates. But in the protocol discussed in section 6.4 Bob 
does not need to trust Carol to be honest and Carol cannot use the surrogates Carol 
delegates to Bob: an auditor can uniquely and irrefutably link all actions to prin- 
cipals. Moreover all identity resolution in the protocol presented in section 6.4 is 
local; Bob does not need to trust the bank or the merchant with personal sensitive 
information in order to view movies. An external auditor can link transactions to 
Bob only with the cooperation of an auditor who is internal to Bob's domain and 
Bob needs to only trust this local auditor. Local identity resolution of this kind 
has implications in the design of role based authorization mechanisms where users 
can activate roles across domains without transitively trusting authorities outside 
their immediate domain [39]. 
The problem -at.. present is that users have little control of the risks they are 
exposed to since: they must enter into an unnecessary compulsive trust relation- 
ship with the system. This forces them to trust the system to protect them from 
threats. This dissertation provides the way to allow clients to control the risks 
to which they are exposed by bearing the cost of relevant countermeasures them- 
selves, rather than clients being forced to trust the system infrastructure (and bear 
an equal share of the cost of all countermeasures which may or may not be effec- 
tive for them. ) Moreover using our mechanisms systems do not need to trust the 
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authentication mechanism of a third party. This feature is useful even if privacy 
is not required, due to the abilitywhich it provides to systematically weaken trust 
assumptions. 
8.5 Future Work 
Our work can be extended to design an open network authentication system sim- 
ilar to Kerberos, which was discussed in section 3.5. Kerberos has a strong au- 
thentication mechanism based on long term credentials, and audit is linked to 
authorization via the same long term credential used to authenticate. Such an ap- 
proach gives birth to some unnecessary trust assumptions between various entities 
of the system e. g. clients are compelled to trust servers not to enable an adversary 
to correlate their access requests. 
We have argued that the trust relationship between users and servers providing 
various services in this scenario is unnecessary, compulsive and can have unde- 
sirable consequences. Services only need to know that the ticket has been issued 
by the ticket granting service and that the user presenting the ticket is authorized 
to use the service. Services do not need to know the identity of the user. An im- 
portant conclusion of this dissertation is that (in this sense) the requirements of 
trust and anonymity are not in conflict with each other and can coexist peacefully 
without compromising the requirements of secure authentication and audit. We 
have demonstrated in this dissertation that even if users authenticate to a service 
using weak identities an auditor can still link actions to principals, thus enabling 
the elimination of the present compulsive trust relationship between users and 
services. The approaches presented in this dissertation could be extended to in- 
vestigate how they can provide useful leverage to eliminate such unnecessary and 
compulsive trist relationship between various other parts of the system. 
Delegation is difficult in current versions of Kerberos. If tickets issued by a 
Kerberos authentication service are delegated then it will be hard for an auditor 
to uniquely and irrefutably link actions to users, and users can frame each other. 
At present, to delegate anonymous credentials users have to share their secret key, 
which is not desirable as the delegatee can reuse credentials of the delegator and an 
auditor cannot figure out whether it was the delegator or the delegatee who used 
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a particular credential. This dissertation shows a way of introducing auditable 
anonymous delegation in the electronic world. Open network authentication sys- 
tems are often used to issue tickets to users, using which users can access a remote 
resource. The approach for auditable anonymous delegation can be extended to 
design open network authentication services where users can delegate credentials 
without compromising the goal of audit. 
The goals of the open network authentication system which we propose in this 
section can be summarized as 
1. The service should be sure that the ticket has been issued by a ticket granting 
service authorized to do so. 
2. An adversary should not be able to masquerade by stealing the ticket of a 
legitimate ticket owner. 
3. Only the legitimate owner of the ticket should be able to use a ticket during 
the duration of the ticket. 
4. An adversary who controls a service should not be able to correlate actions 
of any particular user. 
5. The authorization service should allow authorized delegation of credentials. 
6. An authorized auditor should be able to uniquely and irrefutably link actions 
to principals. 
An important benefit of an approach with reduced trust assumptions is that risks 
are reduced e. g. clients do not need to trust the server or the remote authentication 
mechanism to presgrye their privacy. Preserving workstation integrity is an open 
problem in public networks, For example someone might change the software 
running on a workstation to record the password of a user. Our approach using 
weak identities or surrogates can be extended to address this problem. Since our 
passwords change after each use so an adversary does not benefit by recording the 
password. Only the TGT service and the legitimate owner of the password can 
use a TGT ticket. 
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We have shown mechanisms which enable us to separate identity management 
from the trust management envelope, thus eliminating the present compulsive 
trust relationship between users and various electronic services. We propose a 
more localized trust relationship rather than having globally trusted entities act- 
ing as a repository of personal sensitive information. Even though the protocols 
described in this dissertation include a partially trusted third party, our third party 
cannot do any harm to the legitimate owner of a surrogate. In this dissertation we 
concentrated on access control models, but our work has implications in other ap- 
plication areas some of which we discussed in chapter 7. Chapter 7 shows that the 
surrogates can be tied to payment tokens and used in conjunction with them. This 
dissertation also comments implicitly on the desirable level of privacy which does 
not impede the development of approaches allowing auditability The approaches 
we present in chapters 5 and 6 do not guarantee absolute anonymity but make it 
difficult for an adversary to link actions to individuals. Previous anonymous cre- 
dential management systems (which we have discussed in chapter 2) do not allow 
principals to share their credentials, a feature which we believe prevents users be- 
ing able to delegate credentials. Our delegation mechanism in chapter 6, we feel, 
is a significant improvement over previous approaches. Delegation is useful [25] 
because resources are hardly ever entirely local and it is often a legitimate real 
world requirement that users are able to delegate both jobs and credentials using 
which the delegatee can access the resources of the delegatee so as to complete the 
job. Such approaches allow an auditor with appropriate authority to link actions 
to individuals, thus enabling fair dispute resolution. This dissertation shows that 
the requirements of trust and anonymity are not in conflict with each other and 
that the two can coexist in a peaceful manner. Finally, reduced trust assumptions 
enable users to control the risks to which they are exposed. 
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1 Introduction 
We now live in a world of wide open distributed systems which has unleashed a 
whole new lot of both commercial and noncommercial opportunities for us. We 
will concentrate on a system for commercial transaction on the web. The goal 
is to have a large number of small entrepreneurs who can do business at a low 
operating cost and we shall argue that this is indeed possible. At the same time 
we now have to deal with completely new kinds of situations and threats. 
The problem very briefly is as follows. Every time we buy something over 
the phone or over the net the information goes into a database somewhere. All 
these records can be linked together and people can have access to our medical 
records, where we buy, whom we communicate with etc. Thieves routinely use 
stolen credit card numbers to trade on their victim's good payment records or 
murderers have tracked down their targets by using government maintained ad- 
dress records. It is indeed possible to build a complete dossier on an individual 
by aggregating school, travel, medical and credit card records [6]. The Total in- 
formation awareness project of the U. S. government is aggregating information 
from credit cards, school, travel and medical records to root out potential terror- 
ists but this can well be used by malicious persons to get hold of their targets [1]. 
Apart from these issues we are not also sure whether we will get the goods we 
are paying for. There are a whole lot of questions that come to our mind when 
we do transactions over the net. This implies that we take risks knowingly or 
unknowingly while we transact over the net. In situations like these we take a 
leap of trust with the belief that everything will be fine. William Harbison in his 
PhD thesis argue, that this trust results from lack of verifiable knowledge about 
the entity at the other end of the communication channel [? ]. To represent this 
situation more correctly we should say that here both the buyer and the seller 
takes a risk. He rightly points out that trust is not a system property but is a 
property of a state of knowledge that either increases or decreases with the risk 
involved. There has been studies conducted which concluded that there would 
have been substantial increase in the number of transactions over the net if the 
users knew how their personal information would be used (18]. It is also true 
that most of the attacks are on the servers that store the information rather 
on the communication channels as doing the former is easier than doing the 
later. To be precise the requirement is of anonymity in online transactions. The 
questions which haunt us while we do transactions online can be summed up as 
1. How will our personal information be used? 
2. Do we get the goods we pay for? 
The question the seller ask is 
Will I get the money for the goods I sold? 
The issues that we have raised above are not exhaustive but can be regarded as 
the more important ones. Apart from these we also should take into account the 
reputation of a seller before shopping with a particular seller. The questions like 
whether or not our rights as a customer are protected, what is the refund policy 
etc also crop up when we do transactions over the net. Here the requirement 
is of ascertaining the reputation of the seller. It is quite evident now that 
transacting over the web is full of risks. Computer scientists call this a trust 
management problem. They opine that these problems are in the domain of the 
trust management systems as according to them this is the entity responsible 
for answering the question 
'Should we carry out this dangerous action or not? [2] 
We in this paper examine some of the trust management approaches along 
with other approaches in the light of an online transaction where we are buying 
goods online. We also show that these approaches cannot be used satisfacto- 
rily to address the issues we have mentioned above. We argue that the trust 
management approaches we have seen in the past had different goals and in- 
terests. They cannot guarantee that there won't be any malicious use of our 
personal information, or it is not also possible to ascertain the reputation of 
the entity at the other end of the communication channel. That's what led us 
to propose a reputation assessment system rather than using conventional trust 
management approaches. We chose to have complete anonymity in our proposed 
scheme while buying goods online to guard against malicious use of our personal 
information and propose a reputation assessment system to ascertain the rep- 
utation of the seller. Reputation of a real world entity increases or decreases 
with time and is based our personal experience. We also refer to friends and 
other sources taýa§sess the reputation of real world entities before we enter into 
any sort of transaction with any real world entity. Our key innovation has been 
a proposal that models this dynamic nature of reputation as we find in the real 
world. Though the reputation assessment system proposed here forms a part of 
a compliance checker that implements local policies but the way it implements 
and makes decisions is different from the trust management systems proposed 
by other researchers. The compliance checker dynamically assesses the reputa- 
tion of the entity at the other end of the communication channel before coming 
up with a decision on a particular action. So far as anonymity is concerned 
some past approaches providing anonymity will also be discussed in this paper 
before we present our approach. A digital equivalent of credit card is proposed 
in this paper which we use to buy goods online but at the same time preserve 
anonymity. The interesting part of our scheme is that payment methods are 
not tied to identity of the payer and like cash the seller is happy as long as it 
sees the Bank of England stamp on the coin or the stamp of the issuing bank 
on the card here. When we buy using coins or bank notes the coins or notes 
doesn't have or we do not need to give our name or other information along 
with the coins. Similarly the cards we propose do not have our names like the 
traditional credit cards. The legitimate holder of the cards we propose needs to 
authenticate him/her every time he/she uses these cards to buy goods online 
as this protects the cards from theft but this process of authentication doesn't 
reveal his/her real world identity. This is a significant difference when compared 
to the traditional credit cards. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; in section 2 we will have a look 
at what historically has been done in the area of trust management systems 
and whether those systems are able to address the questions we have mentioned 
above. In section 3 we will focus on anonymity and in the following section 
4 some approaches to anonymity will be presented. In section 5 we have our 
proposed approach for anonymous transaction. The approach we will present 
will also enable two-way verification of credentials of the principals involved in 
the transactions. A model of assessing reputations and making decisions based 
on them will also be presented in section 6 followed by a compliance checking 
mechanism which incorporates the model of section 6 will be presented in section 
7. Finally we present our conclusions in section 8. 
2 Review of Current Approaches 
2.1 Keynote 
Keynote [2] is the latest version of a set of trust management approaches that 
came from Matt Blaze and others of AT&T. Policy maker was also developed 
by the same people and some of them were involved in the development of 
REFEREE [7] another trust management approach that was developed along 
with researchers from-MIT and W3C. We shall focus on Keynote here. Keynote 
works more or less like a database query engine. It can function as a stand 
alone application interfacing with other parts of the system and helping them 
in making decisions. Let's lump these other parts of the system together and 
call them by a common name application. Whenever any application faces the 
question "Should we carry out this dangerous action" then it refers to Keynote 
for an opinion and based on that opinion it decides its future course of action. 
The application presents the Keynote trust management engine with a set of 
local policies that should be taken into account while taking a decision on this 
particular request along with the credentials of the requestor and details about 
the proposed action. If the proposed action conforms to the local policy then 
keynote advises the requestor to proceed otherwise Keynote advises it not to 
perform this action as it is against the local policy. Keynote acts as a compliance 
checker for the application. The policies are specified in the form of assertions 
and the actions are specified which are evaluated against these assertions. We 
shall deal with the structure of keynote assertions and requests later in this 
section. 
We have already mentioned the questions that come to the mind of both the 
buyer and seller while we do financial transactions over the net. We will have a 
look whether keynote is able to address these issues. We would like to mention 
here that may be solving this problem was not the goal of keynote but this is a 
problem that needs to be addressed somehow and so we wanted to investigate 
whether the current approaches are already able to address this problem. Let 
our policy be that we are only going to pay by credit cards those who are 
authorized to accept them and have the required credentials from a bank or a 
building society or whoever is legally empowered to issue such authorizations. 
A Keynote assertion specifying this policy looks like 
1. Authorizer: "DSA: 1FFG2" (CA's key) 
2. Licensee: "RSA: DEF662" (Buyer's key) 
3. Conditions: "((app-domain == "BUY") ("Pay by credit cards if seller is 
authorized to accept credit cards") 
4. Signature: "DSA-SHA1: 1861234" (Signature of the authorizer. ) 
Suppose this is how the keynote assertion looks like when we implement our 
local policy via key note. The sellers to need to have digital representation of 
their authorizations to accept credit cards. Lets the seller use a SPKI certificate 
which can be roughly as 
1. Issuer: "RSA 2GG36" (Bank's key) 
2. Subject: "RSA 7YYH5" (Seller's key) 
3. Authorizatiän: "' Can accept credit cards" 
4. Delegation: "No" 
5. Validity: " 1002 1009" 
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When there is a request by the buyer then the relevant application fetches 
the relevant credential of the seller, parses it and presents it to keynote along 
with the id of the requestor and the id of the policy to be consulted to make a 
decision. Based upon this information keynote comes out with a decision which 
is most likely to be positive in the above instance. Though keynote was able to 
act perfectly to implement the above mentioned policy but that is not all that 
what we want to achieve. We should also be able to answer the questions that 
what they are going to do with our personal information? Are we going to get 
the good we are paying for? Will the seller get his money? Here keynote checks 
whether the remote host is allowed to accept credit cards or not and based 
on this it gives decision. But consider a situation where there is a corrupt or 
disgruntled employee who steals in credit card numbers and uses them or in other 
cases people getting access to other information like medical records etc. So we 
shouldn't use a keynote affirmation to wrap the entire organization with a trust 
blanket when we do not have information about the storage and usage of records. 
The sellers might argue that they have secure access control mechanisms but 
why should we believe that this is more than advertising? Are we able to test 
how secure those access control mechanisms are? These verifications also do 
not guarantee that we will be getting the goods we are paying for. Similar 
arguments can be given from the seller's point that simply checking that the 
customer has a valid credit card doesn't guarantee that the seller is going to get 
the money. The buyer may have used a stolen credit card and the legitimate 
owner is going to stop all payments before the settlement is done between the 
seller and the bank. It can be said that the trust management approaches 
such as Keynote do not attempt to address these issues. So far as the issue 
of assessing reputation is concerned we will again have a look at the assertions 
and certificates above. We have talked about certificates in a bit detail below. 
Now the structure of the keynote assertions doesn't permit us to incorporate 
our past experiences. Keynote doesn't support this concept at all. This static 
nature of assertions won't be able to support this dynamic real world process. 
Keynote only supports authorization based on public keys which doesn't cover 
the entire trust management problem [10]. It focuses on establishing resource 
access trust and service access trust [10]. We can even say that the question we 
are looking at is quite hard for the trust management systems to address. 
2.2 Independent Unbiased Trust Entities 
There has beep considerable interest now a days about independent unbiased 
trust entities like TRUSTe, EEF [13] etc. These are termed independent un- 
biased trust entities. They issue a seal that is displayed on the websites that 
do financial transactions online. There are also alternative dispute resolution 
agencies that intervene whenever there is a dispute between the consumer and 
the seller. These seals are more like the trade licenses that we find in most of 
the shops or like a safety certificates. For example any boat plying on the Trent 
River has to have some form of authorization from the British waterways board 
and display that. But the fact is that just having a seal doesn't prove that you 
are very honest or that all your employees are honest or are trained what to 
do when there is a man overboard. There are checks while issuing such seals 
or certificates but someone can always register and get a seal and later on turn 
dishonest. We are very sceptical about the utility of such practices as gathering 
evidences purely in the electronic world is very hard to do [15], and a seal cannot 
guarantee for somebody's honesty. Seals can have a psychological effect on the 
customer who doesn't understand the system in much depth. So again if we put 
the question what happens to our personal information, can these trust entities 
give us a satisfactory answer? Neither does these seals guarantee proper deliv- 
ery of goods or save the seller from being defrauded. They can argue that since 
they are displaying the relevant seals they are expected to act properly. The 
success of these independent unbiased trust entities depend more on self regu- 
lation which assumes that everyone will do things honestly. The organizations 
issuing seals have little control over the storage, usage and access control of the 
target organizations. The seal issuing organizations also lack verifiable proof of 
usage and storage of information by the sellers and so there is an element of risk 
or unnecessary trust is involved between these trust entities and the sellers. So 
far as assessing reputation is concerned these trust entities are of little help for 
reasons similar to as for the other issue of anonymity. 
2.3 Certificates 
There has been considerable work done in representing principals in a digital 
world and digital certificates are one way doing that. Digital certificates were 
first proposed by Kohnfelder in his 1978 MIT bachelor's thesis [11]. A digital 
certificate was initially devised after public key cryptography was introduced 
and the need arose to communicate to principals each other's public key. Typi- 
cally a public key certificate contains information about the issuer which may be 
a certifying authority, the subject whom it is supposed to represent, the dates 
the certificate is valid and related information. This kind of certificates cannot 
vouch for the trustworthiness of the subject but is used for identifying them. 
They may also be used to check for authorization like we have in SPKI [8]. As 
we have seen above a certificate from a bank state whether or not a particu- 
lar seller is capable of accepting credit cards but that is not enough to ensure 
that our credit card numbers won't be used maliciously. Apart from these cer- 
tification schemes-are also riddled with risks [9]. We need detailed assertions 
about who can be a CA, its authority, revocation services etc in order to build 
a public key authority of some credibility. In the light of these problems it can 
be said that certificates aren't also able to address the issues like proper use of 
personal information or reputation which we are interested in. They have their 
own interest and goals and that is identifying principals in the digital world. 
2.4 Attribute Vector Model 
This was developed with the goal of having trust decisions in pervasive comput- 
ing. This model incorporated both the traditional identity based model and the 
context based model that is of relevance to pervasive computing. They derive 
degree of trust of an entity Si on S3 as 
D(Si, Sj) =f (A(Sj)) 
where Si and Sj are separate entities and A is the set of their attributes. At- 
tributes can be traditional credentials or they may be context based like location. 
The former can be used for traditional computing purposes and the later can 
be used for pervasive computing devices. In the light of our question relating to 
the safety of our personal information now we do not think this model can be 
of much help as when applied in the traditional context as they operate on cre- 
dentials and we have seen earlier that credentials aren't meant for guaranteeing 
somebody's trustworthiness. 
2.5 Intermediate conclusions 
We started with the questions that we need to address in order to improve the 
credibility of web based transactions. A number of past and present approaches 
were analyzed in the light of above questions and what we have seen that none 
of the approaches satisfactorily addresses the issues. They stop with saying 
whether or not somebody is authorized to do something like accepting credit 
card numbers but there is more to the problem than this authorization decision. 
Most of these approaches are based on credentials and are more suited in mak- 
ing better access control decisions but it is beyond doubt that access control 
decisions just are one part of the entire trust management problem and not 
the whole. This dependence on credentials makes them very static and renders 
them unsuitable to emulate the real world dynamic nature of reputation assess- 
ment. At this point we would like to explore an alternative approach where 
nobody can misuse our personal information. In a word what we envisage is a 
system that provides anonymity as well as helps me to make a decision whether 
or not a particular action conforms to the local policies taking into account the 
reputation of the entity at the other end of the communication channel. 
3 Anonymity 
There has been considerable work done on anonymity [3,16,17,6,51. There 
have been various ways this has been implemented. I think there are at least 
two kinds of anonymity 
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3.1 Complete Anonymity 
What we mean by this is that everything is under the control of the principal 
whose identity is to be protected. The principal is responsible for maintaining 
and implementing the mechanisms necessary for preserving his anonymity. The 
principal doesn't depend on others to meet this requirement. 
3.2 Partial Anonymity 
In this scheme the responsibility for implementing the anonymity requirement 
rests partly on a third party. We can say what our policies are but the in- 
formation is in the hands of the third party and we trust them to implement 
our policies. An example of Dr. Ross Anderson is we trust our doctor to keep 
our medical records and that means that he can manipulate with it. If he is 
malicious then he can leak information about me and we cannot do anything 
about it. We do not trust our friends to keep our medical records and this 
means that even if he wants he cannot do any harm to me. In this scenario a 
'Dusted Third Party is a third party that can break your security policy. In the 
following sections we will have a look at some current approaches to anonymity. 
4 Some Current Approaches To Anonymity 
5 TCPA 
There have been suggestions from the TCPA [19] about AAWS i. e. authenti- 
cated anonymity webservice where by the system goes to a trusted third party 
and then AAWS will assert that the platform is unique but will not reveal any- 
thing that can be used to track back to the system. This approach is similar 
to where we trust somebody to make proper use of our personal information. 
Below we will discuss an approach that builds on this approach. 
5.1 On iPrivacy and Lumeria 
These are systems that were developed to protect user's personal information 
from companies. The first one is iPrivacy a U. S based company where by the 
user downloads software from the website of iPrivacy. This software encrypts 
the user's personal details, creates a fictitious identity and a one time credit card 
number which is matched by the credit card company with the real credit card 
number and then the goods are delivered at an address chosen by the customer. 
Another is Lumeria where by all the information is stored with Lumeria and 
the customer accesses the seller via a proxy server of Lumeria and can then buy 
goods online. These schemes can be compared with the example that we have 
mentioned earlier where we trust our doctor to keep our medical records safe. 
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we have no verifiable proof about the integrity of the software downloaded over 
the net or the integrity of the company storing our personal information. So 
these kinds of schemes we think are vulnerable to abuse in the same way as the 
previous ones where we keep our information with the selling websites. 
5.2 Chaum's Digital Cash 
The scheme proposed by Chaum speaks of anonymity [6]. The user goes to 
the bank sends a signed request; the bank credits the account of the requestor 
after checking the signature. In this scheme the user generates the note number 
which the bank cannot see and that's how he says that even the bank cannot 
track the spending habits of the user. There are also proposals of implementing 
an observer in the representative of the user where by it checks against double 
spending. As we have mentioned later on that this scheme cannot prevent 
transfer of credentials which we do not require in case of notes but we certainly 
need them for driving licenses, medical prescriptions etc. 
5.3 Pseudonyms 
This was proposed by Ron Rivest and others in [121. Here the user generates 
the private and public keys and so do the organizations. The user goes to 
the organization it wants to communicate generates a nym which is a function 
of the secret and non secret keys of the user and the organization. After the 
nym generation the credential is generated and given to the user. The user has 
different credentials for different organizations and it can use credentials issued 
by one organization while dealing with another organization. The scheme we 
present is different from these as ours is based on completely new architecture. 
In our scheme the user is globally represented by his/her public key rather 
than by different nymes. Both our scheme and Rivest's scheme overcomes the 
problem where it was easier to share credentials. 
5.4 Mixes and Crowd 
Mixes was proposed in [4]. Here the user goes to a mix server gets a ticket and 
using that communicates through a series of mix servers. That makes it difficult 
for traffic analysis and spoofing attacks. The communication between the user 
and the mixes are encrypted using keys that the user obtains from the mix 
servers. We would like to mention here that it costs n public key encryptions and 
decryptions when we have n-mixes which is sometimes not desirable. The mix 
servers scramble the messages, reorder them and thus prevent taffies analysis. It 
also requires that dummy messages are sent regularly by the proxy on the user's 
side to counter traffic analysis. We think that the goal of Mixes is different from 
the issues we are trying to address. We can use mixes below our scheme to 
guard from traffic analysis but we will discuss that later. 
9 
Crowds were proposed in [14]. Here they hide the action of one user within 
the actions of several users. They put some constraints on the browser by 
disabling the Active x and Java. Their goal is again to prevent from traffic 
analysis and unlinkability between the sender and receiver. Each user runs a 
jondo on his/her machine which contacts the blender server to request an entry 
into the crowd. All the communications from the user to the web servers is sent 
via the jondo. The jondo contacts a random jondo among the path and then 
forwards the request. The randomness in path selection is the key feature of 
crowd. Similar to mixes we would like to say that Crowds can be used below 
our proposals to provide sender and receiver unlinkability and guarding against 
traffic analysis. 
6A Palladium Based Architecture for Online 
Anonymous Transactions 
6.1 Background 
We wish to prevent anybody from getting hold of our personal information, like 
name, address, social security numbers, and credit card numbers etc. One of 
the instances when we reveal our personal details is when we buy goods online. 
So our quest has been to find an alternative where we have complete anonymity 
from the seller and still buy goods from him or avail the services we pay for. We 
have devised a token-based scheme whereby it is possible to preserve anonymity 
from anyone we do financial transaction with over the web. There will be only 
one entity with which we share our personal information. If all other parts of 
the system work properly and still if there is a leakage then the source of leakage 
can be concluded with reasonable certainty. Here we will discuss the protocol 
and taking a particular example of selling of goods over the net we show three 
stages. After outlining the protocol we present proposals for delivery of goods 
and informing the customer when the customer doesn't have a physical address 
with the seller or the post office. Then we present the generation of tokens and 
propose a token format. The interesting part of this scheme is that we cannot 
transfer credentials and the credentials can only be used only by those to whom 
it is issued. We have seen in Chaum's protocol that though it was tough to 
double spend but we can always transfer credentials or digital cash [6]. The 
bank issues a note without maintaining a record as the note number is blinded 
and then we cn always share the note with friends. But this is not desirable 
where we -have credentials like driving licenses etc. Ron Rivest proposed a 
scheme where it is not possible to transfer credential [12]. The scheme we will 
propose also makes it difficult to transfer credential but it is different as it 
requires that all the credentials are digitally signed by the requestor. Rivest 
proposes a scheme where a user is identified by a nym generated between the 
user and the credential- issuing organization where as in our scheme the nym is 
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the public key of the user. We propose a digital equivalent of a credit card here. 
In our scheme the payment method is not tied or dependent on the identity of 
the payer al though the payer needs to authenticate him/her before he/she uses 
the cards, but that doesn't reveal their identity to the seller. This is different 
from the traditional credit cards. 
6.2 Assumptions 
The approach presented here uses a Palladium machine. Palladium is a new 
trusted computing venture by Microsoft, Intel and several other companies. 
The goal is to have a trusted computing environment which is implemented by 
a combination of hardware and software. Thus the user can be sure that the 
banking application is not being driven by a virus or the passwords are not 
heard by a rogue application. The user trusts that a palladium will implement 
his/her security policies. The hardware is called the Fritz chip which is a 
dongle 
soldered near the motherboard contains an AES key along with a pair of RSA 
keys which also acts as unique identifiers for the system. The trusted software 
element is called nexus. The hardware provides crypto services to nexus and 
recursively nexus provides these crypto-services to the applications above. The 
applications are known as NCAs or Nexus Certified Agents. The proposals also 
speak of a secure input and output so that the user is sure that the banking 
application is free from the influence of any virus, or a rogue application viewing 
the buffer while he/she is typing the password. The nexus communicates with 
the application we use to sign statements, ensures that the legitimate user is 
signing the credential or a statement before signing statements. Every program 
running in a palladium machine has a cryptographic identity which may be 
its SHA-1 hash value and can be checked for integrity. The applications are 
free from the influence of malicious applications running in the system and 
Palladium also claims of performing that by implementing curtained windows. 
The Palladium system is capable of maintaining logs of transactions, performing 
encryption and decryption and generating random numbers. Our scheme relies 
heavily on a third party called AAWS [17] which asserts that the platform is 
unique and the request is legitimate without revealing any other details that 
can be used to trace back to the user. 
6.3 AAWS 
AAWS acts a: s-the third party which authenticates two communicating parties 
to each other and guarantees that they are not talking to an imposter. We use 
AAWS to authenticate two communicating parties to each other and yet preserve 
anonymity. In our proposal we wish to prevent anybody to get information on 
the buyer or on a person to be general. Here the key embedded in the Ritz chip 
acts as the pseudonym. It should not be possible to trace back to the owner 
of the key provided the bank is not malicious or the AAWS is not malicious. 
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We have to have something where there is some stake involved on the part of 
the bank and the AAWS to keep our information secret. So far as the bank is 
concerned the credibility of the bank is involved which directly affects its market 
share and it is unlikely that the bank is ready to risk its market share. So far as 
the AAWS is concerned we would propose it to be the manufacturer's certificate 
which asserts that the platform is unique but will not disclose anything that can 
be used to trace back to the user. AAWVS can also assert that platform can be 
trusted for certain purposes. The manufacturer's certificate is hardwired in the 
secret box and can only be activated by the secure path which is only under the 
control of the legitimate user. The manufacturer's certificate cannot be forged. 
We can have a hash of the manufacturer's certificate encrypted under the public 
key of the receiver which is done automatically every time it is sent. If someone 
tries to tamper with the certificate then that can be easily detected from the hash 
value. The AAWS contains the legitimate public key assigned to the machine 
and then if the communications that accompany that particular AAWS can de 
decrypted using the public key mentioned in the AAWS then that proves that 
the request originated from the legitimate person and didn't originate from an 
imposter. In the protocol mentioned below all the communications accompany 
the AAWS. How they are used is mentioned when we discuss token issuing, or 
credential verification etc. 
6.4 The Protocol 
Here we will outline the various steps of the protocol and state the format of 
the messages at each step. There are three principal entities involved in the 
transaction namely the bank, the seller and the customer. All communications 
between these parties take place across a network channel. 
1. B represents the Bank 
2. S represents the Seller 
3. C represents the Customer 
We represent a signed message M as MEB where M is signed by the private 
key of the bank. When we write AAWS we mean the manufacturer's certificate 
by that. The manufacturer's certificate from the bank looks like AAWSBank. 
Where we write h(x) we mean a SHAT hash of x. The various steps of the 
protocol are as follows: Step 1: The buyer goes to the bank and asks for a token 
that it can use to` buy goods online. The buyer's request R is signed by its 
public key. 
1. C --i B: REC, AAtiVSBuyer, h(AAWSBuyer) > 
The request R contains the SDSI identity of the nexus which generated the 
request which is globally unique and signed by the secret key of the buyer. This 
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ensures that credentials can be kept secret and used by the legitimate user. This 
is achieved in a palladium machine with the help of a Seal/Unseal function. The 
process of credential issue is discussed later on in this paper. It also contains 
a date and time to guard against replay attacks. R also contains a statement 
about the nature of the request. The buyer can be figured out from the AAWS. 
The buyer is known to the bank by the key mentioned in the AAWS which is 
unique by virtue of the algorithms used to generate key pairs. The bank after 
going through its normal procedure issues a token to the buyer. 
2. B --+ C: TEB, AAWSBank, h(AAIVSBank) }- 
T contains the pseudonym of the subject, to whom this credential is being 
issued without revealing any other information. The bank also specifies the 
credit limit of the buyer and assures the seller that the bank will pay the amount 
spent by the legitimate holder of the token. People may argue that the bank can 
have track of the spending habits which it can use for many purposes. What we 
would reply is that when we open an account with the bank we enter into an 
agreement with the bank where it is agreed that our personal information won't 
be shared without our consent. Now since the bank is the only place where our 
personal details are stored any leak of information is easy to detect. In the past 
we had information about us at all sorts of places so it would have been difficult 
to detect from where the leak has been. The threat we are guarding against is 
malicious use of our personal information. In the light of this threat we trust 
the bank and believe the bank is trustworthy as any leaking would affect its 
credibility and market share. We doubt that any bank is ready to risk that. 
Step 2: The buyer goes to an online seller and asks for the credentials of the 
seller before it proceeds with any transaction. The buyer sends a signed request 
to the seller. 
3. C ----b S: - R1-EC, AAWSBuyer, h(AAWSBuyer) >- 
The request R1 contains a request for the credentials of the seller which may 
be whether or not the seller is authorized to accept credit cards and other 
information that can be used for decision making by the compliance checker. 
The seller sends h signed statement back to the customer. 
4. S -+ C: -< M is, AAWSSeller, h(AAWSSeller) > 
The message M contains the credentials of the seller as well as other information 
asked by the buyer: ", 1 and M can differ with different situations. 
Step 3: At'this point the buyer gets back to the compliance checker before 
proceeding further with the seller. We have described a reputation assessment 
scheme and the compliance checker below. We have identified at the beginning 
the need to have a reputation assessment scheme and how it works is mentioned 
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in section 7. The buyer at this point can also refer to other sources for infor- 
mation which is done by the compliance checker before the compliance checker 
arrives at any decision. 
Step 4: If the compliance checker is happy with the seller and gives a positive 
decision then the buyer and seller at this point agree to a transaction. They 
generate a transaction description which is unique and let's call it T. The seller 
sends a signed T to the customer. 
5. S -+ C: < TDES, AAWSSeller, h(AAWSSeller) }- 
TD contains the date, time, description of the goods, the value of the transaction 
and the identity of the agreeing parties to the transaction. T helps us to guard 
against a situation where the buyer pays for X and the seller generates a receipt 
for Y. This raises a dispute and then it might be hard for the buyer to convince 
to a third party that he intended to buy something else. 
Step 5: The buyer presents the token it received from the bank to the seller. 
6. C -# S: - TEB, AAWSBank, h(AAWSBank)ECES, AAWSBuyer, h(AAWSBuyer) >- 
The seller commits the transaction and generates a digitally signed money 
receipt and sends it to the customer with the same details it had in TD along 
with a receipt number. 
7. S -> C: -< Receipt j9, h(Receipt), AAWSSeller, h(AAWSSeller) >- 
The customer checks the receipt it gets against the TD it received earlier and 
thus ensures that the receipt is for the goods it selected and not for something 
else. Without having a valid receipt the customer instructs its bank to ignore 
a particular transaction. The buyer doesn't gain too much in issuing a false 
denial that he/she didn't receive any receipt from the seller. The seller gains 
where as the buyer intends to buy something else but the seller issues a receipt 
for something else. To guard against this situation we have the step where the 
seller signs the transaction details to the buyer. Coming on to another related 
threat which the users have while buying online that do we get the goods we 
pay for. Now if we retain the receipts we receive which is digitally signed by 
the seller then that can be used to prove that we indeed paid for the goods 
which we haven't received though that is not sufficient. We may hide the goods 
somewhere and then claim, but this can at least start an investigation which will 
later on involve the post office or courier companies. The mechanisms required 
to support aiz. the part of the courier companies are proposed below. The seller 
also maintains a log of the transaction so that he can claim payments. If he 
doesn't then he doesn't get any money. So eventually if the seller is at fault 
then it can be traced from the seller's log that the buyer has paid for the goods 
he/she didn't receive. This way we can preserve anonymity as well as present 
proof when ever there is a dispute. Here both the parties have to maintain a log 
for their own interest which can go against them if they try to act maliciously. 
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Moreover if the seller wants to tamper with his evidence with after he receives 
the payment then the bank has the proof that the seller asked for the payment 
which the seller does by digitally signing the transaction from his Palladium 
machine which unambiguously states that the seller and nobody else, asked for 
the payment. Similar is the case with receipts where the receipt is signed by 
the secret key of the seller which can only be done by the seller and the seller 
cannot deny that later on. The fact that the seller uses a particular machine 
can be figured out easily as in cases of Palladium we need a third party to prove 
that this Palladium box belongs to the one who is claiming to own it. This 
very concept raises another debate, is whoever is in possession of a system is 
he/she responsible for any and every malicious use of the system. To address 
this controversy we can have some secret sharing between the application we 
use sign statements and me or at least between the trusted part of the machine 
and the intended user. Only the legitimate user can have access to the trusted 
part of the machine and nobody else can access the trusted part of the system. 
6.5 Delivery of Goods 
A very important question is if we keep our address secure then how do we 
get the goods delivered to our address? There have been alternatives proposed 
and implemented in this regard. A company in U. S which protects customer's 
privacy does so by getting the customer to choose an address of delivery. The 
customers can have arrangements with the local post office and have post box 
numbers. There can be new business opportunities where by the post office en- 
ters an agreement with the clients to maintain a post box. There can be various 
ways of implementing this and we are not going to comment on that here. But 
we would mention here that there should be mechanisms of logging the details 
of the goods coming for a particular client in his/her post box and when those 
goods are collected by the customers. The seller keeps an acknowledgement 
similar to proof of delivery that comes from the last post office in the chain 
for its own records and another one from the first one in the chain, to prove 
that the customer has in fact collected the goods and that the seller posted the 
goods to be sent to the customer respectively. The post offices should also keep 
a similar log of the goods as they enter and when they leave. These systems 
are already in place so can easily be implemented or extended. We can have 
a system where every post box holder has an account with the post office and 
when he/she comes to collect the goods they do so after entering their details 
and the secrgt. they share with the server at the post office. There should also 
be a unique identifier for the customer and thereby the customer doesn't reveal 
any other details about his/her whereabouts. It may be that the post office 
recognizes the customer by his/her public key. The secret should be used to 
open the door of the locker of the customer and as soon as he/she opens the 
door the date and time of collection is recorded and a proof of receipt is gen- 
erated as mentioned above which is forwarded upwards in the delivery chain to 
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the seller and also stored with the post office. The proof of receipt can only be 
generated by the customer's key the reason we will see in the next few lines. 
There is something very important here. The employee who is at the post of- 
fice has also access to the locker. He can always open the door and run away 
with the goods. This can lead to a dispute for which neither the customer nor 
the seller is liable. To counter this threat what we propose is a system where 
the customer and the employee have different keys both of which will open the 
door. Based upon the key used the door records who opened the door and at 
what time. Like the one we have at networks where we have user passwords 
and administrator privileges. Since the proof of receipt can never be generated 
by the employee's key and in absence of that in the log of the post office the 
customer can always prove that it didn't collect the goods. We also ensure that 
a corrupt employee can never defraud the customer by a scheme of display in 
the next section. We are also able to address another situation where by the 
customer forgets or doesn't generate the proof of receipt in other applications. 
Here when ever the customer comes to collect the goods and opens the lock a 
proof of receipt is automatically generated whether the customer wants or not. 
There is another interesting issue here. We check our pigeon hole everyday irre- 
spective of whether there is any mail or not. Here whenever the customer opens 
her lock receipts will be generated. It might be that such receipts are generated 
when there are no goods waiting for the customer. How will the customer know 
whether the deliveries that are scheduled to arrive has arrived or not. We will 
address this in the next section. 
6.6 Informing the customers 
Here we will propose a scheme where by we can inform the customer about 
the delivery of the goods. We are assuming that the customers only come to 
look at their locks when they have ordered for goods online and only come 
after the period which is reasonable for the goods to arrive. We can have some 
display on the door of the lock where by the customer comes to know about 
the goods. The display can be manually set by the employee of the post office 
or it can be done electronically when ever a good is recorded in the system 
against the particular customer. The display can only be set off by the key of 
the customer. This also ensures that the employee can never set the display 
off, though he can set the display on. If the display is set on manually locally 
then there should be local arrangements that the display is set off locally. Even 
if the display. is set on by an entry into the central system of the post office 
then also there is no harm if the arrangement is to set the display of locally 
when the key of the customer is entered. The display can also act as a physical 
verifier to the local authority that the customer hasn't collected the goods. It 
can also help us in unusual circumstances when there is an unusual delay on the 
part of the customer then arrangements can be made to physically inform the 
customer. There is a problem though. The customer is known by its public key 
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and nothing else. It is only the bank who has information about the customer. 
Arrangements can be made to deal with such unusual circumstances. There 
can be a criticism that the users have to go for collecting their goods. We 
would argue that this is small price for privacy. There can certainly be ways of 
addressing this problem may be using agents, but we can deal with that problem 
separately. 
5.7 CG8aaratiion a dý Delivery of° tokens 
We would like to have a SPKI certificate format based token with certain changes 
that can be used by the customer for paying for goods bought online. A very 
important part of the whole is auditing which is necessary in the event of any 
dispute between the bank and the seller. Auditing surely helps in resolving 
those disputes. Both the bank and customer are identified by their public keys 
although the bank also has a physical presence. The customer sends a digitally 
signed request to the bank along with the AAWS. The AAWS states that the 
request originated from the legitimate owner as it gives the public key of the 
owner and that can prove to the bank that the requestor is the legitimate owner 
of the corresponding secret key. The proposed token will contain the following 
fields 
1. Issuer The public key of the bank can be the AES/RSA key of its chip. 
2. Subject The public key of the customer can be the AES/RSA key of his 
chip. 
3. Authorization This will state the upper limit fixed by the bank up to 
which a customer can spend. 
4. Validity Here we can have a scheme as proposed by Rivest where he spec- 
ifies three dates whereby; the credential is perfectly valid between datesl 
and 2 should be accepted with caution between dates2 and 3 and should 
not be accepted without verification after date3. 
We have programs with cryptographic identities. We would like to propose a 
scheme whereby a program is identified by a SDSI name where the AES/RSA. 
key serves as the root name and the SHA-1 hash of the program is the local name 
and both of them makes the program uniquely identifiable. The request from 
the customer to the bank will contain the SDSI name of the nexus that requested 
it. The credential is sent by the Seal/Unseal function to the target nexus and 
the binding between the customer and the particular machine is done by the 
HAWS. Only the intended nexus is able to retrieve the credentials and no other 
nexus will be able to get the credentials. The customer's Palladium machine 
uses the Unseal function to retrieve the credentials and that is presented by the 
NCA responsible for such transactions to the seller online after digitally signing 
the credential with the buyer's key. The bank also has a Palladium machine 
and it has its keys which it uses to sign the customer's credentials. 
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6.8 Credential Verification 
Here we will dwell on another important aspect of credential verification and 
propose a scheme for the above situation when we are buying and selling over 
the net. We have already mentioned the questions that come to our mind when 
we do transactions online. The user would like to know whether the seller is 
authorized to do business over the net or not, is it authorized to accept the 
tokens or not etc. We can have a similar model to what we have while verifying 
the buyer. The bank can issue a similar SPKI certificate which is signed by the 
bank and again the seller can be identified by the AES/RSA key of its Palladium 
machine with the help of an AAWS. The seller can present its certificate to the 
buyer by digitally signing it which can be verified by the buyer. With such 
verifications we eliminate the need to have online verifications which are very 
costly in low valued transaction. The format of a certificate possessed by the 
seller can be as 
1. Issuer The public key of the bank can be the AES/RSA key of its chip. 
2. Subject The public key of the seller can be the AES/RSA key of his chip. 
3. Authorization This will state that the particular trader is allowed to accept 
tokens issued by banks. 
4. Validity Here we can have a scheme as proposed by Rivest where he spec- 
ifies three dates whereby; the credential is perfectly valid between datesl 
and 2, should be accepted with caution between dates2 and 3 and should 
not be accepted without verification after date3. 
The seller sends digitally signed credentials along with the AAWS. If the public 
key that is mentioned in the AAWVS can be used successfully to decrypt the re- 
quest then that proves that the seller is the legitimate owner of the credentials. 
We assume that the keys are not compromised and digital signatures uniquely 
verify the principal with whose public key we decrypt the signature. No one 
else can generate the signature. Similarly the customer sends a digitally signed 
request along with the credentials to the seller along with the AAWS which 
states unambiguously that the request originated from the legitimate owner of 
the corresponding public key and credentials. After the credentials are authen- 
ticated we take a decision based on our policy whether we can carry on with 
a particular transaction. A mechanism for compliance checking is mentioned 
below. ""t 
6.9 Key Management 
Perhaps the most important question that surrounds Palladium today is of key 
generation and who is going to generate the keys. A reasonable way to do is 
to let the user generate the keys and then put them in the box and seal this 
18 
only in the presence of the user. The box can be sealed once and can never be 
reopened. The box contains the manufacturer's certificate along with the keys. 
What we mean by the box is Fritz chip. Another important issue is revocation. 
This is similar to answering the question, how long are we willing to let the 
world believe something that is not true. A problem is that since the box can 
be sealed once we also need to throw the box away but the box contains the 
manufacturer's certificate. We would like to make some assumptions here. The 
keys are reasonably secure against cryptographic attacks within their crypto- 
graphic lifetime. Another is that the users won't share their keys as that would 
lead to a situation where the user suffers substantial losses. We have mentioned 
that in the credentials we can three dates as proposed by Rivest. We will always 
discard the keys after their cryptographic life time irrespective of whether they 
are compromised or not. If the keys are compromised then we have to generate 
new key pairs and reprogram the Fritz chip. We have proposed in our scheme 
that all requests should accompany the manufacturer's certificate so even if the 
keys are stolen out of a Palladium machine the victim cannot be impersonated 
by the attacker as the manufacturer's certificate in the attacker's machine can- 
not be changed without tampering with the chip. We are not saying that key 
compromises should no longer be reasons for worrying but for this example it 
will be hard for the attacker to impersonate as the legitimate user. 
7 Reputation Assessment 
The system we have proposed above helps us to maintain anonymity, we can 
check the credentials of the party we are transacting with and above all now we 
have a means for uniquely identifying a machine and the owner of the machine 
and what is he using it for with the help of AAWS. But this is not all we wanted 
to address in the sphere of E-commerce. There remains a very important issue 
that needs to be addressed. As a customer we worry not only about our credit 
card numbers but also other issues related to the level of service we get. Do 
the customers enjoy the same right online as they do while dealing with the 
shop down the road, Can they get a refund and a whole lot of other issues. We 
have already mentioned independent trust entities and shown that these do not 
serve our purpose as somebody can always get a certificate and later on turn 
dishonest. We would like to have up-to-date information about the dealings of 
a particular seller. Normally we get information from friends, relatives some of 
whom we trust about information and some of them we do not trust what they 
are saying. Gossip is a very powerful way to build impressions about somebody 
and we will try to emulate that in the electronic world. Each source will have 
its own weight and those will be calculated while taking a decision. We can 
always move sources up and down in the list i. e. increase and decrease their 
weights. This makes the decision making process very dynamic. The scheme we 
are proposing here also can be used for new entrants in the fray in building their 
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credibility. We would like to mention here that a particular principal qualifies 
as a source for another principal when both of them have the same interest so 
far as the outcome of the transaction is concerned. Let's take an example where 
a insurance company who is going to pay its customer for any losses in the event 
of any dispute with the seller, and a customer of the insurance company both 
desire that the goods arrive properly maybe for different reasons. Let's think of 
a situation where Alice believes what Bob says about x, Alice's belief about x 
is dependent on three things 
a. Bob is saying exactly what he believes about x and not misleading 
Alice 
2. b. Bob's knowledge on x can change or decrease over time 
3. c. Bob and Alice have the same interest so far as the outcome of the 
transaction is concerned. 
We are assuming that Bob is not misleading Alice and is providing her with 
correct information. We will express the degrees of reputation on a scale of 
100. Suppose Alice assigns the weight 20 to Bob. The weight Alice assigns to 
her sources of information depends on several factors like how long she knows 
them, their performance in the past. We can have a separate ratings scheme 
for that. Bob's impression of a particular seller is calculated on the basis of 
his experience which can be calculated as, suppose Bob has used the website 
10 times and out of that he was satisfied by their service 5 times, and the rest 
of the time he had some problems like delays or goods received in an improper 
condition etc. Suppose that our source is our insurance company then it will 
have different parameters for making decisions like the total number of claims 
received etc. Bob also takes into account the time it last used the service. If it's 
too old then that affects the overall weight assigned by Bob, if it's not very old 
it affects the overall weight but less than the previous case, but if it's fairly new 
then we do not let this factor affect the overall weighting. The reason being that 
the services of that particular seller might have deteriorated since Bob used it 
last and so if Bob's impression is pretty old then Bob should take into account 
this fact while assigning weights or this seller. Again if this is our insurance 
company it will have a completely different way of giving its opinion. If the last 
claim date is pretty old then it is going to ignore the fact that this particular 
seller had a bad past but if a claim date is fairly new then that is going to affect 
the decision of. thg insurance company about a particular seller. This flexibility 
helps the system to accommodate decisions from various sources. Going back 
to our example here we are assuming that the information Bob has is fairly 
new. Now going by the straight logic we could have given it 50 on a scale of 
100, but here we take into account those negative experiences of Bob and assign 
40. When we look to Bob for his opinion we get 40 from that we derive our 
decision whether to visit the website by dividing 40 by 20 and the result is 2. 
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If we have more than one source or several sources we calculate our opinion as 
above and take the mean of those and get a value. When we have it we compare 
it with a threshold and if it's greater than the threshold then we do carry on 
with the transaction else abandon it. If we carry on with the transaction and 
get good results we increase the weight we assign to Bob else we reduce it in 
the event of a negative effect. To play it very safe we can have linear increase 
but multiplicative decrease, but that can be customized with the situation at 
hand. Thus we can have a very dynamic system that models the real world fact 
that reputation changes with time. More over as we have already mentioned 
above we are having Palladium based architecture and here everybody can be 
identified by the AAW'VS. This makes sure that we are getting the information 
from the sources we want and not from a spoofed server. Having said all this 
we would like to say that we are making a very big assumption that all the 
sources will pool in proper information and not misguide me. So we have a 
proposed linear increase and multiplicative decrease. If we find a source acting 
maliciously we can always decrease the rating and move away to another source 
of information. We have also mentioned at the beginning that a principal is 
qualified to be a source for another one if both have same interest so far as the 
outcome of the transaction is concerned. The actual implementation and the 
figures will depend on the implementation. We should have a policy of not using 
any source with a weight below a certain threshold value for decision making 
process. This threshold value can increase and decrease according to the threat 
model and the situation. The scheme we have proposed here we think can be 
used to model the relevant aspects of the real world perception of reputation. We 
can also extend this scheme and allow for new sellers to come in and pool in trust 
information which can then be authorized by third parties who can act as our 
source of information. The buyers can refer to third parties who can help them 
to make a decision. A similar scheme was proposed by Jean Bacon and others 
of the University of Cambridge where they have Guarantors who helps the new 
entrants to build their credibility over time [22]. The sources of information can 
be the insurance companies, friends or other trusted sources. As was proposed 
in their scheme we can have a system where the guarantors are liable for wrong 
information. On the one hand we have guarantors who only benefits if there 
is a positive outcome as their interest is same as the buyers interests and one 
the other hand they suffer loss twice when they provide incorrect information 
as they lose business and also their weight gets decreased. This affects their 
credibility as well. To conclude we think that the scheme we have presented 
above helps Vso generate an opinion from various sources when we do not 
have information and at the same time guards from the threats where one or 
more of the sources may be malicious. This also helps new entrants to build 
their customer base by pooling in information about them which can be verified 
by the buyers. We have mentioned the outline the need to have a reputation 
assessment system at the beginning of this paper and here we propose a model 
which emulates the way reputation is built in the real world. 
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8 Compliance Checking 
After the credentials are verified we would like to refer to the local policy 
database for a decision on whether to carry on with the transaction or abort 
it. The compliance checker is a database of policies which are queried by differ- 
ent applications via different interfaces. The application we use to buy goods 
online is different from the one we use for emails and each of them has to act 
according to local policy so each of them queries the local compliance checker. 
The compliance checker can only be programmed by the local administrator 
and it has different modules for different activities. We can have one for content 
verification, one for doing online financial transaction and another for emails. 
The application calls the corresponding module and then presents it with the 
credentials and acts according to the reply. The onus of parsing the credentials 
and interpreting them rests on the application as we have seen in keynote and 
policymaker. The interesting part here is when we incorporate the reputation 
assessment model that we have mentioned above into the compliance checker. 
Whenever the compliance checker doesn't have information about any particular 
request it can always request the corresponding application to get opinions from 
others. So far as the sources for each activity are concerned that will be decided 
by the local administrator along with the weights. The compliance checker has 
full knowledge about the weights assigned to each of them and then calculates 
the decision as mentioned above. The threshold value for each activity is also 
mentioned in each module of the compliance checker. After the application 
has finished with the transaction it should communicate the appropriate mod- 
ule about the outcome of the transaction so that the weights can be updated 
accordingly by the compliance checker. The compliance checker operates as a 
stand alone system apart from the NCAs in the trusted part and all the other 
applications query the compliance checker for an opinion. 
9 Conclusion 
When we were analyzing web based transactions we found that anonymity as 
well as the reputation of the seller is a matter of serious concern for the buyer. 
The mechanism presented here can be used for anonymous transactions over 
the net. We have dealt here with a particular transaction but we can generalize 
this system for other applications too. We can also make decisions before car- 
rying out any actions based on our local policy and it is being ensured that the 
compliance cfieaker also is able to give decisions when it doesn't have required 
information. A mechanism which emulates the real world process of building 
reputations is incorporated into the compliance checker and this makes the com- 
pliance checker proposed here from the compliance checkers found in the trust 
management systems. The mechanism presented above also makes it difficult to 
impersonate due to AAWS and transfer credentials. It is clear now that we are 
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yet to have means that guarantees that our information will be properly used 
and it is better not to disclose sensitive information at all over the net. We use 
a compliance verification system to implement local policy. We have proposed 
a digital equivalent of a credit card but unlike the traditional credit cards they 
do not have our identity. These are issued to our pseudonyms. The legitimate 
holder of the card needs to verify every time they use the card but that doesn't 
reveal their real identity. This independence of the payment method on the 
identity of the payer is useful in many transactions as we have shown here. The 
mechanism for anonymous transaction coupled with this compliance verification 
makes it different from all the current and past approaches we have seen. To be 
precise the system proposed here is a model for anonymous transaction with a 
compliance checker incorporating a reputation assessment system. 
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Abstract. The contribution of this paper is a mechanism which links au- 
thentication to audit using weak identities and takes identity out of the trust 
management envelope. Although our protocol supports weaker versions of 
anonymity still it is useful even if anonymity is not required due to the ability 
to reduce trust assumptions. We illustrate the protocol with an example of 
authorization in a role based access mechanism. 
1 Introduction 
Authentication, authorisation and audit are three traditional concerns in build- 
ing a privilege management infrastructure (PMI); the purpose of authentication 
is to identify a particular user and verify that a user is who he/she is claiming 
to be; the goal of authorisation is to provide access for certain users to certain 
resources based on predefined business rules; and an audit trail links actions to 
principals retrospectively. Traditionally, authentication is based on permanent 
credentials linked to a fixed long-term identity and authorisation is linked to 
audit via the authentication mechanism explicitly using the same permanent 
credential and identity. Privacy is not an explicit goal of traditional authenti- 
cation/authorisation mechanisms [10,9,1]. This we believe is not quite right 
even if privacy is not a requirement; such approaches compel users to enter 
into unneccesary trust relationship with parts of the system infrastructure. For 
example services trust Kerberos' judgement about the identity of the requestor. 
In this paper we present an authorisation mechanism which takes identity 
out of the trust management envelope. Although our protocol supports weaker 
versions of anonymity, but it is useful even if anonymity is not required at all, 
because of the ability to weaken trust assumptions; the approach we present 
here allows users to control the risks they are exposed to rather than forcing 
them to enter into an unnecessary compulsive trust relationship with the system 
infrastructure. Similarly, services also do not need to trust the authentication 
mechanism of a third party. 
Role based access control (RBAC) is one mechanism for building a PMI. 
The main idea behind RBAC is that the permissions are associated with roles 
instead of directly with users. The usual approach for role activation is authen- 
tication by role members using fixed credentials like a key certificate or a role 
certificate. It is well known that repeated use of fixed credentials enables an 
adversary to correlate the transactions of any particular user of a system. The 
problems of using fixed credentials have been well understood in the world of 
commercial transactions, and this has led to the advent of several anonymous 
payment mechanisms. We focus on privilege management infrastructures where 
key certificates are extensively used for making authorisation decisions. The 
certificates when used repeatedly also enable an adversary to correlate all the 
access requests of its victims. Our intention is to show some alternative ways to 
link authentication, Role Based Access Control, Trust Management using tran- 
sient identities (surrogates) in an auditable but unlinkable way. What we are 
suggesting here is creating some conceptually neat layers in trust management 
approaches using explicit labels and policies. Our approach can coexist with 
other traditional non-anonymous approaches. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an outline of what we 
mean by transient identities. In section 3 we present a brief overview of trust 
management systems which is followed by our design goals and assumptions in 
section 4. This is followed in section 5 by the protocol for anonymous authenti- 
cation which is the main contribution of this paper, which is followed in section 
6 by conclusions. 
2 Surrogates 
Surrogates [6] are transient numbers generated from a parent number (such 
as a bank account number, credit card number, or social security number) by 
some mathematical function. They are used to preserve the anonymity of the 
legitimate owner of the parent number. The party who accepts the surrogates 
in exchange of goods or services bears the risk of fake surrogates (4]. There is a 
difference between blinded credentials and the way we generate surrogates here. 
Blinded credentials need to be certified by some authority [5,13], and can be 
reused (5], or the user needs to get a new credential issued after every single 
transaction [13]. Surrogates are for single use, doesn't need to be certified and 
we use and throw them away after every single transaction. Blinded credentials 
can be verified by the acceptor if the acceptor knows the public key of the 
issuer. Surrogates are verified by proving knowledge of a secret that was used 
to generate the surrogate without revealing the secret. 
The surrogates in our protocol are generated by the user and although the 
issuer can verify them but the issuer cannot masquerade as the user. The 
surrogates for a particular user are generated from the parent public key of 
that user. The surrogates have corresponding secret keys like the parent public 
key. These secret values are generated from the secret key corresponding to the 
parent public key and together the public surrogate and its corresponding secret 
value forms the surrogate pair. The surrogate pair for a public private key pair 
can only be generated and used by the legitimate owner of the corresponding 
parent public key. The requirements for surrogates can be summarised as: 
o Un-correlatability - Different transactions initiated by a particular princi- 
pal cannot be linked to each other or back to the initiator of the transac- 
tion. 
o Unforgeability - It should be hard for an adversary to generate and use 
credentials belonging to another user. 
o Verifiability - The verifier who might be the owner of the resource or an 
access granting service should be able to able to unambiguously verify that 
the requestor is who he/she is claiming to be. 
2.3, Generation and U se o Surrogates 
Our key generation method is similar to the traditional one described by Rife 
and Hellman in [8]. Cathy selects a secret s, E1... (P - 1) and generates her 
public key as 
X=g9° modP (1) 
The surrogates are generated by modular exponentiation of X using an exponent 
r where rE1... (P - 1). The secret value corresponding to a surrogate is 
generated by modular multiplication of the exponent r with the secret s that 
was used to generate X. The initial value (ro) of the exponent r is supplied by 
a (partially) trusted third party such as the user's bank. The subsequent values 
(r1) of the exponent r, used to generate the surrogates and their corresponding 
secret, are generated by the user using the linear congruence equation, 
ri = (A * 7i_1 + 0) mod P (2) 
where A and 0 are selected by a third party and are fixed. Then, using -r;, sur- 
rogate K; and its corresponding secret Kti for the ith transaction are generated 
as: 
K =rl s, mod(P-1) (3) 
K; =gK modP=X modP (4) 
To generate surrogates corresponding to a user, first the exponent is calculated 
by equation 2 and then the secret is calculated by equation 3, finally the sur- 
rogate is generated from the secret by equation 4. The third party sends the 
user A, 0, and the initial value rr0 of the exponent so that the user can generate 
his/her surrogates. 
To use a surrogate Ki for transaction ia user proves knowledge of the 
corresponding Ki . 
Only the legitimate owner of X and s. can generate and 
use surrogates corresponding to X. The third party cannot masquerade as the 
legitimate owner of X as the corresponding s is secret but can resolve disputes 
and can correlate transactions conducted with surrogates generated from X, 
thus facilitating auditing. However various transactions conducted by the same 
user cannot be correlated with each other by an adversary at the point of use of 
the surrogates. Learning one set of K; , 
Kt values doesnot help the attacker in 
any way, neither can the attacker generate future Kt, Ki values nor can the 
attacker get the secret value s, 
3 Trust Management Systems 
Trust management systems helps applications answer the question "Can I trust 
this public key for this purpose"? Keynote [2] is the latest version of a set of 
trust management approaches that came from Matt Blaze, Joan Feigenbaum 
and John loannidis. Keynote works more or less like a database query engine. 
It can function as a stand alone application interfacing with other parts of the 
system and helping them in making decisions. Let's lump these other parts of 
the system together and call them by a common name application. Whenever 
any application faces the question "Should we carry out this dangerous action 
"then it refers to Keynote for an opinion and based on that opinion it decides its 
future course of action. The application presents the Keynote trust management 
engine with a set of local policies that should be taken into account while taking 
a decision on this particular request along with the credentials of the requestor 
and details about the proposed action. If the proposed action conforms to the 
local policy then keynote advises the requestor to proceed otherwise Keynote 
advises it not to perform this action as it is against the local policy. Keynote 
acts as a compliance checker for the application. The policies are specified in 
the form of assertions and the actions are specified which are evaluated against 
these assertions. 
4 Transaction Flow 
1. Cathy is a subscriber of an electronic newspaper. The newspaper uses a 
role based authorisation model where Cathy is assigned the role of sub- 
scriber. The process is same for every subscriber. 
2. The subscription department (SA) prepares and sends the information 
Cathy needs to generate her surrogates. At regular intervals the subscrip- 
tion department also sends the web server (WS) the information needed 
to authenticate Cathy and other subscribers. 
3. Every time Cathy reads the newspaper she first authenticates herself to 
the web server (WS) using her current surrogate and upon a successful 
authentication her role is activated. 
4. Cathy generates her own surrogate for the current session. 
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5. The web server authenticates locally whether or not Cathy is a valid sub- 
scriber. The role server consults the local trust management engine to 
ascertain whether or not Cathy is allowed to carry out the actions she 
requested. 
6. The next time Cathy reads this newspaper she uses a different surrogate. 
7. The SA cannot masquerade as Cathy. 
4.1 Cryptographic and Infrastructural Assumptions 
We assume the existence of a secure authenticated communication channel be- 
tween Cathy and the subscription department of the electronic newspaper. This 
can be implemented by digital signatures where every communication between 
Cathy and SA are digitally signed. This provides authentication. The com- 
munication link can be secured by for example SSL/TLS. All communications 
between Cathy and the SA are denoted by -i in the protocol. 
An anonymous communication channel between Cathy and WS is also as- 
sumed for our purposes. This can be implemented by Chaum's mix nets [? ] or 
Mixminion [7]. The mix network makes it harder for an adversary observing the 
network to gain any additional information about the communicating partners 
beyond its a priori belief. Communications over the mix nets are denoted by 
--i, in our protocol. 
Our protocol depends on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms in 
the multiplicative group ZP where P is a large prime. P should be chosen such 
that (P-1) has at least one large prime factor, since if (P-1) has only small 
prime factors then computing discrete logarithm is easy [11]. We also assume 
that principals are capable of keeping their secrets secret. 
5 The Protocol 
The protocol can be described under two phases namely 
1. Preparation phase 
2. Transaction phase 
5.1 Preparation Phase 
Cathy sends jthe subscription department (SA) her public key. 
1. Cathy -a SA :X= gs= (mod P) 
where g and P are public and g is the generator modulo P. SA sends Cathy 
the information she needs to generate her surrogates which is 
2. SA --- Cathy :5 =-< rro, Or, A> 
SA selects To, Oa, Or E ZZ. We use the Linear Congruential Method to 
generate exponent "ri where the offset OT and the modulus P are co-prime to 
each other and A is the constant used in the linear congruence method. ri is the 
exponent used for generating the surrogate. For each subscriber SA sends the 
web server (WS) m surrogates by repeating the following for each of the next 
m values of i: 
Ti = (A * T=_1 + Or) (mod P) 
X; = X' (mod P) 
3. SA --> WS: -< X1 i ....., X,,, r 
Surrogates of various customers are sent together in a batch. At the end of this 
phase SA only retains -< X, A, T=, OT > for every subscriber. 
5.2 Transaction Phase 
For transaction i Cathy calculates her ith surrogate K; . The corresponding 
private exponent K, - of the current surrogate is also generated by Cathy. 
(A * -r; _l + 
Do) mod P-1 
Kt = sc * Tt (mod P- 1) 
Kt = 9K+ (mod P) 
To activate her role for her current transaction Cathy sends the web server 
her current surrogate K; and proves knowledge of the corresponding secret key 
K; . If the web server finds a similar surrogate sent to it by the SA then it 
grants Cathy access. To be specific the WS activates relevant permissions for 
Cathy. To ascertain the validity of Cathy's request the WS consults the local 
trust management engine. An implementation incorporating trust management 
engines can be found in [12]. 
4. Cathy--,, WS: Kt 
The next time Cathy reads the electronic newspaper she uses a different sur- 
rogate to authenticate herself. The role server can authenticate Cathy anony- 
mously without the issuing authority being online. The issuing authority can 
periodically'erid Cathy's new surrogates to the web server. SA cannot mas- 
querade as Cathy to the web server. 
6 Conclusion 
The surrogates can be verified locally by the web server without the cooperation 
of the issuing authority (SA). Various transactions of any particular user cannot 
be correlated with each other without the active cooperation of the issuing 
authority. For purposes of dispute resolution the issuing authority SA in our 
protocol can correlate the actions of the subscribers. 
Our protocol supports weaker versions of anonymity, and it is still useful 
even if anonymity is not required at all, because of the ability to weaken trust 
assumptions. The web server where principals request access does not need to 
trust the authentication mechanism of a third party. From the point of indi- 
vidual privacy users are no longer required to trust web servers with credentials 
linked to long term fixed identity using which an adversary can uniquely identify 
the user. 
Our protocol can also be integrated with web servers which currently use 
trust management systems [2,3] to make decisions based on fixed policies and 
credentials. The trust management systems can be placed in the web server 
and make decisions based on a surrogate supplied by the requestor and role 
specific policies specified by the appropriate authority. The trust policies can 
be communicated to the web server by the appropriate authority. 
Our work also has implications in other areas like payment, price discrimina- 
tion, licensing enforcement. If Cathy avails of service using her surrogates and 
wishes to pay for the service then there should be ways of tying the surrogates 
to the payment for auditing purposes. Similarly for price discrimination if a 
buyer can prove with his/her surrogate which price band he/she belongs to and 
the buyer is the legitimate owner of the surrogate, then price discrimination can 
be done with online transient identities, thus protecting offline identities. 
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1 Introduction 
The Internet is conducive to large scale privacy invasion, identity theft [4], and 
target marketing [? ]. We have seen instances in the past where people have 
suffered serious damage to the ready availability of digital dossiers [4]. Any 
centrally stored information can be abused. The use of fixed credentials (credit 
cards, key certificates) enables an adversary to correlate all the transactions 
conducted with the fixed credential. The threats of identity theft, correlatabil- 
ity can be countered using anonymous transaction protocols. Here we present a 
protocol for uncorrelatable electronic transaction based on ring signatures which 
also guards against identity theft as well as protects the privacy of the commu- 
nicating partners. The organization of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we 
present the threat model which we are considering. This is followed in section 3 
by an overview of ring signatures. In Section 4 we present our design goals and 
assumptions. The protocol which is the contribution of this paper is presented 
in section 5, which is followed by conclusions in section 6. 
2 The Threat Model 
When we buy goods or services or simply surf online we end up giving out 
lots of inforittation about ourselves. All this information goes into databases 
somewhere. These records can be linked together to build a complete dossier on 
an individual [? ]. Thieves can steal credit card information and use it, terrorists 
can track their targets using government maintained address records, or servers 
at the other end can leak sensitive information about us. In many instances 
in the past people have suffered damage due to the malicious use of sensitive 
information [1), [2). When we pay for goods using our credit card we present 
our card (which is the payment token) along with our identity (we provide our 
name and address for authorization on the internet). This information is used 
to check the validity of the card and the creditworthiness of the customer. In 
other applications trustworthiness of communicating partners are established 
using certificates, a good example of which is the Globe System [8]. Using same 
fixed certificates to establish the trustworthiness of the communicating partners 
enables the grantor of access to any service to correlate all the transactions of 
a requestor. What happens in the process is that the merchant, in the case 
of online shopping, also obtains a unique identifier (the credit card number) 
which, as well as learning the credit card number, enables the merchant to 
correlate various transactions conducted under the same credit card. Customer 
information can be indexed using credit card numbers or they can be sold to 
marketing companies [6]. 
The problem is that we do not have a clue about how information about us 
would be used by the entities at the other end of the communication channel. 
3 Ring Signatures 
Ring signatures were designed Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Yael Tauman [9]. In 
this signature scheme the verifier doesn't learn who the signer is but can only 
learn that the signer is a member of group of certain possible signers called a ring. 
One of the members of the ring actually signs using his/her private key and the 
public keys of the other members. The example cited in [9] speaks of a situation 
where aa government minister wants to leak information to a journalist. The 
journalist knowing the public keys of all the ministers can be sure that one of 
the ministers signed it without knowing who is the mole in the cabinet. In 
producing such a signature the signatory doesn't need the cooperation of any 
member of the group. All the signer needs to know is the public keys of all the 
members of the group. Let there be r members in the group. The signature is 
generated as: 
1. The signer first computes the key as the hash of the message m to be 
signed. 
2. Then the signer generates a random initialization value v. 
3. The signer generates a random value x for each member of the group 
and computes yi which is xi encrypted with the public key of that ring 
member. 
4. Then the signer solves the equation Fk,, (y,, y2, ..., y,. 
) =v for ys where F 
is a combining equation. 
5. Now the signer uses his private key in order to invert gs on y$ to obtain 
X , as x, = gs 
1(y9 ) 
6. The output of the signature is the set of values xi, the random value v, 
and the public keys of the group members. 
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A ring signature can be verified as follows: 
1. For each member of the group, we encrypt the the corresponding random 
value xi with that member's public key to give yi. 
2. We obtain the hash of the message to obtain the key k as k= h(m). 
3. We verify that the combining equation F regenerates the random value v 
in Zp. 
4 Design Goals and Assumptions 
4.1 Design Goals 
We present a protocol for Uncorrelatable Electronic Transaction (UET) where 
we use surrogates. Our approach makes it hard for an adversary to correlate 
all the transactions conducted by the same customer. The transaction flow is 
outlined by means of an example as: 
1. The bank prepares and sends the information Carol needs to generate her 
surrogates. 
2. Carol goes to a website selling goods she wants to purchase. 
3. Carol generates the surrogate for the current transaction. 
4. The seller authenticates locally whether or not Carol is a valid customer 
of the bank. 
5. The seller sends the customer information to the bank. 
The next time Carol goes to shop with the same seller she uses a different 
surrogate which can be verified as before but cannot be correlated with a pre- 
vious surrogate. Our motivation has been that Carol trusts her bank which is 
quite a practical thing to do. There is no communication between the bank 
and the seller for authorization of payments and the seller can locally verify the 
validity of the customer. 
4.2 Cryptographic and Infrastructural Assumptions 
Communications between the bank and it's clients (the customer and the seller) 
are not anonymous. We assume the existence of a secure authenticated com- 
munication channel between the bank and the seller and between the bank and 
the customer. This can be implemented by digital signatures where every com- 
munication between the bank and the customer and the bank and the seller are 
digitally signed. This provides authentication. The communication link between 
the customer, bank and the seller can be secured by for example SSL/TLS. All 
communications between the bank and the seller and between the bank and the 
customer are secured in this way. 
An anonymous communication channel between the seller and the customer 
is also assumed for our purposes. This can be implemented by Chaum's mix 
nets [3] or Mixrinion [5]. The mix network makes it harder for an adversary 
observing the network to gain any additional information about the communi- 
cating partners beyond its a priori belief. The communication channel between 
the customer and the entry point of the mix network should also be secure and 
prevent traffic analysis. Communications between the customer and the seller 
are made anonymous in this way. 
4 .3 Mathematical Assu tptio 
Our protocol depends on the difficulty to compute discrete logarithms in the 
multiplicative group Zp where P is a large prime. P should be chosen such 
that (P - 1) has one large prime factor. If (P - 1) has small prime factors then 
computing discrete logarithm is easy [7]. The bank selects A, 0o E Z, and 
ao E {1.. P - 1}. 
The customer selects generator g (mod P) and sE ZP, s is the secret key of the 
customer. We use the linear Congruential Method to generate exponents where 
the offset J6 and the modulus P are co-prime to each other. All operations 
are carried out (mod P) when not specified otherwise explicitly. The method 
we use to generate surrogates is similar to the first group signature scheme 
presented in [? ]. 
5, Pr-, (at: aco1 fo Uncoir e& ata )1e Transactions 
There are three parties in the protocol, the bank, the customer (Carol) and the 
seller. We describe the protocol in three phases: 
1. Preparation Phase 
2. Transaction Phase 
3. Synchronization Phase 
5. R ep atimi Phase 
Carol sends the bank her public key. 
1. Carol , Bank :X= g9 
The bank sends Carol the information she needs to generate her surrogates 
which is : 
2. Bank -Carol :Ö =-< u o, 
0, A }- 
4 
The bank while issuing b calculates the first surrogate the customer will be 
using as follows. 
01 = (A * Qo + Oo) (mod P- 1) 
Si = X°, 
The bank retains A for every customer where 
A= -< O, A, X, Si, a1, Pr 
5.2 Transaction Phase 
For transaction i Carol calculates her surrogate Si as well as the corresponding 
secret key in the following manner. 
u; = (A*Qt_1+Oo) (mod P-1) 
S. -=s*a; (modP-1) 
S± = 9S: 
1. Carol chooses a subset r of the public surrogates of valid customers of the 
bank. The subset agreed forms the ring or the group of probable signers. 
2. Let m be the transaction description something which uniquely identifies 
the transaction. Then Carol hashes in to get the key k as: 
k= h(m) 
3. She selects a random number v eZP. 
4. The seller picks up xl.. r for all the members of the group uniformly and 
independently from {0,1}b and sends that to Carol. She computes y=s 
from the xis as: 
Seller -+mtx 
Carol : X(l.. r) 
yt = 9i(xi) 
5. Then the customer solves F for y, 9 where F is the same combining equation 
used in ring signatures. 
Fk, 
v 
(Y1) Y2 i ... r yr) =V 
5 
6. The customer then signs m and sends it to the seller as in the original 
ring signature scheme. 
Customer -,,, ix Seller : (Si, S2,..., Sr; V; X1; x2) .... i xr) 
where Si,,, are the surrogate DH keys of the r valid customers of the bank 
who are members of the ring. 
7. The seller then verifies the signature as mentioned in section 3. While 
verifying the seller gets the Si which is the surrogate of the customer. The 
seller submits Si to the bank. The bank locates the customer account Si. 
5.3 Synchronization Phase 
We saw in the preparation phase that the bank retains the value of the first 
surrogate while issuing 0 to the customer. The bank, after it receives a surrogate 
for a customer, calculates and stores the surrogate the customer will be using for 
the next transaction. This helps the bank to locate the appropriate account after 
it receives a surrogate from the seller. The bank retains 0 for every customer 
as we have seen in the preparation phase. Both the bank and the customer uses 
the same method to generate surrogates. This enables the bank to calculate the 
correct surrogate for every customer. This calculation of surrogates is done in 
this phase. 
a; +1 = (A * a; + Ov) (mod P- 1) 
sl+i = X°i+i 
The bank replaces in A. 
Qi I' Qi+i 
Si f- Si-f1 
The bank updates its current list of valid surrogates with a new surrogate. 
6 Conclusions 
The use of various surrogates cannot be correlated with each other but at the 
same time the validity of the surrogates can be determined. It is also not 
possible for the bank to masquerade as the customer as the bank doesn't know 
s and cannot generate the private exponent. Surrogates cannot be transferred 
between customers as that requires sharing the secret key s. 
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Abstract. We live in a world where resources are rarely local and dis- 
tributed often at various locations. Designers of distributed systems generally 
use fixed credentials (key certificates) for authentication purposes, which means 
that servers can identify their clients, and can correlate their actions. An au- 
thentication mechanism based on ring signatures does not reveal the identity of 
a client to the process performing the access control decision. 
1 Introduction 
We live in a world where resources are hardly ever local but are often distributed 
across various locations. There is seldom a central authority that manages ac- 
cess to these resources. Designers of distributed systems generally use fixed cre- 
dentials (key certificates) for authentication purposes. This means that servers 
can identify their clients, and can correlate their actions. In this paper we 
present an alternative authentication mechanism for distributed systems, using 
the Globe [21 object based distributed system, which does not reveal the identity 
of a client to the process performing the access control decision. We discuss our 
approach using a case study of an electronic newspaper. 
Globe is a wide area distributed system where objects are physically shared 
between users and also physically replicated at several locations. The principal 
construct in Globe is a Distributed Shared Object (DSO) which consists several 
local objects residing in local address spaces. The local objects storing a part 
of a DSO's state are known as replicas. A replica consists of the following 
subob j ects: 
" Semantics subobject, which is the only subobject written by the applica- 
tion developer, contains the code that implements the DSO. 
" Communication subobject is responsible for communication between local 
objects residing at local address spaces. 
" Replication subobject is responsible for keeping the replica's state consis- 
tent with the other replicas. 
" Control subobject is responsible for taking care of the invocations from 
the client process on the host. 
" Security subobject is responsible for implementing the security policies of 
the DSO. 
For invoking a method on a DSO a user has to create a local object in his/her 
own address space and this object often acts as a proxy routing requests to 
appropriate replicas. The Globe Location Service facilitates finding of replicas. 
A user willing to run a replica or a user proxy needs a Globe Object Server in 
his/her computer either stand alone or integrated with other application. 
A distributed system like Globe presents lots of interesting problems but 
in this paper we will concentrate on access control. The current proposals by 
the developers [2] of Globe are based on certificates issued by the DSO owner 
and follows a role based authorisation model. We present here an alternative 
authorisation model which preserves the privacy of the requestor but at the 
same time satisfies the requirements like verifiability and unforgeability. 
2 Access Control in Globe 
In order to specify the security policies of the DSO its owner must identify all 
the meaningful roles of that object. This involves careful examination of the 
application concerned, which is outside the scope of this paper. Once the user 
role set is identified for an object then with each user role is associated a bit 
vector indicating the methods the role is allowed to execute. Grouping the bit 
vectors for all the roles of a particular object forms the access control matrix 
for the DSO. This matrix is stored in the security subobject and when a replica 
is created it gets the matrix from the owner of the DSO. When a role wants 
to invoke a method on an object the security subobject consults this matrix to 
verify whether or not this role is allowed to invoke this particular method. 
The DSO owners sign certificates binding users to their public key, this 
certificate is then used by the user to authenticate while requesting access. If 
there are users with the power to delegate then the security subobject verifies 
the chain of certificates till the one signed by the DSO owner. The replicas on 
the other hand also authenticate to the user and the replica and the user can 
start talking to each other after they have authenticated to each other. Replicas 
authenticate themselves to the user using replica certificates issued by the DSO 
owner. 
The problem of using fixed credentials by the user to authenticate him- 
self/herself arises from the fact that an adversary can correlate all the actions 
of any particular user. This will leak information about any user's online ac- 
tivities to an adversary which can be used in a way harmful to the user. We 
present an alternative authentication model here in this paper where by an user 
can authenticate himself/herself to the replica anonymously and an adversary 
cannot correlate all the actions of any user. This we believe is new because 
previous approaches to authentication rely on fixed credentials. Similarly trust 
management systems like Keynote [4] make decisions based on fixed credentials 
and policies. Our approach doesn't require significant change from the way we 
do authentications at present. The trust management systems can be queried 
using the surrogates [5,6] one uses in our approach and decisions can be made 
based on fixed policies. We talk about surrogates in the next section. 
3 Design Goals 
In our approach we view principals as members of a group which may be a subset 
of all the members of a particular role. To access a resource the requestor has 
to prove that he/she is a member of the group that is allowed access to the 
requested resource. For example if an electronic newspaper wishes to allow only 
its subscribers to read the paper and there is a DSO modelling the electronic 
newspaper then in the Globe proposal the DSO owner would create a role of 
subscriber and issue certificates to paid subscribers. The paid subscribers in 
turn would authenticate themselves to the replica using their certificate and 
access the newspaper. 
In our approach subcribers just prove that they are valid subscribers with- 
out revealing their key certificates. The DSO owner doesn't need to issue key 
certificates using our approach. The subscribers authenticate themselves as 
member of a group of valid subscribers. In the alternative we propose here 
the subscribers have an offline identity which is their public key and an online 
identity which is their surrogate generated from the parent public key.. The 
surrogate has a corresponding secret key like the parent public key. This secret 
value is generated from the secret key corresponding to the parent public key 
and together the public surrogate and its corresponding secret value forms the 
surrogate pair. The surrogate pair for a public private key pair can only be 
generated and used by the legitimate owner of the corresponding parent public 
key. In our approach while authenticating the user doesn't need to reveal its 
surrogate to the replica. 
However the DSO owner can correlate the public value of the surrogate with 
the parent public key. The DSO owner can never masquerade as the owner of the 
public key as the DSO owner doesn't have the knowledge of the corresponding 
secret key. Our approach also allows delegation of credentials contrary to the 
popular belief that non-trarisferrability is a must for anonymous transaction 
systems. If a subscriber wants to allow someone to read the newspaper using 
his/her credentials he/she can always lend his/her surrogate pair. The delegatee 
however cannot calculate the secret key from the public and private values of the 
current surrogate. So learning one pair of surrogates doesn't help an attacker 
in any way. In non anonymous systems if the private key corresponding to the 
parent public key is compromised then there comes a need for revocation of keys. 
In our approach the legitimate owner, in the event of leakage of the secret part 
of a surrogate pair, just needs to generate another surrogate pair but doesn't 
need to revoke his/her parent public and private key pair. 
4 The Protocol 
The existence of a secure anonymous communication channel between the cus- 
tomer and the DSO owner is assumed for our purposes. A anonymous commu- 
nication channel [3] between the client and the replica is also assumed for our 
purposes. The protocol is based on ring signatures designed by Ron Rivest, Adi 
Shamir and Yeal Tauinan [1]. They call a set of possible signers a ring. One of 
the members of the ring actually signs using his/her own private key and the 
public keys of the other members. In this signature scheme the verifier doesn't 
learn who the signer is but can only learn that the signer is a member of a 
certain group of possible signers. In producing such a signature the signatory 
doesn't need the co-operation of any other member of the group. They don't 
even have to agree to be in the group. All the signer needs to know is the public 
keys of all the members of the group. 
In our example a valid subscriber creates a signature using the public surro- 
gates of the other subscribers and in doing so the signer doesn't need the active 
cooperation of the other subscribers. The replica verifies the signature and if 
the signature is valid then the verifier is sure that the signature was generated 
by a valid ring member without knowing the actual online identity of the signer. 
The online identity of the signer is his/her surrogate and it is hard to deduce 
the offline identity (which is the parent public key from which is the surrogate is 
generated) of the subscriber from his/her online identity. The transaction flow 
can be outlined as: 
1. A customer, Cathy, registers with the DSO owner as a subscriber. This 
registration requires Cathy to prove that she owns the corresponding secret 
key. 
2. The DSO owner prepares and sends the information Cathy needs to gen- 
erate her surrogate pair. 
During the protocol run: 
1. Cathy authenticates to the replica that she is a valid subscriber using her 
surrogates. 
2. On authentication by Cathy to the replica as well as by the replica to 
Cathy she is allowed access to the electronic newspaper. 
Every time Cathy authenticates herself to a replica that she does so using ring 
signatures which preserves her privacy and at the same time the replica is also 
satisfied that the signer is a valid subscriber. 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper we have presented an alternative authentication model for dis- 
tributed systems which is particularly useful for situations where all the mem- 
bers of a particular role have the same level of permissions and access priviledges. 
The signature in our approach can only be generated by legitimate parties and 
someone who is not a subscriber cannot gain access to the newspaper without 
the active collusion of a paid subscriber. 
Our approach also makes the problem of delegation easier. A delegator who 
doesn't use surrogates to authenticate needs to share his/her secret key with the 
delegatee but in our approach the delegator only shares surrogates. Learning 
one pair of surrogates doesn't help an attacker in any way. 
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1 Introduction 
The Internet is conducive to large scale privacy invasion, identity theft [7], and 
target marketing [10]. When we buy goods or services or simply surf online we 
end up giving out lots of information about ourselves. All this information goes 
into databases somewhere and records can be linked together to build a complete 
dossier on an individual [7]. Thieves can steal credit card information and 
use it, terrorists can track their targets using government maintained address 
records, servers can leak sensitive information about us: in many instances 
people have suffered damage due to the malicious use of sensitive information [1, 
2]. When we pay for goods using our credit card we present our card (which is 
the payment token) along with our identity (we provide our name and address for 
authorization on the Internet). This information is used to check the validity 
of the card and the creditworthiness of the customer. What happens in the 
process is that the merchant, in the case of online shopping, also obtains a 
unique identifier (the credit card number) which as well as learning the credit 
card number enables the merchant to correlate various transactions conducted 
under the same credit card. The problem is that we do not have a clue about 
how information about us would be used by the entities at the other end of 
the communication channel. Customer information can be indexed using credit 
card numbers-or. they can be sold to marketing companies [10]. To deal with 
this threat to individual privacy in the networked world methods to preserve 
anonymity were proposed in various scientific literature some of which we discuss 
below in section 2. 
We present a protocol for uncorrelatable electronic transactions using pay- 
ment tokens and surrogates. The payment tokens and surrogates satisfies the 
properties like uncorrelatability, unforgeability and verifiability. This paper is 
organized as follows. In section 2 we present an account of some previous re- 
search in this area. This is followed in section 3 by what we mean by surrogates 
and how we intend to use them in the protocol for uncorrelatable electronic 
transactions presented in this paper. Section 4 gives an overview of our design 
goals and assumptions. The main contribution of this paper is presented in 
section 5, which is followed in section 6 by conclusions. 
2 PIeV1cU5 WOnk 
Idemix [5] is a anonymous credential management system which allows the user 
to be anonymous to the credential issuing organization. In this system there 
has to be a global pseudonym authority which issues pseudonyms to individual 
users and a trusted party through which all transactions are carried out. 
In the anonymous credential management system proposed by Syverson et. 
al. [15] users get credentials which can be used only once. After every transaction 
the user has to go back to the issuer to obtain another credential. 
There is another approach by the name of Independent Unbiased Trust En- 
tities. These trust entities hold all sensitive information pertaining to the users 
and then issue them with one time payment tokens to the users. Such systems 
depend more on self regulation and also participate directly in dispute resolu- 
tion [11]. Trust entities are never a reasonable approach as any centrally stored 
information can be abused. Most attacks on centrally stored information are by 
insiders and not outsiders [1], 
The approach we present in this paper is different from the above mentioned 
approaches. First of all we do not propose another credential management 
system. We use surrogates (short lived electronic identities) [8] which are 
generated from a parent (credit card number in this case). In our approach 
users are not anonymous to the issuer as in idemix. We also do not depend 
on a global pseudonym authority. Deployment of a system like idemix we feel 
difficult as the users, credential issuers and verifiers are all required to be part 
of the system. David Chaum [i] and Stefan Brands [4] proposed protocols 
which use digital cash. The payment tokens we present here are not the digital 
equivalent of cash. Double spending is against the interest of the customer 
but for our system double spending is not against the interest of the bank. 
To preserve its anonymity customers should refrain from reusing their payment 
tokens. Since all payments are verified so double spending can also be detected in 
our protocol. The approach we present here doesn't require the users to contact 
the issuer for new payment tokens after every transaction. The anonymous 
credential management systems emphasize on non-transferability. This we feel 
is not desirable where we need delegations. For example James might allow his 
son to use his credit card but make sure that he cannot use it more than once. 
Using our protocol controlled delegation can be achieved but at the same time 
stealing someone's credential is not going to help the thief in any way. 
3 Surrogates 
Surrogates are transient numbers generated from a parent number (such as a 
bank account number, credit card number, or social security number) by some 
mathematical function. They are used to preserve the anonymity of the holder 
of the parent number. Surrogates have some intrinsic limitations due to the way 
they are generated and the purpose they are used for. If they are not verified at 
the point when they are used then random numbers can be passed as surrogates. 
Although one could use a probabilistic verification model to counter the threat 
of fake surrogates, for the purposes of the present paper we assume the issuing 
authority to be online. 
There is another party in this whole system: the one who accepts the surro- 
gates in exchange of goods or services. The acceptor of surrogates bears the risk 
of fake surrogates [3]. Moreover the power to verify individual surrogates cannot 
be delegated to. the acceptors. We feel that this is the difference between blinded 
credentials and the way we generate surrogates here. Blinded credentials can 
be verified by the acceptor if the acceptor knows the public key of the issuer. 
To verify the surrogates the verifier has to know the mathematical function as 
well as the input (which is the parent number) to the functions. If the power 
to verify individual surrogates is delegated to the acceptors (i. e. acceptors are 
given the inputs) then the whole purpose of having surrogates is compromised. 
Credit cards are verified in the real world by a process in which the card 
issuing bank is involved. The Point of Sale (PoS) terminal first contacts the 
issuer. The card issuer verifies that the PoS has a valid merchant account and 
then verifies the card information. The issuer verifies that the card is valid 
i. e. not revoked and the card balance when added to the current purchase is 
not over the approved limit. Then an authorization decision is conveyed to the 
merchant. The merchant might ask for other form of authentication from the 
customer like signature of the customer etc [? ]. For our protocol we assume 
the issuer to be online similar to the credit card authorization infrastructure 
mentioned above. 
4 Design Goals and Assumptions 
4.1 Design Goals 
We present a protocol for Uncorrelatable Electronic Transaction (UET) where 
we use payment tokens and surrogates. Our approach makes it hard for an 
adversary to Correlate all the transactions conducted by the same customer. At 
the same time the merchant and the bank can verify the validity of the payment 
token. The transaction flow is outlined by means of an example as: 
1. The customer Carol requests payment tokens from her bank. 
2. The bank prepares and sends the information Carol needs to generate her 
payment tokens and surrogates. 
3. Carol goes to a website selling goods she wants to purchase. 
4. Carol generates the payment tokens and surrogates. 
5. The seller authenticates locally whether or not Carol is the legitimate 
owner of the surrogate. 
6. Carol pays with her payment tokens which the seller validates with the 
bank. 
The next time Carol goes to shop with the same seller she uses different 
surrogates and payment tokens which can be verified as before but cannot be 
correlated with a previous surrogate or payment token. Our motivation has 
been that Carol trusts her bank which is quite a practical thing to do. By 
combining a surrogate key with features from the information checking protocol 
we are able to produce an anonymous payment protocol that helps preserve the 
privacy of the customer as well as assures the merchant of their money. 
4.2 Cryptographic and Infrastructural Assumptions 
We assume the existence of a secure authenticated communication channel be- 
tween the bank and the seller and between the bank and the customer. This can 
be implemented by digital signatures where every communication between the 
bank and the customer and the bank and the seller are digitally signed. This 
provides authentication. The communication link between the customer, bank 
and the seller can be secured by for example SSL/TLS. All communications 
between the bank and the seller and between the bank and the customer are 
secured by SSL/TLS and are denoted by ---i in the protocol. 
An anonymous communication channel between the seller and the customer 
is also assumed for our purposes. This can be implemented by Chaum's mix 
nets [6] or Mixminion [9]. The mix network makes it harder for an adversary 
observing the network to gain any additional information about the communi- 
cating partners beyond its a priori belief. The communication channel between 
the customer and the entry point of the mix network should also be secure 
and prevent traffic analysis. Communications over the mix nets are denoted by 
-+,,, in our protocol. 
4.3 Mathematical Assumptions 
Our protocol. depends on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms in the 
multiplicative group Zp where P is a large prime. P should be chosen such that 
(P-1) has *one large prime factor. If (P-1) has small prime factors then comput- 
ing discrete logarithm is easy [12]. We know that Zp has c5(P - 1) primitive 
roots [? ]. The bank selects generators So, B0, Yo (mod P) and ro, OQ, Or E Zp 
and oo E {1.. P - 1}. 
The customer selects generator g (mod P) and sE Zf,, s is the secret key of 
the customer. We use the Linear Congruential Method to generate exponents 'r; 
and o where the offsets Oa and 0, and the modulus are co-prime to each other. 
All operations are carried out modulo P when not specified otherwise explic- 
itly. rrs and o are the exponents used for generating the tokens and surrogates 
respectively. A is the constant used in the Linear Congruential Method. 
5 The Protocol 
There are three parties in the protocol, the bank, the customer and the seller. 
The bank is online and the seller communicates with the bank for authorization 
decisions. The bank selects So, B0 and Yo and shares with the customer only 
B0. The seller knows none of these values. On the other hand only the customer 
knows s which is not known either to the bank or the seller. The Protocol is 
described under three sections namely 
1. Preparation 
2. Transaction 
3. Synchronization 
5.1 Preparation Phase 
Our protocol builds on a new tool called Information Checking which was first 
proposed in [141. The bank in our protocol selects So, B0 and Yo and generates 
the subsequent Si, B; and Y values. For each set of Si, Bi and Y values 
generated the bank calculates 
Ci=SI+B; *Y (mod P) 
The payment token that the customer presents consists of the Bi and C= cor- 
responding to a particular Si and Y; value (known to the bank). The bank 
verifies the equation. The customer cannot generate fake B and C values as 
he/she has no knowledge of the corresponding S and Y values. During the 
preparation phase the customer first sends the bank its public key. 
1. Customer--+ Bank :X=9' 
So that the customer doesn't need to communicate with the bank for every 
single transaction the bank prepares m payment tokens. It sends customer only 
the C values`all ng with the information t it needs to prepare the corresponding 
B values' and the surrogates (which are generated from X). Only the bank 
can generate the S and Y values. 
2. Bank -+ Customer :A= -< Cl..,,,, Bo, uo, To, OQ, Oz, A, P> 
The bank calculates the batch of C values by repeating the following for each 
of the next in values of i: 
Tt = (A * Ti_, + Or) 
Si = Söi 
Bi = Boy 
Y_i0 
C; =Si +B; *Y 
During the preparation phase the bank also generates the surrogate Ki the 
customer will be using in its first transaction. We will see later that the bank 
always stores the surrogate the customer will be using next. When the seller 
submits the customer information for authorization to the bank the bank locates 
the proper customer information using this surrogate. 
Qi = (A * vo + 0, ) (mod P- 1) 
K1+=X" 
At the end of this phase the bank does not retain all the S, Y and B values 
but only the initial generators To and of values, and the offsets and the constant 
A to generate subsequent a and i- values. The bank retains the information r 
which is: 
r= -< So, Bo, Yo, O , 
OT, A, Ki , ai1To, X, P > 
The Ki , rl, and To values will change after every transaction and is shown 
in the Synchronization phase. 
5.2 Transaction Phase 
For transaction i the customer calculates its ith surrogate Ki . The corre- 
sponding private exponent Ki of the current surrogate is also generated by the 
customer. 
(A * a; _i + 
O, ) (mod P- 1) 
Ifi- =s*o; (modP-1) 
K =g" 
The exponent rr used to generate the B; for the current transactions is calcu- 
lated by the customer from the information provided by the bank and using 
the exponent used for generating Bi_1 (except for B1). Then the Bi value is 
calculated. 
ri=(A*Ti_1+OT) 
Bi = Bo 
The seller generates a transaction description T and sends the customer signed 
with the seller's private key K9e«er. T is agreed between both the seller and the 
customer. If the customer wants to pay the customer authenticates to the seller 
that it is the legitimate owner of the current surrogate by signing the transaction 
description T. T typically includes date, sequence number, details of the seller, 
and the amount to be paid. Along with the signed transaction description the 
customer sends the seller the ith payment tokens and the current surrogate. 
1. Seller -,,, Customer : [T]K_«<, 
2. Customer --),,, Seller : [T]K-, K; , Bi, 
C. 
The seller contacts the bank, the bank locates the appropriate customer with 
the help of the surrogate. We have mentioned in the preparation phase that 
the bank calculates in advance the surrogate a particular customer will be using 
next. This is done by the bank during the synchronisation phase at the end of 
every transaction. For the first transaction the bank retains the value of the 
first surrogate while issuing the tokens. The bank calculates the corresponding 
S and Y value and solves the equation C; = Si + B= * Y, " for transaction i.. If 
the equation is satisfied by the B and C values presented by the customer the 
bank agrees to the transaction. This process ensures that the seller receives his 
payment. 
3. Seller --r Bank : -< Kt, [T]K-, Bi, C; }- 
4. Bank -* Seller : -{ T, authorizationDecision >- 
Our protocol allows for one time delegation of payment tokens which might be 
desirable in some situations. A user James can allow his son to use his credit 
card but make sure that he cannot use it more than once. James can do it by 
lending a set consisting of -< Kt , 
K: - , BZ, C. >- to his son. 
His son cannot figure 
out his secret key s from either Kt or Kt. 
5.3 Synchronization Phase 
This phase doesn't involve any communication between the bank and the cus- 
tomer or between the bank and the seller. During this phase the bank updates 
the record for the customer whose transaction request was last approved. The 
surrogate the customer will be using for the next transaction is calculated in 
this phase. For this the bank needs to calculate the proper exponent which can 
be done from the exponent that was used to generate the last surrogate using 
the Linear Congruential Method. The bank also generates the exponent that it 
will use to calculate the next S and Y value for the B and C value the customer 
will submit during the next transaction. Customer records are updated by the 
bank by replacing the current surrogate with the new surrogate and the old 7 
value is replaced with the new r value. The bank calculates the following. 
ai+i = (A * ui + Oa) (mod P- 1) 
rr+l = (A * Ti + OT) 
Ki+i = X°; +I 
The bank replaces in A. 
Qi Qi+l 
Ti t-- Ti+l 
Ki r-- Ki+l 
6 Conclusions 
The surrogates cannot be correlated with each other neither can the surrogates 
be linked to a parent. The payment tokens cannot be forged. The customer 
has no knowledge of S and Y corresponding to aB and C. The customers can 
generate several private and public key pairs from a single parent public and 
private key pair. Since there are no fixed credentials correlation is not possible 
using our protocol. We do not need any hierarchical pseudonym authority as 
in idernix. The customers can generate their pseudonyms locally and do not 
need to contact the issuer after every transaction. This protocol we believe is 
simpler than the credential management systems both in terms of set up and de- 
ployment. Previous credential management systems stressed non-transferability 
which we also do but in a more flexible way. There might be situations when 
controlled delegation is desirable and these are supported by our protocol. We 
agree that this flexibility is not good for credentials like a driving license or 
a prescription but that requirement can be achieved with small modifications 
to our protocol. In our protocol the customer's privacy is protected and the 
merchant doesn't lose money. There are other applications where we can use 
this protocol. Role based access control we feel is an application where we can 
use this protocol. In some other applications trustworthiness of communicating 
partners are established using certificates, a good example of which is the Globe 
System [13]. Globe is also an application where we can use our protocol. 
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